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Abstract 
While disasters are becoming larger, more complex and more frequent, traditional 
emergency management response capacities are not increasing at the same rate.  Sensor 
capabilities could fill this gap by providing improved situational awareness, or intelligence, for 
emergency managers.  Data from sensors is increasing exponentially in quality and quantity 
while the cost of capturing and processing these data is decreasing. This creates immense 
opportunities to bring sensor data into emergency management practices. 
Unfortunately, not all sensors are created equal. The accuracy, precision, presentation and 
timeliness of data varies depending on the source, the way the product is structured and who 
produces it. It is therefore difficult for emergency managers to incorporate sensor data into 
decision making, particularly when they have not seen the data type before, and do not know 
where it originated, or how to use.  
This thesis researches how data product creators can tailor products to increase the 
likelihood of their product being incorporated in emergency management decision making. It 
focuses on the issue of data product uptake, which is inclusion of data products in decision 
making processes. This issue has been poorly covered in the existing literature. 
This thesis synthesises literature from a range of disciplines then designs and conducts 
three targeted studies to build upon this knowledge. The first study compares four international 
data systems which use the same data source but make different choices in the design of their 
products, this then provides examples of the impacts of these design choices. The second study 
looks at disaster inquiries in Australia to consider how sensor data has been used in decision 
making in the past, and what lessons have been learnt from these experiences. The third study 
surveys Australian emergency managers to collect their views on what products they use, trust 
and what factors lead to that trust.  
The results from these studies combine to create a comprehensive collection of design 
choices available to data product creators. This collection covers not just technical choices like 
accuracy, but also presentational and data policy choices, to create a more holistic picture of 
how creators can influence their products. The collection is then presented in a framework 
which, if applied throughout product development, would be expected to increase uptake of 
sensor data in emergency management decision making. Design choices and user-oriented 
design processes are emphasised as a crucially important yet poorly-examined aspect of data 
uptake in emergency management. 
This thesis finds that trust is key to whether emergency managers use a product or not, and 
that trust is created through a series of design choices which can be grouped into quality, 
reputation, maturity and data policy.  
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Glossary 
Accuracy—degree to which information on a map or in a digital database 
[or remotely sensed image] matches true or accepted values. Accuracy 
pertains to the quality of data and the number of errors contained in a 
dataset or map (Open Geospatial Consortium 2013). 
Acquisition—process of observing an object or feature using a remote 
sensor (B. A. Harrison and Jupp 1989). 
Adoption— total amount of usage inclusive of uptake. 
Awareness—familiarity with a given product or item. 
Crisis—a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values 
and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain 
circumstances necessitates making vital decisions (Rosenthal, Charles, and 
Hart 1989). 
Data—symbols; discrete, unorganised and unprocessed objective facts or 
observations that represent properties of objects, events and environments. 
Data do not convey any specific meaning and are of no use until they are 
processed into a form relevant to a particular application (Ackoff 1989). 
Dataset—a collection of data. 
Data Adoption Framework—a set of tools and or advice on how to target a 
given data type to a specific audience. 
Data product—a dataset which has been packaged to maximise the 
likelihood that it will be useful to a given audience. 
Design choice—a decision taken by a product creator which influences how 
a product is received or used.  
Disaster management—social processes for designing, implementing, and 
evaluating strategies, policies, and measures that promote and improve 
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery practices at different 
organizational and societal levels (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2012). 
Disaster—situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating 
a request to national or international level for external assistance; An 
unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction 
and human suffering (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
2012b). 
Earth Observation—Gathering information about the Earth using Remote 
Sensing technologies (B. A. Harrison and Jupp 1989). 
Emergency management—a range of measures to manage risks to 
communities and the environment.  The organisation and management of 
resources for dealing with all aspects of emergencies. Emergency 
management involves the plans, structures and arrangements which are 
established to bring together the normal endeavours of government, 
voluntary and private agencies in a comprehensive and coordinated way to 
xxiv 
 
 
deal with the whole spectrum of emergency needs including prevention, 
response and recovery (Emergency Management Australia 1998). 
Emergency—sudden and usually unforeseen event that calls for immediate 
measures to minimise its adverse consequences (Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters 2012b). 
Hazard— The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical 
event that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as 
damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, 
and environmental resources (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2012). 
Image—collection of continuous coverage data, usually from sampling at 
regular, discrete locations (Open Geospatial Consortium 2013). 
Information—data that are processed to be useful; contained in 
descriptions, and answers to questions that begin with such words as who, 
what, when and how many. The difference between data and information 
relates to function rather than structure. Information is inferred from data 
and frequently includes metadata (Ackoff 1989). 
Interpretation—process of interpreting the measurable properties of an 
observed object (that is the converted Remote Sensing observation) in terms 
of a specific application using a pre-defined structure model (B. A. Harrison 
and Jupp 1989). 
Knowledge—application of data and information; answers how style 
questions (Ackoff 1989). 
Map—two-dimensional visual portrayal of geospatial data, as opposed to 
the data itself (Open Geospatial Consortium 2013). 
Measurement—an observation that results in a numeric quantity. For 
example, height is both a measurement and observation whereas smell is an 
observation but not a measurement (Fowler 1997). A measurement usually 
refers to the measuring device and procedure used to determine the value, 
such as a sensor or observer, analytical procedure, simulation or other 
numerical process (B. A. Harrison and Jupp 1989). 
Metadata—data that describes other data, such as the co-ordinate 
framework in space and time for measurement dimensions; documentation of 
data to enable managers or users to understand, compare and interchange 
the content of a dataset (Open Geospatial Consortium 2013). 
Observation—a self-describing act associated with a discrete time instant or 
period through which a number, term or other symbol is assigned to a 
phenomenon. It involves application of a specified ‘procedure’, such as a 
sensor, instrument, algorithm or process chain. An observation enables the 
value of a property of some feature to be estimated (Cox et al. 2010). 
Precision—level of measurement and exactness of description of dataset. 
Measurements may be precise, but not accurate, due to errors in data 
acquisition or handling (Open Geospatial Consortium 2013). 
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Processing—process of converting Remote Sensing observations to a 
measurable property of the observed object using a pre-defined 
measurement model (B. A. Harrison and Jupp 1989). 
Remote sensing—making measurements of an object using a device that is 
physically remote from it, such as a camera (B. A. Harrison and Jupp 1989). 
Risk—Expected losses (of lives, persons injured, property damaged and 
economic activity disrupted) due to a particular hazard for a given area and 
reference period. Based on mathematical calculations, risk is likelihood of 
the hazard plus the consequence of the hazard plus the assets which are 
exposed (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2012b; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2012). 
Sensor—a device which captures data. Inclusive of Remote Sensing and 
Earth Observation  but not necessarily Earth related (B. A. Harrison and 
Jupp 1989). 
Sensor Web—networked collection of sensors that can be remotely read 
and/or controlled (Open Geospatial Consortium 2013). 
Trust—the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995). 
Uptake—inclusion of a product as evidence within a decision. In the context 
of this thesis the inclusion of a sensor data product as evidence contributing 
to emergency management decision making. 
Usage—the number of times a product or item has been accessed for any 
purpose. For the purpose of clarity in this thesis usage is not inclusive of 
uptake. 
Variable—attribute or physical characteristic of object being observed that 
is required for end use of the remotely sensed data (B. A. Harrison and Jupp 
1989). 
Wisdom—evaluated understanding (Ackoff 1989). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Contextual prologue 
On the 7th of February 2009 Australia suffered its worst natural disaster in modern history. 
With the loss of 173 lives from bushfires across Victoria, this day became known as Black 
Saturday. Of the many fires which burnt that day the most catastrophic was the Kilmore East 
fire which resulted in 119 deaths, 1,242 homes destroyed and 125,383 hectares burnt (Country 
Fire Authority 2012). 
Despite the severity of the fires, little data from sensors, such as satellites, planes or 
smartphones was provided to, or used by, frontline personnel. The testimony in the royal 
commission which followed highlighted this concern. The Kinglake West Fire Brigade were at 
the centre of the response to the fire.  The Brigade’s second lieutenant, Ms Karen Barrow 
described:  
 “We had no more intelligence than the average resident… I was making 
uninformed decisions that could have led to further loss of life—both 
members of the public and crew.” (Teague, McLeod, and Pascoe 2010, 84) 
Further, what information was available, from the Country Fire Authority’s own 
surveillance flights and reports, proved inaccessible:  
“…a liaison officer appointed to the Yarra Ranges MECC was unable to log 
on to an ‘overloaded’ CFA computer system. The liaison officer was thus 
unable to provide information to allow the MECC to ‘track the fires and 
forward plan’.” (Teague, McLeod, and Pascoe 2010, 85) 
The result was that “Between 12:40 and 14:25 no information about the Kilmore East fire 
was posted to the CFA website” (Teague, McLeod, and Pascoe 2010, 85). The fire began at 
11:45 with the first casualty reported at 17:00 (Teague, McLeod, and Pascoe 2010, 73).  
Between the beginning of the fire and the first report of a casualty, three satellites capable 
of fire mapping passed over the fire ground: Kompsat-2 at 11:54:30, RapidEye-4 at 12:03:30 
and Aqua at 15:51:30 (CEOS 2015). The Aqua pass was collected by Geoscience Australia who 
processed the data into fire hotspots, shown in Figure 1 (Geoscience Australia 2015). The 
Kompsat-2 data was acquired by the Korean government who provided it to Geoscience 
Australia after the event (Hudson and Mueller 2009), and the RapidEye-4 satellite did not turn 
on the camera to image the disaster (Rapideye 2015). 
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Figure 1: Satellite derived hotspots on the Sentinel hotspots system from the 
Aqua pass at 15:51:30 on 7 February 2009 in the Kinglake area with Google 
imagery background (Geoscience Australia 2015). 
The data that was captured and published was in high demand. Figure 2 shows a dramatic 
usage spike from an average usage of around 300,000 hits per day on Geoscience Australia’s 
Sentinel hotspots system, to 5.2 million hits on Black Saturday.  
 
 
Figure 2: Levels of usage of the Sentinel hotspots website during January and 
February 2009 (Hudson and Mueller 2009). 
Despite these statistics, it remains unclear whether this sensor data had any effect on 
emergency management decision making. This prologue serves to illustrate the relevance and 
topicality of this research and raises several questions which set the context for this thesis. 
Could more have been done to capture and process timely sensor data? Why was the data 
available not incorporated into emergency management decision making? How can sensor data 
be retrieved, processed, packaged and distributed to maximise its utility in emergency 
management decision making? 
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1.2 The problem statement 
In 2010, 385 natural disasters killed more than 297,000 people, affected over 217 million 
people and caused over $120 billion in economic damage worldwide (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). 
With increasing population, urbanisation and climate change the frequency, intensity, spatial 
extent, duration and complexity of natural and human induced disasters is only set to increase 
during the 21st century (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2012; Handmer and 
Dovers 2013). These increases will have dramatic political, social and economic effects. This 
makes emergency management capabilities central to global security, prosperity and well-being. 
Since the invention of the microprocessor, sensors monitor all aspects of our environment. 
Sensors, devices designed to capture data, are becoming cheaper and more numerous, at the 
same time as their capabilities are rapidly growing, enabling more frequent measurements, finer 
resolution and faster processing. For example, in 2015 the World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO) monitors, through sensors, 260 processes on the Earth purely related to the weather and 
climate (WMO 2015). Separately, it is argued that by 2020 over 50 billion sensing devices are 
expected to be connected to the Internet (Swan 2012). Due to the number of satellites being 
launched, the satellite imaging sector alone is expected to more than double within a decade 
growing from $2.1 billion in 2013 to $5.1 billion by 2023 (North Sky Research 2014).  Climate 
sensor data is projected to grow from less than five petabytes in size in 2010 to over 350 
petabytes in 2030 (Overpeck et al. 2011). In 2014, the 10 day weather forecast was as accurate 
as the 5 day weather forecast was in 1980 in large part due to the addition of satellite 
measurements (ECMWF 2014). We are arguably witnessing the coming of age of sensor data as 
the quality, quantity and speed of sensor data increase faster than ever before. 
Yet, disasters are becoming more difficult to manage with a frequency and complexity that 
often overwhelms local and international responses. This thesis contends that using sensor data 
to map, model and monitor disasters in detail and in real time, can vastly increase the 
information available about the disaster. This could produce a step-change improvement in 
emergency management capabilities. Boin et al. (2005) support this contention, arguing that 
sensor data is one of the few means of reducing complexity of modern disasters. The 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2005) in their World Disaster 
Report have gone as far as to say, “when disaster strikes, access to information is equally 
important as access to food and water”.  Sensor data can provide information on: the detection 
of hazards; monitoring of hazards or disasters; monitoring of the response; monitoring of the 
recovery; and modelling the potential impacts of each of these areas. All of these types of 
information can inform emergency management decision making, reducing complexity and 
increasing situational awareness.  
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The challenge is how to channel these large quantities of data into useful products. As it 
stands, much of the sensor data created about the world is not used. Every second, millions of 
observations are captured from sensors measuring a range of processes occurring on, above or 
below the Earth’s surface (WMO 2009).  Yet much of this data is not requested, never 
processed or not analysed for use in decision making processes. For example in 2008, Chinese 
satellite ground reception stations downlinked 369,100 satellite images, however only 13,600 
images or 3.7% were ordered by users, with even less reaching the desired decision makers 
(Zhang 2011). Although these statistics vary across sensor, location and application, it is fair to 
say that sensor data is not being used to its full potential. 
While there is a significant body of research on the technical aspects of processing sensor 
data, this thesis focuses on a more fundamental puzzle: how can sensor data creator’s process 
and package sensor data so that it will be most useful in decision making, in this case, 
emergency management decision making. 
Like all products, data products can vary greatly and there are innumerable options for how 
to design a product for a given audience. These ‘design choices’ are particularly difficult to 
understand and prioritise for data products, given the relatively new and virtual nature of these 
products. Every day, new sensors are designed and launched which provide society more 
information about the world than ever before. Every day, new algorithms are created which 
allow the calculation of phenomenon in the world to increasingly higher accuracies. Every day, 
new standards are created to help improve the speed, security, interoperability and consistency 
of these sensors. When designing a new data product or updating an old product, these 
multitude of potential improvements or design choices make it difficult to prioritise what to 
implement first.  
While many have claimed that the vast quantities of sensor data at our disposal will 
improve emergency management decision making (Lorincz et al. 2004; F. Wang and Yuan 
2010; Alamdar, Kalantari, and Rajabifard 2014), no literature to date has stepped outside the 
technical domain and fleshed out how products can be best tailored to improve decision making.  
This thesis explores the research question, “How can sensor data products be designed to 
maximise their uptake in emergency management decision making processes in Australia?” In 
the context of this thesis, uptake is the active consideration of a sensor data product within 
decision making. Uptake is a step beyond just usage or awareness, which ensures a focus on the 
end result – supporting improved decision making during disasters.  
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1.3 Research aim and questions 
The aim of this research is to answer the core research question, “How can sensor data 
products be designed to maximise their uptake in emergency management decision making 
processes in Australia?” 
To answer the core research question of the thesis the following sub questions are posed: 
1. How is sensor data being used in the Australian emergency management sector? 
2. What do emergency managers believe are the impediments and opportunities to 
greater inclusion of sensor data products in emergency management decision 
making processes? 
3. What choices can sensor data product creators make to change how a product is 
received by emergency managers? 
4. What recommendations can be made to sensor data product creators targeting 
emergency management uptake? 
1.4 Key terms used in this thesis 
This thesis’s scope is limited to sensor data. Sensor data, for the purpose of this thesis, are 
raw observations from a device designed to capture data. This includes satellite images, thermal 
data from planes, depth soundings from a boat, seismic waves from a seismometer and location 
information from a tweet. 
This research maintains a clear distinction between the following key terms adoption, 
awareness, usage and uptake. Awareness is the familiarity with a given product or item. Usage 
is the number of times a product or item has been accessed or used. Uptake is the inclusion of a 
product as evidence within a decision. For the purpose of clarity, usage is not inclusive of 
uptake. Finally, adoption is the total amount of usage inclusive of uptake. 
In addition to these key definitions, the Glossary and Terms section in the preliminaries of 
this thesis lists a collection of definitions. Chapter two further explores terms used in the 
emergency management and sensor data fields as relevant to this thesis.  
1.5 Audience, scope and limitations 
The primary audience of this thesis is sensor data acquisition and value adding researchers 
and practitioners, otherwise known as sensor data product creators. This research is relevant to 
policy makers, emergency managers and researchers, but its findings really are targeted at 
people who develop sensor data products. 
Government, the private sector, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and the public 
are all affected by and involved in emergency management. The primary audience of this thesis 
is public sector data acquisition, processing and delivery agencies who aim to assist emergency 
6   Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
management organisations. This is both to manage the scope of the thesis but also because the 
majority of emergency management practitioners work in the public sector. 
This thesis does not focus on technical developments such as new algorithms to increase 
data accuracy or standards to improve data accessibility because they are well served within the 
literature. This thesis focuses instead on how to prioritise these developments in order to 
improve uptake. 
This thesis is applicable to all phases of emergency management including prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery. Response is explicitly included to ensure timeliness of 
data delivery is covered by the scope. Furthermore, examples in this thesis are focused on 
natural disasters but much of the contents is also relevant to man-made disasters but this is not 
the focus. 
A limitation of this research is the limited time and resources related to a PhD program. 
This thesis is targeted at Australia: a global study would have been relevant but not possible in 
the timeframe. In addition, trialling the framework created by this research during the 
development of a sensor data product, and tracking its uptake during a disaster would have been 
ideal but was not practical given the time and resource limitations. 
This thesis assumes that better information makes for better decision making, whether it is 
instrumental, direct, indirect or in subsequent ways. It is also assumed that sensor data will 
continue to be captured. The thesis does not consider broader implications of data capture such 
as civil liberties or satellites failing due to major space weather events. 
This thesis takes an integrated and applied perspective and not a pure public policy, 
administrative, information systems, Earth Observation or emergency management perspective. 
This research could have engaged more with emergency management doctrine or sensor data 
interoperability standards but the scope needed to be limited in order to create a manageable 
project. The research questions require a breadth of coverage across a number of fields, which 
would be sacrificed by focusing studies more narrowly. 
The balance between specificity to an audience and the breadth of fields covered is 
challenging. This thesis can be viewed as too specific for many audiences, such as public policy 
and trust academics, but it could just as easily by viewed as too generic by technical experts.  
This thesis has a pragmatic, multi-method and data source approach. The thesis does not sit 
within or follow a singular theoretical or methodological tradition or direction. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has eight chapters. The first two chapters are introductory, followed by three 
chapters which present independent studies. The studies are followed by a discussion which 
brings together findings from the literature and the three studies. Throughout the thesis findings 
are highlighted through the use of call out boxes, these findings vary in type and scale but are all 
relevant to the central argument presented within the thesis. The key findings are then 
summarised in an uptake framework for practitioners. The final chapter is the conclusion.  
The findings of this thesis are highlighted in the section in which they are made using call 
out boxes. The call out boxes are then summarised at the end of each chapter and in the 
conclusion. The findings are recorded in this manner to make explicit the conclusions arising 
during the research, and the sequence in which these conclusions are reached. Even though they 
are termed ‘findings’, they include distillations of key points drawn from the literature, 
including synthesised points, as well as substantive new findings arising from the research 
undertaken. In Chapter eight, a set of higher level key findings are presented. 
Chapter two outlines the key terms, concepts and literature of emergency management, 
sensor data and the management of a data product as relevant to this thesis. Chapter two then 
explores the current usage of sensor data within emergency management as described in the 
literature. This thesis argues that although the existing research is well established there is a gap 
in identifying whether sensor data is used or has any impact on decision-making and how 
uptake can be increased. 
Chapter three establishes a key term for this thesis: design choices, which refers to the 
collection of decisions made to create a sensor data product. These creator’s choices cover the 
quality, reputation, data policy and maturity of a sensor data product. Chapter three then uses a 
comparative case study of one specific and representative type of sensor data system: moderate 
resolution optical imagery processing systems. This comparison highlights the breadth of design 
choices available to sensor data product creators and their impact on the usefulness of the 
products.  
The fourth Chapter presents a study on the large body of formal post disaster inquiries in 
Australia. Chapter four uses word frequency analysis to identify those inquiries which have a 
significant data focus, then analyses this subset in detail. The analysis looks for examples of 
sensor data uptake during a disaster, or data concerns raised within the inquiry. This information 
is synthesised to identify data products used in Australia and common concerns raised by post 
disaster inquiries.  
The fifth Chapter presents a survey which examines how emergency managers choose to 
use, or not use, a data product. The survey canvases different stakeholder’s views across the 
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data supply chain to identify major concerns with sensor data in disasters, barriers to sensor data 
in decision making and how sensor data can be optimised to maximise uptake. 
Chapter six establishes a common lexicon to describe the design choices available to 
sensor data product creators and brings together all the evidence collected on each design choice 
to date.  
Chapter seven summarises the findings of the research into a brief, framework for 
practitioners. This framework aims to help sensor data product creators increase the likelihood 
of a sensor data product being incorporated in emergency management decision making in 
Australia. 
The final Chapter concludes the thesis, identifying how the thesis research questions have 
been addressed and identifies the implications of this research. Several future research 
directions are described. 
1.7 Datasets generated for this thesis 
This research generated two significant and unique datasets. This research consolidated 
three lists of Australian disaster inquiries and created the first Australian disaster inquiry 
database currently used by the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre 
(BNHCRC). The second dataset was created through a survey titled “Data from sensors in 
disaster decision making survey”. 
The Australian disaster inquiry database developed in this thesis contains 257 inquiries 
from 1886 to 2013. These inquiries include seven inquiry types: Agency, audit, coronial, 
governments, independent, parliamentary and royal commission. This database originates from 
the fusion of three existing lists (Casus Calamitas Consulting 2013; Casus Calamitas Consulting 
2012; Eburn and Dovers 2015). Following the addition of more recent inquiries and discussions 
with experts in the sector the inquiries are processed into a structured, searchable database. Of 
the 257 inquiries, 183 were acquired digitally, totalling 303 PDF documents. See Chapter four 
Section 4.3.1 and Appendix A for further details on this dataset. 
The ‘data from sensors in disaster decision making’ survey opened on 17 March 2014 for a 
brief period of testing by key informants, before being distributed throughout the emergency 
management community. Official invitation emails were sent out during in the first week of 
May. The survey closed after 84 days on 9 June 2014. In total the survey received 230 responses 
of which over 90% were Australian. The dataset is a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
responses, with the core of the results rating the importance of various design choices to 
emergency managers. See Appendix F for the survey, Appendix G for the raw results and 
Chapter five for further explanation and analysis of this dataset. 
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1.8 Publication and validation  
During this research, content has been published in various forums. The following Table 
outlines the publications and presentations created during this thesis and how they relate to the 
structure of this thesis: 
Table 1: Peer reviewed abstracts generated by this thesis mapped to Chapters. 
Publication Ch. 1 Ch. 2 Ch. 3 Ch. 4 Ch. 5 Ch. 6 Ch. 7 Ch. 8 
Hudson, D., 2013. 
Crowdsourcing, satellites and 
seismometers: A framework for 
trusting data in disaster, abstract 
presented at the World 
Conference on Disaster 
Management. Toronto, Canada, 
23-26 June 2013 
   
     
Eburn. M., Hudson, D. , Cha, I., 
Dovers, S., Learning from 
Adversity: What has 75 years of 
Bushfire Inquiries (1939-2013) 
Taught Us? Proceedings of the 
Research Forum at the Bushfire 
and Natural Hazards CRC & 
AFAC conference, Wellington, 
2 September 2014 
        
Table 2: Book contributions as part of this thesis mapped to Chapters. 
Publication Ch. 1 Ch. 2 Ch. 3 Ch. 4 Ch. 5 Ch. 6 Ch. 7 Ch. 8 
Harrison, B., Jupp, D., Phinn, 
S., Lewis, M., Hudson, D.  
Earth Observation  
Various volumes. In Press 
   
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Chapter 2: Sensor data in emergency 
management 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Aim and overview of this chapter 
This thesis sits at the intersection of three academic fields: emergency management, sensor 
data and the management of digital products. It brings sensor data into an emergency 
management application and in doing so, brings theories related to the management of digital 
products into sensor data.  
This Chapter has two objectives. The first is to establish the basics of each of these fields, 
including by defining key terms and concepts used. The goal is to allow non-disaster or non-
sensor data professionals to understand the content presented in this thesis. While a synthesis, 
this chapter fills a need not covered by existing literature, it provides an explanation and 
definition of multidisciplinary terms which apply to emergency management, sensor data and 
the management of digital products. The second objective is to explore the existing literature 
that engages with these overlapping fields. It concludes that almost no detailed work has been 
done to date on how to tailor sensor data product for emergency managers, particularly within 
Australia. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: 
2.2 Emergency management ....................................................................................... 12 
2.3 Data and sensor data .............................................................................................. 19 
2.4 Sensor data for managing disasters ....................................................................... 25 
2.5 Management of digital products ............................................................................ 31 
2.6 Summary of findings ............................................................................................. 39 
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2.2 Emergency management 
Natural and man-made disasters are unexpected shocks which disrupt or overwhelm a 
system. Understanding and responding to these shocks is the role of disaster managers. In 2010, 
385 natural disasters killed more than 297,000 people, affected over 217 million people, and 
caused over $120 billion in economic damages worldwide (Guha-Sapir et al. 2011). With 
increasing population, urbanisation and climate change the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, 
duration and complexity of natural and human induced disasters are set to increase during the 
21st century (Handmer and Dovers 2013; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2012). 
This increase will have dramatic effects politically, socially and economically. For example, the 
economic losses from local flooding in Australia in 2040 relative to 2000, are set to increase by 
67-514% (Bouwer 2010).  
 
Finding 1: Impacts of natural disasters are a rapidly growing problem (Section 2.2) 
 
Over the last 50 years, the emergency management field has developed to cover all levels 
of government, the private sector, the non-government sector and the community. This thesis 
focuses on the use of data which may be acquired by any sector, but is primarily processed and 
used by emergency managers within Federal, State and Territory government agencies. This 
section outlines the differences between the terms hazard, risk, emergency, disaster and crisis. 
It then examines the types of disasters commonly considered in emergency management and 
outlines the main processes through which a disaster is managed. 
The modern emergency management field stems from a thesis published in 1942 by 
Gilbert F. White on the human adjustment of floods. White (1942) argued that various 
adjustments could be made to limit the impact of a disaster, adjustments such as changing the 
land elevation or land-use. As he explains, “Floods are ‘acts of god,’ but flood losses are 
largely acts of man” (White 1942, p. 2). This is the foundation upon which modern disaster 
management is based in that it establishes that disasters are unavoidable events, but their effects 
are influenced by the way humans respond to them. 
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Hazard, emergency, disaster and crisis are common terms used every day within society. 
These terms are often used interchangeably, but in fact they all have specific definitions which 
allow them to describe various facets of an unexpected event.  
Hazard— The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical 
event that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as 
damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, 
and environmental resources (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2012);  
Emergency—Sudden and usually unforeseen event that calls for immediate 
measures to minimise its adverse consequences 
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2012a); and 
Disaster—Situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating 
a request to national or international level for external assistance; or an 
unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction 
and human suffering 
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2012a).  
A hazard, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has 
potential to harm but may not actually cause any impact at all. An emergency is an event which 
requires immediate action and has caused harm. A disaster, on the other hand, is a situation with 
the ability to "overwhelm local capacity". This means that the difference between an emergency 
and a disaster is one of scale. Put another way, a disaster only describes events which cause 
serious disruption (Emergency Management Australia 1998). Finally a crisis can be defined as 
an event where any system has been threatened, such as a financial or personal crisis. 
According to title 42 of the United States Code Section 5122 a major disaster is "any 
natural catastrophe ... regardless of cause ... which in the determination of the President causes 
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance" (42 U.S.C. § 
5122(2)). Due to the subjective nature of whether the President determines a disaster to be 
major (or President determines to have overwhelmed local capacity), the physical magnitude or 
scale of the event is not necessarily the key determinant in defining a disaster. A disaster can be 
a minor event in terms of scale or impact, which receives large quantities of media attention 
causing the minor emergency to be treated as a disaster (Perry and Quarantelli 2005).  
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2013) present an 
alternative definition whereby a disaster is “(Vulnerability + Hazard) / Capacity”. This 
suggests that an emergency is when Vulnerability + Hazard are less than the capacity to 
respond. When Vulnerability + Hazard are more than the capacity to respond it can be 
considered a disaster.  
One aspect of a hazard is risk. Risk is commonly defined as likelihood of the hazard, plus 
the consequence of the hazard, plus the assets which are exposed (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change 2012). Risk can often be the cause of great anxiety due to its conflicting 
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definitions. This issue was first raised in 1738 when the original ‘Exposition of a new theory on 
the measurement of risk’ was published. This paper was later republished by Bernoulli in 1954. 
Risk is often communicated through risk maps which are models which incorporate various 
datasets to produce a probabilistic map for a given hazard type. In this thesis many different 
styles of disaster related maps are considered including observed maps, risk maps, historical 
observation maps, risk maps created from historical observations and risk maps created from 
hazard models. 
The management of emergencies, disasters and crises involves the "social processes for 
designing, implementing, and evaluating strategies, policies, and measures that promote and 
improve…preparedness, response, and recovery practices at different organizational and 
societal levels" (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2012, 35). 
As an operational field, emergency management has developed frameworks to understand 
and articulate all areas of operation. The Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery (PPRR) 
emergency management framework, otherwise known as Comprehensive Emergency 
Management (CEM), has been the framework for emergency management in Australia for at 
least the last 20 years (Attorney-General’s Department 2009; Emergency Management Australia 
2004; Cronstedt 2002). PPRR was created by the Emergency Preparedness Project of the 
National Governors' Association in the United States in 1979. Its objective was to create a 
comprehensive framework to allow all emergency management stakeholders to communicate in 
a more "structured approach" (National Governors’ Association. Emergency Preparedness 
Project 1979). The PPRR framework articulates all aspects of the emergency management 
operational lifecycle. 
According to the Emergency Management in Australia Concepts and Principles manual 
(2004, p. 4) PPRR can be defined as: 
 “prevention/mitigation activities, which seek to eliminate or reduce the impact of 
hazards themselves and/or to reduce the susceptibility and increase the resilience 
of the community subject to the impact of those hazards; 
 preparedness activities, which establish arrangements and plans and provide 
education and information to prepare the community to deal effectively with such 
emergencies and disasters as may eventuate; 
 response activities, which activate preparedness arrangements and plans to put in 
place effective measures to deal with emergencies and disasters if and when they 
do occur; and 
 recovery activities, which assist a community affected by an emergency or disaster 
in reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of emotional, 
social, economic and physical well-being.” 
Figure 3 depicts the four phases and the relative involvement of the main stakeholders in 
each of these phases. 
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Figure 3: Original Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery emergency 
management framework. Organisational involvement in natural disaster 
(National Governors’ Association. Emergency Preparedness Project 1979). 
 
Since 1979 the PPRR framework has become the standard emergency management 
framework in the western world (Cronstedt 2002; Handmer and Dovers 2013). Although PPRR 
is still the most dominant emergency management framework, particularly in the western world, 
some aspects have changed overtime. Since 1979, accountability and transparency have become 
increasingly important in a public policy setting, disasters have become more common and 
many disasters have overlapped or caused other disasters, hence becoming more complex 
(Handmer and Dovers 2013). These changes have led to greater involvement throughout the 
phases of the framework from existing stakeholders, such as government and the private sector, 
but also new stakeholders such as community organisations and the survivors themselves 
participating in emergency management using tools such as social media (Goodchild and 
Glennon 2010).  
This greater involvement of stakeholders in all aspects of the framework has led to calls for 
a more integrated approach to emergency planning and management (Trim 2004; Waugh and 
Streib 2006). PPRR has also been criticised for its rigid phases which give a sense that one 
phase must be completed for another to begin (Cronstedt 2002). The US Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) provides a recent and highly relevant example of the evolution of 
PPRR. FEMA transitioned from having a rigid PPRR, government-centric, approach during 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, to a more inclusive survivor-centric model following Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012 (Jensen 2013). This transition can also be described as “shared responsibility”, 
highlighting the increasing role of the public (Jensen 2013; Waugh and Streib 2006).  
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Defining the type of disaster is also a challenging exercise. Consider the 2011 Tōhoku 
earthquake in Japan which generated a tsunami which in turn caused a nuclear accident. 
Depending on the definition, this event is one complex disaster, two disasters (tsunami and 
industrial accident) or three disasters (earthquake, tsunami and industrial accident).  
Initially established by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Belgian 
Government in 1988, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) has 
built and maintained the world’s most well-known database of disasters, the Emergency Events 
Database or EM-DAT. The database has over 30 types of disasters (Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters 2012a; Below, Wirtz, and Guha-Sapir 2009). While the database is 
well respected, it should be noted that there are some differences between the stated 
classification structure and what is actually stored within the database. These differences are 
mostly related to disasters without groups, or over usage of the disaster type “Other” which does 
not appear in the stated classification structure. Furthermore there are still some gaps in the 
classification such as hail and space weather disasters.  
Many countries, including Australia, have developed their own country specific disaster 
classification structures and databases. These databases have quite different classification 
structures. The Australian database has only 18 types of disasters, compared with the 30 of EM-
DAT. A GLobal IDEntifier or GLIDE number, maintained by the Asian Disaster Reduction 
Center (ADRC) is now used as a globally common unique number assigned to disaster events to 
allow comparison between databases.  
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In order to demonstrate how much sensor data is used in disasters, it is important to 
develop a comprehensive list of disaster types. This research has fused together several existing 
disaster type classification structures. The fused classification uses EMDAT as the core, then 
hail is added to the Sub-sub type Freezing Rain from the Australian EMA classifications and the 
NOAA classifications of space weather. This list divides disasters into either natural or 
technological disasters, then into 11 sub-groups ending up with 64 unique disaster types. Table 
3 shows this list.  
Table 3: EMDAT based disaster classification structure. Adapted using (Centre 
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2012a; Below, Wirtz, and Guha-
Sapir 2009; Attorney-General’s Department 2012; NOAA / NWS Space Weather 
Prediction Center 2012). 
Disaster 
Generic 
Group 
Disaster Sub-
Group 
Disaster Main 
Type 
Disaster Sub-Type Disaster Sub-sub Type 
Natural 
Disaster 
Geophysical 
Earthquake 
Ground Shaking   
Tsunami   
Volcano Volcanic eruption   
Mass Movement 
(dry) 
Rockfall   
Avalanche 
Snow avalanche 
Debris avalanche 
Landslide 
Mudslide 
Lahar 
Debris flow 
Subsidence 
Sudden subsidence 
Long-lasting subsidence 
Meteorological Storm 
Tropical Storm   
  Extra-Tropical cyclone 
(winter storm) 
  
Local / Convective Storm 
Thunderstorm/Lightening 
Snowstorm/Blizzard 
Sandstorm/Dust storm 
Generic (severe) storm 
Tornado 
Orographic storm (Strong 
winds) 
Hydrological 
Flood 
General river flood    
Flash flood   
Storm surge/coastal flood   
Mass Movement 
(wet) 
Rockfall   
Landslide 
Debris flow   
Debris avalanche   
Avalanche 
Snow avalanche   
Debris avalanche   
Subsidence 
Sudden subsidence   
Long-lasting subsidence   
 Climatological 
Extreme 
Temperature 
Heat Wave   
Cold Wave Frost 
Extreme Winter Conditions 
Snow Pressure 
Icing 
Freezing Rain/Hail 
  Debris avalanche 
Drought Drought   
Wild fire Forest Fire   
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Land fires (grass, scrub, 
bush, etc.) 
  
 
Biological 
Epidemic 
Viral Infectious Diseases   
Bacterial Infectious Diseases   
Parasitic Infectious Diseases   
Fungal Infectious Diseases   
Prion Infectious Diseases   
Insect infestation Grasshopper/Locust/Worms   
Animal Stampede     
Extra-terrestrial 
Meteorite/asteroid   
Geomagnetic 
Storms 
  
Solar Radiation 
Storms 
  
Radio Blackouts   
Technological 
Complex 
Disasters 
   
Famine    
Displaced 
populations 
   
Industrial 
Accident 
Chemical Spill   
Collapse   
Explosion   
Fire   
Poisoning   
Radiation   
Oil spill   
Gas leak   
Transport 
Accident 
Air   
Road   
Rail   
Water   
 
This list provides a useful set of definitions for this thesis but it should be noted that 
alternate definitions do exist. For example, the distinction between natural and technological 
disasters is not universally recognised. Emergency Response Law of the People’s Republic of 
China states that there are four kinds of disasters: natural disasters; technological disasters; 
public health disasters; and social safety disasters (China 2007; F. Wang and Yuan 2010). 
 Multiple official classification structures can also exist within the same country. In an 
effort to standardise disaster classifications in Australia the Common Alert Protocol or CAP 
standard was adopted in 2008. This standard was developed to create a national standard for 
handling of the essential content of alert warning messages. The Australian profile of this 
standard is referred to as CAP-AU with 176 unique disaster types (Australian Government 
2012). The purpose of such a list should be considered. To many stakeholders, 176 categories 
could be considered overly exhaustive and only useful for scientific or research purposes, but to 
a specialist, such as a volcanologist, this list does not classify disaster types comprehensively 
enough.  
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An example of a simpler data-centric disaster classification structure is the structure used 
by the German Aerospace Center (DLR); specifically their Center for Satellite Based Crisis 
Information (ZKI) whose mission is to use satellite data to map emergencies. The DLR-ZKI 
categorises disasters into: Flood, Earthquake, Wild Fire/Burn Scars, Landslide, Severe 
Storm/Hurricane, Tsunami, Volcanic Eruption, Technical Accident, Humanitarian Crisis, 
Exercise and Other. The distinguishing factor to create this twelve type classification is that 
these disasters require different types of datasets to aid in their emergency response, or put 
another way they create a different and distinctive spatial disruption. The most common 
disasters are shown in the DLR-ZKI list but less common disasters are also included. For 
example, due to a satellite’s strength in mapping large areas, volcanic eruptions are included on 
the list despite being quite rare.  
This thesis considers the use of sensors in disasters. As such, a disaster classification 
structure need only be as specific as will change the type of data required for the management of 
that disaster. For example, if the same data products are produced for a mudslide compared with 
a landslide then this difference is not relevant to a data product audience. 
 Finding 2: Types of disasters are grouped differently depending on the purpose of 
the classification, the agency, or the author’s background (Section 2.2) 
 
2.3 Data and sensor data 
This section is based upon Harrison and Jupp (1989), and all unreferenced definitions in 
this section are from this book. This is because the author of this thesis is a co-author on the 
new edition of the book Harrison et al. (In Press). 
Data is “discrete, unorganised and unprocessed objective facts or observations that 
represent properties of objects, events and environments” (Ackoff 1989). This could be raw 
telemetry from a satellite’s camera, or hand written notes counting the number of cars at an 
intersection. Many terms are used to describe different groups of data, these groups generally 
differ by data purpose or collection platform type.  
A collection of data is generally referred to as a dataset or a data product. These two terms 
are used interchangeably by many. While a dataset is the core of a data product the term 
product implies considerations such as packaging, marketing and a business model. For this 
reason these terms are both used in this thesis but with specific meanings – a dataset is a 
collection of data and a data product is a dataset which has been packaged to maximise the 
likelihood that it will be useful to a given audience. This packaging and processing is 
undertaken by some form of automated, semi-automated or manual system. 
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Massourian (2005) establishes a method of defining different types of data according to 
their rate of update, or how often specific data within the dataset is updated from new data. 
Under this definition there are two major categories: static datasets and dynamic datasets. Static 
datasets have a slow and steady rate of collection with some being kept up to date, but most are 
left as static datasets once published. Examples include the road network, contours and general 
base map information. Dynamic datasets are datasets which have high and often continuous 
data collection rates, where the processing and updating of the dataset can occur in real-time or 
near real-time. Examples include time series satellite imagery, seismographs, Global Positioning 
System (GPS) feeds and the weather forecast.   
Remote sensing refers to making measurements of an object using a device that is 
physically remote from it, such as a camera taking a photo. Gathering information about the 
Earth using Remote Sensing technologies is called Earth Observation (EO). Inclusive of Remote 
Sensing and Earth Observation is sensor data which is data captured using a device or sensor 
but not necessarily about the Earth (Harrison and Jupp 1989). 
Sensor data is collected by a device called a sensor which is carried on board a platform. 
There are three general types of platforms which carry sensors: 
 space borne—satellites, shuttles, or space stations; 
 air borne—manned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, balloons or blimps; and 
 ground based—in-situ (seismometers or sonars), mobile devices, or animals 
(including humans). 
For example, the worldwide weather community uses over 65 space borne sensors or 
satellites, 4000 airborne sensors (3000 aircraft and 1000 upper air stations) and 11000 in-situ 
sensors (10000 land stations and 1000 ships with sensors) to collect data that informs weather 
prediction (WMO 2009).  
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According to Harrison and Jupp (1989), resolution refers to level of detail, density refers to 
the intensity or rate of sampling, and extent refers to the overall coverage or area of a dataset. 
Extent relates to the largest object or feature, or range of features, which can be observed, while 
resolution relates to the smallest. Density indicates the continuity and frequency of sampling. 
For a feature to be distinguishable in the data, the resolution, density, and extent of the 
measurement dimensions of the data set need to be appropriate to the measurable properties of 
the feature. For a feature to be separable from other features, the resolution, density and extent 
must be appropriate to pick up the differences between given features.  
Resolutions can also be referred to as sampling dimensions and can include spatial and 
temporal dimensions for all sensors and spectral and radiometric dimensions for remotely 
sensed sensors. Each of these resolutions have a specific definition which aligns with resolution, 
density and extent. Each definition is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Sampling Dimension in Remote Sensing adapted from Emelyanova et 
al. (2012).  
Scope Dimension 
Characteristic 
Resolution Density Extent 
All sensors 
Spatial 
Ground area imaged 
per optical pixel 
Number of pixels and 
lines in image 
Area covered by 
image 
Temporal 
Time period over 
which each image is 
acquired 
Frequency of 
successive image 
acquisitions 
Total time period for 
which this imagery is 
available 
Remotely 
sensed data 
Spectral 
Width of each 
wavelength channel 
Number of channels 
detected by sensor 
Range of 
wavelengths covered 
by all channels 
Radiometric 
Smallest change in 
detected energy that 
would be 
represented as a 
different image 
brightness level 
Number of gradations 
(grey levels) used to 
represent full range of 
radiances that could 
be detected by sensor 
Actual range of 
radiances detected in 
each channel 
 
In the past, sensor data products were often static, but with technological advances they are 
becoming ever more dynamic. Sensors are becoming cheaper and more numerous, at the same 
time as sensor capabilities are increasing with more frequent measurements, finer resolution and 
faster processing. One subset of the sensor community is the Internet of Things community 
which looks at devices connected to the internet, such as smart watches containing sensors like 
GPS, cameras and microphones, or Wi-Fi (WIreless FIdelity) enabled scales which measure and 
record our weight. In 2008 the number of devices connected to the internet exceeded the number 
of people on Earth, and by 2020 there are expected to be over 50 billion devices connected to 
the Internet (Swan 2012). As one example, figure 4 outlines the projected growth in climate 
sensor data from less than five petabytes in 2010 to over 350 petabytes in 2030. This increase is 
due to satellite data and new models for using these data (Overpeck et al. 2011). A more 
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specific example is the increased accuracy of the weather forecast. In 2014 the 10 day weather 
forecast was as accurate as the five day weather forecast was in 1980, due in large part to the 
addition of satellite data to the weather model (ECMWF 2014).  
 
Figure 4: Projected increase in global climate data holdings for climate models, 
remotely sensed data, and in situ instrumental/proxy data (Overpeck et al. 
2011). 
Finding 3: Sensor numbers, quality and delivery speed are exponentially growing 
(Section 2.3) 
 
Different sensors measure different processes for a wide variety of applications. One 
characterisation of the different applications of sensors is the International Group on Earth 
Observation’s Societal Benefit Areas, which divides different applications of EO sensors into 
nine key groups: Agriculture, Biodiversity, Climate, Disasters, Ecosystems, Energy, Health, 
Water, and Weather (GEO 2007). This means that sensor data products have a large variety of 
users which they must satisfy. 
The objective of such applications was best described by Al Gore’s 1992 ‘Digital Earth’ 
vision of a ubiquitous global environmental in which a “multi-resolution, three-dimensional 
representation of the planet, into which we can embed vast quantities of geo-referenced data” 
was foretold (Gore 1998). ‘Digital Earth’ envisioned “a dynamic framework to share 
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information globally and improve our collective understanding of the complex relationships 
between society and the environment” (Craglia et al. 2012, 18). 
Following the definitions of data and discussion of its availability, the process involved in 
capturing and processing sensor data to make it useable is now described. In the case of sensor 
data there are three logical stages: 
 acquisition—observations are made of the object; 
 processing—observed data is modified to represent a property of the object; and 
 interpretation—processed data is analysed with reference data for a specific end 
use or application. 
Sensors acquire data in the form of observations. This data is processed to become 
measurements then interpreted to become variables which reflect real world phenomena. The 
interrelationships between these terms and their relevance to Remote Sensing are summarised in 
Table 5. The Table also includes examples to illustrate the process. The first EO example traces 
the stages involved in detecting potential fire hotspots from sensors that detect energy in visible, 
near infrared, middle infrared and thermal infrared wavelengths.  For the sake of clarity, the 
second non-EO example provides a day-to-day case study which is a simple analogy to the 
Earth Observation process.  
Table 5: Observations, Measurements and Variables. 
Stage Result Description EO Example Non-EO Example 
Acquisition  
Using sensors carried 
on platforms 
Remote sensor 
records radiance of 
land area 
Traffic speed camera 
photographs 
speeding vehicle 
 Observation 
Detect energy from an 
object or feature of 
interest 
Visible and infrared 
(middle and thermal) 
images  
Photograph vehicle 
number plate 
Processing  
Using pre-defined 
algorithms  
and prior knowledge 
about the sensor and/or 
platform  
Land temperature 
computed from 
middle and thermal 
infrared images 
Sharpen photograph 
to match standard 
clarity 
 Measurement 
Represent known 
properties of feature of 
interest 
Brightness 
temperature image 
Clear licence 
number of vehicle 
Interpretation  
Using reference 
information about 
feature of interest and 
measurements 
Use visible and near 
infrared channels to 
exclude bright, non-
fire pixels or cloud 
Use registration 
records to link 
licence number to 
owner details  
 Variable 
Relate directly to 
feature of interest 
Hotspot imagery 
showing potential 
locations of active 
fires 
Identification of 
vehicle owner 
 
The initial observations of most sensors are quantitative, but calibrated relative to a sensor-
specific sensitivity range. The processing stage converts the initial observations so that they are 
comparable with a standard measurement scale and/or other data sources. This initial conversion 
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is often undertaken by the data distributor, so may not be apparent to many users. Some forms 
of remotely sensed data, for which metadata and/or appropriate models do not exist, cannot be 
converted into measurements or variables. These data can only be used as observations. For 
example, historical imagery with no record of what sensor was used or when and where the 
image was taken, does not have the required information to convert it into a measurement or 
variable. Thus, considering the logical stages involved with using sensor data, the ability to 
relate objects or features on the Earth’s surface to data acquired by sensors with suitable 
specifications for that application rests on two underlying, but interrelated, considerations: 
 the intrinsic ability of the variables to be resolved in the type of measurements 
being made—that is, the accuracy and precision of the sensor; and 
 the effectiveness of the models that relate physical processes to these 
measurements.  
These two considerations are important because they mean that not all data is created 
equal. In fact, a large amount of the data collected from sensors and other means are not able to 
be interpreted into a usable variable. This distinction is referred to by many terms including 
images versus scientific observations, but for the purpose of this work ‘data’ is described as 
everything and ‘observations’ are described as data which meets the two criteria listed above. 
Finding 4: Not all data is high enough quality to become an observation, variable or 
product (Section 2.3) 
 
Table 4 looked at acquisition, processing and interpretation. These three stages align with 
the three key groups of people involved in the data supply chain that is: producers, value adders 
and users. Producers include people who design, build, install and maintain sensors in addition 
to those who generate measurements from the raw observations. Value adders are professionals 
who interpret measurements into variables, in addition to people who tailor measurements and 
variables for a specific audience. Finally users could include people who conduct analysis on all 
of these data to generate advice, or people who use this data to inform their own decisions. 
People and organisations can span one, two or all three of these tasks but generally only focus 
on one.   
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2.4 Sensor data for managing disasters 
As previously defined, a disaster is an event which overwhelms local capacity. Sensor data 
is one of the few means of reducing complexity and determining what is happening at any point 
in time to inform what should be done next (Boin et al. 2005). 
Using accurate information to reduce complexity in disasters is not a new idea. Following 
the 1939 bushfires in Australia, the Stretton royal commission discussed the benefits of accurate 
information:  
“The detection and ascertainment of the position of the fire in the forest, 
however inaccessible that position may be, has the advantage of placing the 
fire-fighting force in possession of accurate information upon which may be 
based … plan of disposition of forces to take protective measures at places 
which are accessible and thus to prevent the unfettered spread of the fire and 
to protect property which may lie in its path.” (Stretton 1939, 30)  
 
Finding 5: The Stretton Royal Commission in 1939 shows how long Australia has 
used spatial intelligence to improve emergency management decision making 
(Section 2.4) 
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Sensor data is commonly used in emergency management. Table 6 shows peer reviewed 
examples of sensor data being used for emergency management. The list has been collated by 
the author and identifies how extensively sensor data can be used within emergency 
management. 
Table 6: Published examples of sensor data in disaster mapped to extended 
EMDAT typology. 
Disaster 
Generic Group 
Disaster Sub-Group Disaster Main Type Example of EO data 
Natural 
Geophysical 
Earthquake 
(Guo et al. 2010; Wächter et 
al. 2012) 
Volcano 
(Jayaraman, Chandrasekhar, 
and Rao 1997) 
Mass Movement (dry) 
(Kerle and Oppenheimer 
2002; Tang and Dai 2010) 
Meteorological Storm 
(Jayaraman, Chandrasekhar, 
and Rao 1997) 
Hydrological 
Flood 
(Jayaraman, Chandrasekhar, 
and Rao 1997) 
Mass Movement (wet)  
Landslide 
(Jayaraman, Chandrasekhar, 
and Rao 1997) 
Avalanche  
Subsidence (Colesanti et al. 2003) 
Climatological 
Extreme Temperature  
Drought 
(Jayaraman, Chandrasekhar, 
and Rao 1997) 
Wild fire (Voigt et al. 2007) 
Biological 
Epidemic  
Insect infestation 
(Jayaraman, Chandrasekhar, 
and Rao 1997) 
Animal Stampede  
Extra-terrestrial 
Meteorite/asteroid (Plado and Pesonen 2002) 
Geomagnetic Storms  
Solar Radiation Storms  
Radio Blackouts  
Technological 
Complex Disasters  (De Longueville et al. 2010) 
Famine  (Thornton et al. 1997) 
Displaced populations  (Giada et al. 2003) 
Industrial Accident 
Chemical Spill  
Collapse (Wegmuller et al. 2000) 
Explosion  
Fire 
(Chrysoulakis and Cartalis 
2003) 
Poisoning  
Radiation (Yasunari et al. 2011) 
Oil spill (Jha, Levy, and Gao 2008) 
Gas leak (Mcrae 1989) 
Transport Accident 
Air (Kaplan et al. 2005) 
Road (J. White et al. 2011) 
Rail (Clark 2004) 
Water (Raspini et al. 2014) 
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Table 6 shows that at least 23 of the 34 main disaster types (68%) have published 
examples of sensor data being used to assist with emergency management. This shows that 
sensor data are prevalent in the majority of disaster types. Table 6 is limited given it only 
demonstrates the use of data in given disaster types in the EMDAT typology, and those which 
are documented within the scientific literature. One example of this limitation is the exclusion 
of published examples of space weather disasters. For example there are current satellite 
missions flying for that exact purpose such as the Solar TErrestrial RElations Observatory or 
STEREO mission which is the third in NASA's Solar Terrestrial Probes program (National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 2013).  
All of these papers demonstrate the relevance of sensor data in emergency management. 
The existing literature focuses on data products for a specific disaster or event. None of them 
consider the broader emergency management context including, whether or how their product 
may have been used by emergency management decision makers. 
 
Finding 6: Scientific literature has shown that sensor data has been used in at least 
68% of disaster types (Section 2.4) 
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Sensor data can be used for many different purposes in managing a disaster. In Figure 5 
Justice et al. (2003) provide a clear example of the diverse applications one type of sensor data, 
satellite imagery, can have for bushfire management. The figure also illustrates the temporal 
resolution of different sensor data products, with examples of annual, fortnightly, weekly and 
daily resolution products.  
 
Figure 5: Uses of satellite remotely sensed data for bushfire mitigation and 
management in Australia (Justice et al. 2003). 
As the Figure illustrates, sensor data is used across the majority of disaster types and can 
be used in all four phases of emergency management. Further examples of the use of sensor data 
across PPRR phases include: planning (Tolhurst, Shields, and Chong 2008; Kussul et al. 2013), 
preparedness (Allen and Greenslade 2007; Tang and Dai 2010), response (Lorincz et al. 2004; 
Laituri and Kodrich 2008) and recovery (Tolhurst 2009). Furthermore, Leidig and Teeuw 
(2015) explored the use of geoinformation, the majority of which is sourced from sensors, 
across all four phases of PPRR.  
While this literature engages with the emergency management context and there are 
example of products being tailored to a specific aspect of the cycle, the literature does not 
address considerations beyond the technical aspects of the product such as data accuracy, 
algorithms and modelling. 
Finding 7: Sensor data can be used in all stages of the emergency management 
framework: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (Section 2.4) 
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There are many facilities which make sensor data products for disasters. One measure of 
the pervasiveness of sensor data in emergency management is the number of facilities dedicated 
to that task. The World Meteorological Organisation’s (WMO) work on meteorology is relevant 
to emergency management, particularly cyclones and floods. WMO has 188 members from 183 
countries who, although primarily involved in weather, have a strong emergency management 
data focus (WMO 2009). In addition, there are at least 9 facilities1 which are fully operational 
facilities dedicated to using satellite sensors (not including aerial and ground sensors) for the 
purpose of emergency management. 
One would expect that with 9 operational facilities, questions of uptake would have been 
systematically considered but this is not the case. Some facilities have clear data policies 
(SERTIT, ZKI, EMS, UNOSAT), some have clear product specifications (ZKI, EMS, NDRCC, 
UNOSAT) and some have world class product accuracy (SERTIT, ZKI, EMS, UNOSAT).  That 
said, none have explicitly engaged with how their products have been targeted to specifically 
improve emergency management decision making processes. Of most relevance to this thesis, 
none of these facilities have specifically considered Australian requirements. These facilities 
improve disaster preparedness of their specific regions but their impact could be improved by 
better incorporating their products into emergency management decision making. 
 
Finding 8: Dedicated operational satellite mapping facilities for disasters are 
common in Europe and Asia (Section 2.4) 
 
Data and emergency management research to date has focused on specific technical or 
implementation issues such as data quality (Clifford et al. 2008; Yue, Gong, and Di 2010; X. Li 
et al. 2011), data policy (von der Dunk 1999; R. Harris and Browning 2003), the increase of 
Earth Observation data as evidence in legal proceedings (Purdy 2006; M. Davis 2012), usage of 
crowd sourced observations in emergency management (Goodchild and Glennon 2010), 
designing an architecture for moving data within emergency response (Butterfield, Pearlman, 
and Vickroy 2008; Gray et al. 2011; Ji and Zhu 2012)  and even scientific corrections to remove 
                                                     
1  
1. France, SErvice Régional de Traitement d'Image et de Télédétection (SERTIT)  
2. Germany, German Aerospace Center - Center for Satellite Based Crisis Information (DLR-ZKI) 
3. China, Centre for Resources Satellite Data and Application (CRESDA) 
4. China, National Disaster Reduction Centre of China (NDRCC)  
5. Hindu Kush Himalayas, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) 
Geoportal  
6. Europe, European Commission Joint Research Centre – Institute for the Protection and Security of 
the Citizen -  Copernicus Emergency Management Service  
7. Europe, European Space Agency’s (ESA) Centre for Earth Observation (also known as the European 
Space Research Institute or ESRIN) 24 hour watch office  
8. Global, UNITAR Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT)  
9. Global, International Charter for Space and Major Disasters 
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glint or cloud from moderate resolution optical images (Irish et al. 2006; F. Li et al. 2012; 
Masek et al. 2006; Zhu and Woodcock 2012). The relevance of these types of research to 
disaster management must now be analysed. 
Sensor data is often said to “help” or “benefit” emergency management with no discussion 
of how the technology is relevant, or whether a requirement even exists. For example, Masek et 
al. (2006, p. 68) states that the “new surface reflectance dataset should help researchers more 
easily use the GeoCover data for tracking land-cover changes in North America, including fire, 
forest harvest, urbanization, woody encroachment, and changes in agriculture.” This type of 
statement suggests a strong emergency management focus and relevance. Unfortunately, this 
connection to emergency management practices is not fleshed out anywhere else in the paper. 
Papers often use a disaster management case study to illustrate their research, while 
leaving no explanation of the relevance or tailoring of the product for the application. Yue et al. 
(2010, p. 271) use wildfire “as an example to help understand metadata tracking during service 
chaining and to illustrate how metadata tracking can contribute to data provenance.” Gray et 
al. (2011, p. 8856) use flood response planning to “demonstrate the use of our semantic sensor 
web architecture“. Gray et al. (2011, p. 8856) and his sixteen co-authors in fact open the paper 
with the uncited claim that “Sensor networks are increasingly deployed to monitor the state of 
the physical environment around us.” While there are clear examples of increasing numbers of 
sensors in the world which have been explored earlier in this thesis, this claim implies usage 
which is not at all clear. These papers imply through the selection of a disaster case study that 
their new technology or research contribute to emergency management. What is lacking is any 
exploration of how, or if, this type of research is used in products for emergency management 
decision making.  Yue et al. (2010) and Gray et al. (2011) are strong examples of the disconnect 
that exists between producers and value adders creating data products and referencing users 
which appear to have never been asked whether they want or need that product. 
Authors sometimes refer to how their technology is relevant to emergency managers, but 
do not explore or measure this relevance. Butterfield et al. (2008, p. 327) identifies an 
emergency management requirement which can illustrate a technology, “Timely dissemination 
of information to reduce the loss of life and property from natural and human-induced disasters 
was chosen as an example of one of the desired SoS-level operational capabilities for GEOSS.” 
Ji and Zhu (2012, p. 314) go a step further by identifying a need for which the technology they 
are investigating could address, in this case being “The accurate and real-time urgent relief 
demand information is almost inaccessible.” These papers identify the problem they attempt to 
solve but pay little attention to understanding the problem or measuring the impact of the 
technical solution they hope to impose on, or have welcomed by, emergency managers. While 
there is no doubt that these papers achieve the technical objectives of their paper, the lack of 
inclusion, consultation or even consideration of emergency management users reduces the 
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likelihood of emergency managers trusting the solution and hence lowers the likelihood of the 
solution being used.  
 
Finding 9: While there is an active and diverse academic debate around improving 
the technical or implementation issues of using sensor data for emergency 
management, the utility to emergency managers is often unclear (Section 2.4) 
 
2.5 Management of digital products 
Having discussed how technical solutions often do not connect to user experience, it is 
worth considering whether non-technical literature, outside of the disaster management field, is 
relevant to targeting data products to a given audience. There is a collection of fields that look at 
what drives the usage of one data product over another, including marketing, social science and 
the law. After a review of these fields, three papers were identified in three additional fields 
which are the most relevant to this topic. These papers are related to data quality, data policy 
and data presentation. Before covering these fields an understanding of the data supply chain is 
required. 
All types of products progress through a standard lifecycle of development, introduction, 
growth, maturity and decline (Sudarsan et al. 2005). While in many ways data products can be 
treated like any type of product, one significant difference is that data products can be 
completely virtual for their entire lifecycle, meaning they can move through this lifecycle faster 
than traditional products. 
Gartner Hype curves are one of the most common tools within the technology sector which 
characterise “the typical progression of an emerging technology from user and media 
overenthusiasm through a period of disillusionment to an eventual understanding of the 
technology's relevance and role in a market or domain” (Linden and Fenn 2003, p.1). The 
standard Hype curve is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Gartner Hype Curve (Linden and Fenn 2003). 
 
During the positive hype stage an application is shown to be possible. During the negative 
hype stage, access is created to the application and provides an opportunity to ensure that the 
users have the relevant skills to use the product. Finally, out towards the plateau of productivity, 
users have come to trust the application and are using it regularly but not to the amount that the 
initial hype predicted. 
While useful, the hype curve does not show the quality of the product or how the product 
is used. The most popular measure for the quality of a product is the performance S-curve, 
shown in Figure 7. This curve shows that the quality or performance of a product starts slowly, 
rapidly increases after launch, then plateaus once a product matures.  
The traditional adoption curve shows market adoption over time, also shown in Figure 7. 
One significant problem with the adoption curve is that it does not separate people using a 
product for interest’s sake from people using a product within their decision making. This 
distinction is one of the focuses of this thesis. To address this distinction clear definitions of the 
following terms are required adoption, awareness, usage and uptake. Awareness is the 
familiarity with a given product or item. Usage is the number of times a product or item has 
been accessed or used. Uptake is the inclusion of a product as evidence within a decision. For 
the purpose of clarity, usage is not inclusive of uptake. Finally, adoption is the total amount of 
usage inclusive of uptake.  
Examples of each of these terms in an emergency management context further clarify these 
definitions. Awareness is the most basic level where emergency managers have knowledge of a 
product, such as having heard of social media but not using it. Usage is where emergency 
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managers use a product in their work, such as under laying imagery on a map without analysing 
the imagery. Uptake is the highest level where a product is not only used but the information 
and knowledge extracted from the product is used to improve emergency management decision 
making, such as an emergency manager increasing the readiness of their staff based on a 
weather forecast.  
Finding 10: The distinction between awareness, usage and uptake is critical in 
assessing the effectiveness of a sensor data product (Section 3.2) 
 
The distinction between uptake and usage is particularly important. In many cases, a 
dataset, such as bushfire hotspots, may be popular and have high usage metrics but this is 
different to it actually being used in emergency management decision making. Uptake is far 
more difficult to measure. As shown in the literature review, many publications refer to their 
research being useful to emergency managers. In some cases this claim is proven through usage 
metrics, but as you cannot distinguish between who used it, this metric does not show whether 
or not their research is helping emergency managers directly in making decisions, or just 
providing information to the broader community.  
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The distinction between usage and uptake is particularly important for data products 
because digital usage can be caused by a machine rather than human usage of a physical 
product. For example, Hudson and Mueller (2009) celebrated the 5.2 million hits during the 
Black Saturday fires in Victoria, Australia, as a resounding success of the Sentinel bushfire 
hotspot system, even though through subsequent investigation they were unable to confirm if 
the system improved operational decision making. Figure 7 shows an extended version of the 
Gartner Hype curve, the performance S-curve, the adoption curve and a splitting of the area 
under the adoption curve into usage and uptake. Depending on the context usage can be defined 
as inclusive of uptake but as this thesis seeks to define and focus on product uptake, usage is 
defined as exclusive of uptake to aid in data capture and analysis, particularly in the survey in 
Chapter five. 
 
Figure 7: Technology lifecycle models adapted and expanded from Linden and 
Fenn (2003). 
 
Product awareness, or hype, is large at the beginning of a product’s life, then usage takes 
over before uptake becomes the dominant metric once a product matures.  
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Turning now to the three fields related to the management of digital products, the first is 
data quality.  With 2300 citations to date, Wang and Strong (1996) is one of the most common 
and accepted data quality works in recent history. Through the use of intuitive, theoretical and 
empirical studies Wang and Strong (1996) established a framework for assessing data quality, 
which is regarded as the foundation paper on the topic. This hierarchical framework is as 
follows, with the relative importance from most important (1) to least important (15): 
Table 7: Wang and Strong (1996) conceptual framework for data quality. 
Intrinsic data quality 
Believability (1) 
Accuracy (4) 
Objectivity (8) 
Reputation (11) 
Contextual data quality 
Value-added (2) 
Relevancy (3) 
Timeliness (9) 
Completeness (10) 
Appropriate amount of data (15) 
Representational data quality 
Interpretability (5) 
Ease of understanding (6) 
Representational consistency (12) 
Concise representation (13) 
Accessibility data quality 
Accessibility (14) 
Access security (7) 
 
The second relevant topic is data policy.  In most cases, emergency management data is 
supplied to emergency management agencies by other government agencies or the private 
sector. This means that the data policy and associated conditions used to supply data to the 
emergency management agencies can affect the trust of those data. For example, if a data 
provider offers a licence on a bushfire boundary map which only grants access to the map and 
not the underlying dataset, quality or process by which the map was created, then no assessment 
of data quality can be made by the emergency manager. This then leads to potential distrust of 
the dataset by the emergency manager particularly when the emergency manager may be held 
accountable for the decision based on that data. As described by von der Dunk (2008) about 
emergency managers using sensor data:  
“… such activities, normally undertaken with the best of intentions, might be 
subjected to legal scrutiny and run into legal obstacles or at least raise legal 
issues which may make potential rescuers think twice before doing the 
seemingly obvious.”  
von der Dunk (2008) specifically addresses the legal issues of using space-derived 
geospatial information for emergency response. While not often considered by product creators, 
data policy has been identified as a significant issue for using data within emergency 
management by authors including von der Dunk (2008), Lowell et al. (2011) and Purdy (2010). 
von der Dunk (2008) explores the legal issues, including data policy, related to the use of data in 
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emergency management. He also provides synthesis of the four most common legal issues in the 
field. As quoted from von der Dunk (2008, p. 22) these are: 
1. “The application of copyrights to geospatial information products relevant for 
emergency response as far as resulting from satellite activities. 
2. The international regime applicable to access to data, which result from Remote 
Sensing, and the application of copyrights. 
3. Responsibilities and (in particular) liabilities which may result from satellite-
based geospatial information operations and activities. 
4. Security and dual-use issues in the context of using geospatial information for 
emergency response, to the extent that existing international arrangements may 
have a bearing on the legal context within which certain emergency services or 
products might be provided.” 
Von der Dunk (2008, p. 22) does not suggest that these four issues are an exhaustive list, 
but other issues such as privacy would be “one step further removed from the core aspect of 
using satellite-generated data for emergency response”.  
The third relevant topic is data presentation.  Artz and Gil (2007) look at how data can be 
presented in a manner which drives trust in that data’s content. In their paper they focus on the 
emerging field of the semantic web, developing a list of factors that influence content trust on 
the internet. While similar, this list adds to those factors discussed in Wang and Strong (1996), 
by bringing in a focus on modern technologies. Artz and Gil (2007) reduce the risk of divergent 
definitions of trust between different disciplines such as between social science and computer 
science through its use of discipline specific definitions. The 19 factors proposed by Artz and 
Gil (2007) are as follows: 
1. Topic considered 
2. Context and criticality of the need for information 
3. Popularity of the resource 
4. Recognized authority of associations 
5. Reputation by direct experience 
6. Referrals by other users 
7. Association by other trusted resources (e.g., citations) 
8. Provenance and pedigree 
9. Expertise of the user 
10. Perceived bias of source 
11. Perceived incentive in providing accurate information 
12. Absence of other alternative resources 
13. Agreement with other resources 
14. Precise and specific content 
15. Likelihood of content being correct given what is known 
16. Time of creation of the content 
17. Professional appearance 
18. Likelihood of deceptive behavior 
19. Recency of factors under consideration 
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This thesis intends to look at how algorithms and packaging changes affect the likelihood 
that an emergency manager will use a product in a decision. This type of assessment can be 
referred to as a data adoption framework. There are several examples of data adoption 
frameworks in non-emergency management fields such as quality measurement for imaging 
satellites (QA4EO Secretariat 2007) and satellite based habitat monitoring (Vanden Borre et al. 
2011). Unfortunately the only example of a data adoption framework for emergency managers 
is for satellite-derived fire products of resource managers in southern Africa (Trigg and Roy 
2005). This paper is restricted only to satellite data, only for fires and only for southern Africa. 
There is a gap in the understanding of how to target a sensor data product for inclusion in 
emergency management decision making. 
Finding 11: There is a lack of research and understanding into how to optimise 
sensor data products for emergency managers (Section 2.4) 
 
This lack of research has been identified as a problem within several different fields. Harris 
and Browning (2003, p. 274) from the data policy field, using two disaster case studies, identify 
that data discovery is a large problem: 
 “Much of the information required for an earthquake monitoring project 
was unearthed only after extensive searching, and some could not be located 
at all.”  
Harris and Browning's quote highlights the issue of data discovery but also illustrates 
problems with usability (extensive searching was required) and relevance (even after ‘extensive 
searching’ no relevant information could be located).  
In the context of a habitat monitoring study, Vanden Borre et al. (2011, p. 124) goes one 
step further: 
“We call upon monitoring experts and remote sensing scientists to enter into 
a dialogue, discover what can reasonably be expected, define exact user and 
product requirements, exchange ideas, data and results, set standards for a 
common validation framework and strive for integration and synergies 
between remote sensing and field approaches.”  
In their paper, aimed at settling divisions between ground based and space based observers, 
Vanden Borre et al. (2011) highlight many issues including accuracy, relevance, usability, data 
source and presentation. Goodchild and Glennon (2010, p. 240) expand this to look at wildfires 
in Santa Barbara. Their paper examines the key issues associated with Volunteer Geographic 
Information and its potential role in disaster management, finding that: 
“Research is also needed to interpret what is known about trust and 
volunteerism in the specific context of crowdsourced geographic 
information, to devise appropriate mechanisms and institutions for building 
trust in volunteer sources.”  
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In this quote the requirement to design data adoption frameworks which build trust in 
crowd sourced information is established, noting both technical mechanisms and institutional 
changes are required. Both papers flag that there is a requirement to research how to present 
products, both to aid discovery and to research what drives an emergency manager to trust one 
product over another. This thesis explores the design choices at a technical and institutional 
level which lead to an emergency manager choosing to consider one data product in a decision 
making process over another. 
Finding 12: There is a gap in the literature and a need to research what changes to 
sensor products will increase the likelihood that an emergency manager will 
incorporate a sensor product in their decision making (Section 2.4) 
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2.6 Summary of findings  
Finding 1: Impacts of natural disasters are a rapidly growing problem (Section 2.2) 
Finding 2: Types of disasters are grouped differently depending on the purpose of the 
classification, the agency, or the author’s background (Section 2.2) 
Finding 3: Sensor numbers, quality and delivery speed are exponentially growing 
(Section 2.3) 
Finding 4: Not all data is high enough quality to become an observation, variable or 
product (Section 2.3) 
Finding 5: The Stretton Royal Commission in 1939 shows how long Australia has 
used spatial intelligence to improve emergency management decision making 
(Section 2.4) 
Finding 6: Scientific literature has shown that sensor data has been used in at least 
68% of disaster types (Section 2.4) 
Finding 7: Sensor data can be used in all stages of the emergency management 
framework: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (Section 2.4) 
Finding 8: Dedicated operational satellite mapping facilities for disasters are common 
in Europe and Asia (Section 2.4) 
Finding 9: While there is an active and diverse academic debate around improving 
the technical or implementation issues of using sensor data for emergency 
management, the utility to emergency managers is often unclear (Section 2.4) 
Finding 10: The distinction between awareness, usage and uptake is critical in 
assessing the effectiveness of a sensor data product (Section 3.2) 
Finding 11: There is a lack of research and understanding into how to optimise sensor 
data products for emergency managers (Section 2.4) 
Finding 12: There is a gap in the literature and a need to research what changes to 
sensor products will increase the likelihood that an emergency manager will 
incorporate a sensor product in their decision making (Section 2.4) 
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Chapter 3: Design choices in developing 
sensor data products  
 
3.1 Aim and overview of this chapter 
Chapter two explored the literature on sensor data in disasters and found a gap in looking 
at how to optimise data products for an emergency management audience.  
The introduction to this thesis hypothesised that there are many options for how to design a 
data product. The objective of this Chapter is to explore these options, or what this thesis terms 
design choices. The Chapter will first explore the idea of design choices. It will then conduct a 
case study examination of four large and reputable data systems which process the same raw 
ingredient - medium resolution optical sensor data into data products. Despite starting with the 
same ingredients, the four systems produce very different products. The case study will show 
that this is a result of the different design choices made in each system. By comparing and 
contrasting the four systems, the case study highlights key design choices and their impact on 
the resulting products.  
In demonstrating, that system level design choices impact the resulting product and starting 
to identify what some of these design choices are, this study provides a foundation which future 
studies build upon. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: 
3.2 Design choices ...................................................................................................... 42 
3.3 Medium resolution optical data products case study............................................. 44 
3.3.1 Background .................................................................................................... 44 
3.3.2 Systems comparison ....................................................................................... 47 
3.3.3 Analysis .......................................................................................................... 49 
3.4 Summary of findings ............................................................................................. 54 
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3.2 Design choices 
Before commencing the case study, it is important to define what is meant by the term 
‘design choices’. The distinction between awareness, usage and uptake shifts the focus from 
getting more users aware of sensor data, to increasing the uptake of sensor data products in 
emergency management decision making. This leads to an important question: Can sensor data 
products be designed to meet a given consumer’s needs or are they simply a function of the 
sensor? The central hypothesis of this thesis is that sensor data products can be designed in 
order to improve uptake and they are not simply a function of the input sensor data. 
Design choices are broadly the collection of decisions made to create a sensor data 
product. These choices cover scientific, technical, legal, aesthetic and business models. All 
these things will impact how a product is received. As these are decisions made by the product’s 
creators this thesis uses the term ‘choices’ to make clear that creators choose how their 
consumers interact with their product. This thesis uses the term ‘design choice’, defined as a 
decision taken by a product producer which influences how a product is received or used.  
This is important because if a consumer underestimates a creator’s capacity to change or 
tailor a sensor data product, it limits the potential usage and uptake of the sensor data. If 
consumers do not influence how they interact with a product then creators will always make the 
minimal amount of changes to the original sensor data rather than creating a product which 
meets the needs of a consumer. To do otherwise would likely involve guesswork (as to user 
needs) and/or inefficiency (in expending unasked-for or unnecessary effort). 
Finding 13: Consumers who underestimate a creator’s capability to tailor the design 
choices of a sensor data product dramatically limit the potential usage and uptake of 
that product (Section 3.3) 
 
There are a large number and variation of design choices and this thesis casts a wide net to 
capture all possible options. This chapter will start by putting forward some choices that are 
evident to the author from the literature. The studies in this thesis will then build on this to make 
a comprehensive list of design choices related to emergency management.  
The best known design choices are technical design choices specifically related to the 
choice of sensor and its specifications. Attributes of a specification are discussed in Section 2.3, 
including spatial, spectral, radiometric and temporal resolutions to name a few.  
Metadata, or data which describes data, is an increasingly important choice. Product 
creators can choose or choose not to generate, encapsulate and distribute metadata about a 
product. The provision of metadata increases the interoperability and transparency of a product 
because it provides the user with evidence of how a product was made, and to what standard 
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(Moreau et al. 2008). One form of metadata which deserves a specific mention is provenance, 
which describes how a product is created. Often referred to as lineage, this information can 
build confidence in a sensor data product. Quality information is another form of information 
where creators can describe the accuracy and limitations of a given product. All of these forms 
of metadata are decisions by the creator of the product to disclose how a product was created, its 
quality, its desired purpose and caveats for its use. 
Data policy is an area often overlooked in data product creation, potentially due to its legal 
nature. Prices are often represented as fixed rather than as a choice made by the creator. Other 
forms of data policy include licencing, indemnity, liability and distribution rights (Harris and 
Browning 2003). Data policy, including licence and cost, are choices made by the product 
creator and can be influenced by the consumer. 
Presentation is another area where product creators can make design choices which affect 
uptake. Traditional areas include file format, data projection and colour schemes. These are all 
relatively simple changes. Other more complex changes include, the speed which a product is 
generated after the measurement is taken, otherwise known as timeliness. This is particularly 
changeable with the advent of High Performance Computing (HPC).  
The business model of the product is another choice. The most common business models 
in sensor data products are processing on demand and rolling generation. Processing on demand 
involves storing data and generating a product on receipt of a request, such as making a single 
map of a fire at the request of an emergency manager. Processing on receipt involves generating 
products on receipt of data regardless of whether there is any relevant information within that 
data product, for example the rolling or continuous generation of the weather forecast even on 
days with good weather.  
Finding 14: Product creators have a myriad of design choices which can be altered 
in order to affect the uptake of a product (Section 3.3) 
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3.3 Medium resolution optical data products case study 
3.3.1 Background 
This case study focuses on data systems that use medium resolution optical sensor data. 
Medium resolution optical sensors record visible and infrared wavelengths with a geometric 
pixel size greater than 10 metres, and less than or equal to 80 metres. They are commonly 
considered as ‘paddock scale’ or agricultural sensors (Hudson et al. 2011). 
Data systems refer to the process through which raw data is processed into data products 
and distributed. As discussed earlier, Earth Observations are taken which detect energy from an 
object or feature of interest. These observations are processed using predefined algorithms into 
measurements which represent known properties of a feature of interest once interpreted beyond 
raw data becoming a value added product. The measurements are then interpreted through 
reference information to generate a variable which directly represents a feature of interest. For 
example, the Landsat-8 satellite images the Earth creating observations, these observations are 
processed into surface reflectance measurements, and this measurement is then interpreted to 
generate a burn intensity map of the fire burning within the satellite image.  
Improvements in scientific algorithms for the processing and interpretation of satellite 
imagery means systems are no longer just providing observations, but are now monitoring 
complex variables, which are now commonly being distributed.  This capacity to provide 
biophysical or geophysical variables that can be interpreted by non-EO specialists represents a 
key step in the mainstreaming of Earth Observation data (Wulder 1998). Simplified data will in 
turn allow for rapid growth through the mainstreaming of data extraction from optical data by 
technical users not just imaging specialists (Sellars et al. 2013).  
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All medium resolution optical sensor data generation systems are the most prevalent 
systems in the public sphere. They have been categorised by the author into broad system 
generations as shown in Table 8. These generations are defined by differences in data 
processing and distribution characteristics. A timeline for these generations is not appropriate as 
different countries have moved through the system generations at significantly different speeds 
hence the generations vary by more than a decade depending on country. 
Table 8: System generations for data processing and delivery systems for 
medium resolution optical data. 
Characteristic First 
generation 
Second 
generation 
 
Third 
generation 
 
Fourth and 
current 
generation 
Distribution 
medium 
Physical 
medium (CD, 
DVD, Tape) 
Internet Internet Internet 
Distribution 
model 
User pull User pull User pull User pull and 
supplier push 
Processing 
method 
Manual Manual and 
automatic 
Automatic Automatic 
Processing 
model 
Once ordered Once ordered On receipt On receipt 
Interaction 
method 
Website Website Website and 
web services 
Website, web 
services and 
mobile apps 
Product Satellite scene Satellite scene Satellite scene  
and pre-
processed 
observations for 
ROI 
Pre-processed 
observations for 
ROI 
Product type Measurements Measurements Measurements Measurements 
and variables 
 
In order to assess what design choices can be made in building systems, this Chapter 
compares Earth Explorer, the United States system which defined the third generation of 
delivery systems, with fourth generation systems either recently released or under development 
from the United States of America, Australia and China.  
The United States’ Earth Explorer system (http://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/) was launched in 
January of 2012 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). USGS describes the system: 
“Earth Explorer (EE) is a client/server interface that provides access to the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS) Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS) Center archive” (USGS 
2009). The objective of providing access is synonymous with an objective to increase usage. 
This system is a process on receipt system where users can download a variety of different 
datasets, in the form of satellite scenes, but also some value added products which have been 
clipped to predetermined boundaries such as countries. The medium resolution optical data, all 
from the Landsat series, are delivered as pre-processed scenes which can either be downloaded 
one by one, or through a bulk downloader following a registration and confirmation process.  
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Also from the United States, the Web Enabled Landsat Data (WELD) system 
(http://landsat.usgs.gov/WELD.php ) was developed by South Dakota State University and the 
USGS. Developed through a NASA grant, awarded in May 2008, the system was launched in 
October 2010 (Roy et al. 2010). The system processes imagery from the Landsat satellite series 
to high accuracy and then generates monthly, seasonal, and annual, composited products of the 
continental United States. The aim of this system is to make imagery more accessible and 
thereby increase usage (Roy et al. 2010). The system is currently under redevelopment in order 
to generate global mosaics and incorporate the Landsat 8 data stream. 
Earth Observations from space are the single most important and richest source of 
environmental information for Australia (AATSE and AAS 2009). Yet, Australia has no 
satellites and is therefore fully dependent on foreign-owned satellites for supply of this critical 
information. For this reason, systems which improve the surety of access are a high priority in 
Australia. Initiated by the Cooperative Research Centre for Spatial Information (CRC-SI) in 
February 2007 as the Platform for Environmental Modelling Support (PEMS), the now 
Australian Geoscience Data Cube (AGDC) has had many incarnations. In 2015, following its 
development by Geoscience Australia, the AGDC is a joint Geoscience Australia and 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) capability hosted on 
the National Computational Infrastructure (NCI). While not publically accessible in 2014, the 
system has already generated a national flood history of Australia back to 1998 (Geoscience 
Australia 2014). As described in a promotional video for the system, “The data cube is a way of 
organising satellite data, it chops the data up into tiles and stacks them up and delivers them 
through time so we can analyse the data in a way which is not dependent on a particular 
satellite.” The objective of the system is “to make better decisions for the Australian 
government, for the community and for business, for anyone”  (Geoscience Australia 2013b). 
While there is a scene based version of the product referred to as the Australian Reflectance 
Grid 25 metre, the AGDC is the archive wide version which shall be analysed in this Chapter 
(Geoscience Australia 2013a). 
The final system compared is China’s SatSee system, currently under development in the 
Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth in the Chinese Academy of Science (RADI-
CAS). The system uses quicklook images, compressed JPEG images from the ground station, 
instead of full uncompressed bands which are the standard in the sector. Quicklooks are 
commonly used by ground station operators as a form of quality assurance. This system 
however, uses quicklooks in full resolution, not sampled as is typical, and uses these data as the 
product to distribute and to generate derived products. This system will offer a subscription 
service by which users can select a Region of Interest (ROI) and receive updated imagery 
straight to their computer or mobile device immediately once the satellite images a ROI. The 
concept is described as Location-Based Instant Satellite Image Service (LBISIS) and the aim of 
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this system is “to increase the amount of users from the public and to promote the value of 
these data” (Liu et al. 2014, 94). 
All of these systems have slightly different objectives but in short they hope to allow less 
technical users to access more data faster. Earth Explorer is a traditional third generation system 
from which WELD and AGDC are the natural evolution into fourth generation systems. SatSee, 
while still fourth generation, is different and potentially quite disruptive as products are pushed 
to users rather than being accessed by logging in. It may also lead to improvements in timeliness 
which makes real time decision making possible from this data. SatSee could be attractive to a 
group of users which have not been reached by traditional systems.  
3.3.2 Systems comparison 
This section compares the third generation Earth Explorer and three fourth generation 
systems, the publically available WELD system and the still under development AGDC and the 
SatSee system. This section firstly presents detailed comparisons of key design choices such as 
the backend, archival and data management processes, and the front end data and distribution 
policies. This is followed by an analysis of what impact these design choices have on data 
accuracy, timeliness and system maturity. 
The differences in the data sources and data management design choices of each system 
show that each is using a slightly different combination of medium resolution optical data to 
generate the data products. Table 9 displays the detailed archival and data management design 
choices of each system. Table 9 is derived from the author’s technical examination of each 
system. In order to limit the scope, this Chapter does not consider the derived products (such as 
Digital Elevation Models) in Earth Explorer.  
Table 9: Comparison of archival and data management system design choices. 
Characteristic Earth Explorer WELD AGDC SatSee 
Temporal 
coverage 
1972-Present 2003-2012 1986-2013 ROI registration – 
present (Project 
commenced 2012, 
data not 
retrospective) 
Sensors Landsat 1-8, SIR-C,  
Orbview-3, EO-1, 
IKONOS-2, AVHRR 
and Aerial  
 
Landsat 7 Landsat 5; Landsat 7 Landsat 8; HJ-1A; 
HJ-1B 
Central data 
archive format 
GeoTIFF 1° x 1° tiles NetCDF 1° x 1° tiles GeoTIFF Full paths in RAW 
Local data archive 
format 
N/A N/A N/A Full path in JPEG 
Data storage and 
management 
Database + structured 
file store 
Unknown Database + structured 
file store 
Unknown 
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Table 10 highlights the data policy and distribution design choices of the four systems. 
Data distribution shows significant changes with the addition of web services and mobile 
applications in the fourth generation. 
Table 10: Comparison of data policy and distribution system design choices. 
Characteristic Earth Explorer WELD AGDC SatSee 
Access/download 
method 
HTTP or Bulk 
Download 
Application 
HTTP and web 
services 
Web services HTTP, SatSee 
downloader or 
mobile application 
Mosaic Nil, standard satellite 
scene 
Composited mosaics Composited mosaics Nil, satellite path 
clipped to ROI 
Data distribution 
format 
GeoTIFF  GeoTIFF, HDF, 
Single Pixel Time 
Series and OGC 
compliant browse 
imagery 
User defined Custom in JPEG 
Data retrievable as 
time series 
No Yes Yes No 
Registration 
required 
Yes No TBA Yes 
Open access Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Licence Unlicenced open data 
policy 
Unlicenced open data 
policy 
Creative Commons 
3.0 By Attribution 
Unlicenced open data 
policy 
 
Table 11 considers the corrections applied to medium resolution optical source data in 
order to generate the final product. As previously discussed, SatSee uses full resolution 
quicklook imagery in compressed JPEG format and so has less corrections applied. This is 
designed to increase the speed with which it can be delivered to users. 
Table 11: Comparison of data accuracy system design choices. 
Characteristic Earth Explorer WELD AGDC SatSee 
Geometric 
correction 
LPGS L1T standard 
GCPs from GLS2000 
LPGS L1T standard 
GCPs from GLS2000 
LPGS L1T standard 
GCPs from GLS2000 
and local 
Reverse projection 
Cloud/cloud 
shadow flagged 
Nil Yes, ACCA (Irish 
2000; Irish et al. 
2006) 
Yes, ACCA (Irish 
2000; Irish et al. 
2006) and Fmask 
(Zhu and Woodcock 
2012) 
Nil 
Atmospheric 
correction 
Yes, Top of 
atmosphere 
reflectance LEDAPS 
(Masek et al. 2006) 
Yes, Top of 
atmosphere 
reflectance LEDAPS 
(Masek et al. 2006) 
Yes, Top of 
atmosphere 
reflectance and 
BRDF corrected 
surface reflectance 
NBAR (F. Li et al. 
2010) 
Nil 
BRDF topographic 
correction 
Nil Nil Yes, (F. Li et al. 
2012) 
Nil 
Pixel compositing All observations are 
preserved 
Best available pixel 
compositing is 
applied in side laps 
All observations are 
preserved 
All observations are 
preserved 
Projection/Datum  Albers Equal Area 
WGS84 
Latitude/Longitude 
WGS84 
Unprojected 
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Table 12 compares the timeframes for processing and distribution of each system. The 
timeliness, or time from acquisition to delivery, is critical for applications such as emergency 
management but also is perceived as quite important by the public at large (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1994).  
Table 12: Comparison of timeliness system design choices. 
Characteristic Earth Explorer WELD AGDC SatSee 
Processing mode On receipt Batch Batch On receipt 
Ephemeris2 Precise (Definitive)  Precise (Definitive) Precise (Definitive) Predicted  
Data push/pull Pull Pull Pull Push 
 
3.3.3 Analysis 
All systems consume at least one of the Landsat satellite series, with Earth Explorer having 
a more diverse set of data, and SatSee with sensors from China. This means that all systems 
consume the same type of Landsat data hence an examination of the choices which lead to the 
differences in products begins to show possible design choices.  
The four system’s archiving and data management practices are indicative of the users they 
are targeting. Earth Explorer, WELD and AGDC are similar in that they provide archive data 
from a central archive. Satsee only provides data from the data of registration, showing its focus 
on real-time decision making and high timeliness applications. 
While there are some differences in user registration policies and use of specific legal 
licences, all systems hold an open data policy. The selection of an open data policy, user 
registration or no licence, are all choices which the system’s creators made. 
Open data is now the norm in the sensor data sector because of its proven impact on usage. 
Following the unsuccessful commercialisation of the United States Landsat program in 1984, 
the United States Geological Survey and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
adopted a new open data policy in January 2008 (Wulder and Coops 2014). As a result, data 
usage has increased dramatically. For the entire year of 2001, 25,000 images were purchased, 
whereas in 2009, 108,214 scenes per month were downloaded. In 2010, after the final parts of 
the archive were opened up, downloads reached 233,241 per month, with more than 250,000 
images each month in 2012 (Wulder et al. 2012). These downloads took place through two 
online systems, the USGS Global Visualization Viewer or GloVis and the Earth Explorer 
system. Following this success, the global Group on Earth Observations released its GEOSS 
Data Sharing Principles in 2009 making it global best practice for all environmental information 
to be released under an open data policy (GEO 2009). 
                                                     
2 Precise ephemeris, or definitive ephemeris in Landsat terminology, takes two days for 
the final orbit parameters to be received. 
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Technical advances over recent years have been accompanied by breakthroughs in 
scientific corrections such as Masek et al. (2006), Irish et al. (2006),  Zhu and Woodcock (2012) 
and Li et al. (2012). These new corrections generate imagery to represent the Earth’s surface so 
accurately that the effects of the atmosphere, terrain shadow, clouds and cloud shadows can be 
removed or masked. These new corrections are expected to generate observations capable of 
scientific analysis, which can be stored in a time series to understand changes to the earth over 
time. These time series can contain not just images from one satellite over time, but images 
from similar sensors even outside that satellite series. For example with these style of corrected 
time series of medium resolution optical images built not just out of Landsat 5, Landsat 7 and 
Landsat 8 data but also including corrected observations from outside the Landsat series of 
satellites such as Sentinel 2a/b and Gaofen-1/6’s Wide Field Imager. 
Based on the number of different corrections, accuracy appears to be the main focus for the 
AGDC, slightly less important for both Earth Explorer and WELD, and not a priority at all for 
SatSee. Both the WELD and SatSee systems aim to improve their respective data qualities in 
the future, but this can only go so far for the SatSee system while it is based on compressed data 
that cannot be corrected without reducing timeliness. 
 
Finding 15: Open data, technological and scientific developments have meant that 
product creators can now increasingly change and tailor sensor data products 
(Section 3.3.3) 
 
Timeliness is clearly the focus for SatSee. Timeliness is prioritised over all other design 
choices with processing on receipt and pushing the data to the users. Data is still processed on 
receipt by Earth Explorer but downloaded by users. Both WELD and AGDC bulk process and 
then are downloaded by users. 
Historically, the size of satellite datasets has meant that processing and distribution of 
these 200-400 megabyte per scene datasets has always been a bottleneck. With technological 
advances allowing for faster processing and easier transmission, this is being addressed. In 1979 
when the Australian Landsat Station opened, Australia was acquiring Landsat data before the 
country had a computer fast enough to process one scene (Leslie 2008). Now thousands of 
scenes can be processed each day by the modern equivalent to the Australian Landsat Station, 
Geoscience Australia. The processing model is now capable of processing all data immediately 
on receipt, rather than processing data one scene at a time, if and when they are ordered. This 
means data distribution systems can push out the data, rather than just responding to the 
traditional ‘user pull’ model. Users now interact with these data systems not just through 
website portals but through mobile applications and through system-to-system interaction using 
3.3 Medium resolution optical data products case study 51  
 
 
web services (Chen et al. 2011). Greater technological capacity also means that products are no 
longer limited to the traditional satellite geometry defined by the scene in the camera, but can 
cover the user’s Region of Interest (ROI), as demonstrated in the Satsee system, which may be 
larger or smaller than a standard satellite scene by using pre-processed archives of observations 
ready for delivery. 
As established by Wright (2001), there is an inverse relationship between accuracy and 
timeliness. Using the timeliness and accuracy information defined above, Figure 8 plots the 
timeliness compared with accuracy of each system. The scale bars have been removed to avoid 
readers focusing on a specific value rather than the purpose of these graphs which is to 
illustrative the inverse relationship.  
 
 
Figure 8: Chart showing the relationship between timeliness of each system 
and the accuracy of each system. 
 
This graph illustrates that SatSee is the fastest system and AGDC has the highest accuracy 
products. These were active choices made by those designing these products. The AGDC 
employs every possible correction including two types of cloud/cloud shadow masking, two 
types of atmospheric correction, sun sensor geometry corrections and topographic corrections 
all to maximise accuracy. On the other hand SatSee does not even wait for the entire dataset to 
be transferred from the ground station, it provides compressed quicklook images with no 
corrections to maximise timeliness. This relationship not only shows the design choices of 
accuracy and timeliness but illustrates how changing the design of the system can affect how the 
product is received. Systems targeted at different stakeholder groups must actively considering 
how to trade off accuracy and timeliness.  
Table 13 presents a comparison of system maturity design choices. System maturity is an 
independent measure of the completeness of a system. While many different maturity models 
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exist (such as the NASA technical readiness levels for flight hardware and the computer 
software industry’s Capability Maturity Model Integration) this Chapter uses a system 
developed by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  
The NOAA maturity model described in Bates and Privette (2012) assesses the 
completeness of climate data records and is applicable to this context, as each of the medium 
resolution optical data archives can be considered a similar style of product to a climate data 
record. The model has been slightly adapted to apply to data systems rather than just the data 
product3. The author has used Bates and Privette's (2012) methodology, particularly their 1-6 
scale maturity model to describe the maturity of the various parts of each system. 
Table 13: Comparison of maturity design choices. 
Characteristic Earth Explorer WELD AGDC SatSee 
Software 
Readiness 
6, No code changes 
expected; Stable and 
reproducible; 
portable and 
operationally 
efficient 
4, Some code 
changes expected 
3, Moderate code 
changes expected 
2, Significant code 
changes expected 
Metadata 
6, Updated and 
complete at file and 
collection level. 
Stable. Allows 
provenance tracking 
and reproducibility of 
dataset. Meets 
current international 
standards for dataset 
3, Research grade; 
meets international 
standards; ISO or 
FGDC for collection; 
netCDF for file 
3, Research grade; 
meets international 
standards; ISO or 
FGDC for collection; 
netCDF for file 
1, Little or none 
Documentation 
6, Public C-ATBD 
and OAD; Multiple 
peer-reviewed 
publications on 
algorithm and 
product 
5, Public C-ATBD, 
Review version of 
OAD; Peer-reviewed 
publications on 
algorithm and 
product 
4, Public C-ATBD; 
Draft OAD; Peer 
reviewed publication 
on algorithm; paper 
on product submitted 
2, C-ATBD Version 
1+; paper on 
algorithm reviewed 
Product Validation 
6, Observation 
strategy designed to 
reveal systematic 
errors through 
independent cross-
checks, open 
inspection, and 
continuous 
interrogation; 
quantified errors 
3, Uncertainty 
estimated for select 
locations/times 
3, Uncertainty 
estimated for select 
locations/times 
1, Little or None 
Public Access 
6, Record is 
publically available 
for Long-Term 
4, Data and source 
code archived and 
publicly available; 
uncertainty estimates 
2, Limited data 
availability to 
develop familiarity 
2, Limited data 
availability to 
develop familiarity 
                                                     
3 Where the model calls for an Operational Algorithm Description (OAD) or Climate 
Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document (C-ATBD) equivalent documents have been accepted as 
these terms are specific to the meteorological community.   
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archive; Regularly 
updated 
provided; Known 
issues public 
Utility 
6, Used in published 
applications; may be 
used by industry; 
assessments 
demonstrating 
positive value 
6, Used in published 
applications; may be 
used by industry; 
assessments 
demonstrating 
positive value 
4, May be used in 
applications; 
assessments 
demonstrating 
positive value 
3, Assessments have 
demonstrated 
positive value 
Average 6 4.2 3.2 1.8 
Min 6 3 2 1 
 
According to Fisher and Kingma (2001) there are three variables that influence the way 
decision makers use information: information overload, experience levels of the decision-
makers and time constraints. These three variables can be considered as design choices related 
to relevance (too much detail), simplicity (too complex) and timeliness (too slow). These design 
choices can help product creators determine how to optimise a system to a stakeholder group. 
Emergency managers must make quick decisions, often in the absence of high quality 
information. Emergency managers also require systems with high reliability due to the literally 
‘life and death’ nature of decisions such as deployment of response teams or issuing warnings. 
High reliability means that high maturity and low timeliness is critical to emergency managers. 
Decision makers and planners require the highest quality information in order to reduce 
uncertainty and to justify their decisions. Scientists have a diverse range of requirements 
meaning that customisation is critical so that information is targeted for their specific inquiry. 
The public, by definition, is the broadest possible user group giving them the broadest possible 
set of requirements, this often leads to systems targeted at accessibility to enable the broadest 
possible user base to access the system. These characterisations of different user groups show 
how different design choices can be tailored to appeal to that group. 
Unfortunately, as Chapter two showed, there is a lack of systematic research into 
optimising data systems for a particular user group. This study shows that there is a large 
diversity of design choices which create varied products from the same sensor data. This study 
illustrates that the perception that a data product is purely a function of the input data is not true. 
Finding 16: In most cases no system is better than another. They are simply 
choosing a different collection of design choices to target a different groups of users, 
therefore different agencies and countries interpret user’s needs in different ways. 
(Section 3.4.3) 
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3.4 Summary of findings   
Finding 13: Consumers who underestimate a creator’s capability to tailor the design 
choices of a sensor data product dramatically limit the potential usage and uptake of 
that product (Section 3.3) 
Finding 14: Product creators have a myriad of design choices which can be altered 
in order to affect the uptake of a product (Section 3.3) 
Finding 15: Open data, technological and scientific developments have meant that 
product creators can now increasingly change and tailor sensor data products (Section 
3.3.3) 
Finding 16: In most cases no system is better than another. They are simply choosing 
a different collection of design choices to target a different groups of users, therefore 
different agencies and countries interpret user’s needs in different ways (Section 3.4.3) 
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Chapter 4: Data uptake in Australian 
disaster inquiries 
 
4.1 Aim and overview of this chapter 
Chapter three explored how data systems with the same input can make different design 
choices to create varied products. This was achieved through exploring the main system design 
choices of moderate resolution optical data delivery systems and how these vary across different 
groups.  
This Chapter focuses on Australia in an effort to gain more specific insights. This Chapter 
analyses disaster inquiries in Australia to identify examples of any data usage and concerns 
raised about data. 
Following this Chapter, these uptake examples and concerns are added to the findings of 
previous Chapters and tested through a user survey in Chapter five. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: 
4.2 Study logic ............................................................................................................ 56 
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4.3.2 Word frequency analysis ................................................................................ 58 
4.3.3 Bushfire recommendation classification ........................................................ 59 
4.3.4 Document analysis ......................................................................................... 59 
4.4 Study results .......................................................................................................... 60 
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4.4.2 Word frequency analysis ................................................................................ 62 
4.4.3 Bushfire recommendation classification ........................................................ 63 
4.4.4 Document analysis ......................................................................................... 66 
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4.6 Summary of findings ............................................................................................. 75 
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4.2 Study logic 
This Chapter identifies examples of data uptake and data related concerns from Australian 
disaster inquiries. Post event inquiries scrutinise the management of emergencies and given the 
critical role of sensor data in emergency management much can be learned from these inquiries 
relevant to this thesis. Due to the highly specific nature of this study many inquiries contain no 
relevant information for this thesis, hence a prioritisation is conducted to determine which 
inquiries warrant further analysis. This prioritisation is achieved through word frequency 
analysis of data related keywords. In addition to word frequency analysis across all inquiries a 
targeted classification of all bushfire inquiry recommendations is undertaken. Following this 
prioritisation and classification, in-depth document analysis collects the data uptake examples 
and data related concerns.  
The objectives of this Chapter are: 
 To identify the usage and uptake of data within recent Australian disasters;  
 To analyse the relationship between different types of data, uptake and usage; and 
 To analyse the circumstance around data usage and/or uptake. 
The scope of this Chapter is restricted to official investigations of a disaster by an 
Australian authority. This scope allows for disasters which did not occur on the Australian 
mainland such as maritime incidents. Official investigations refer to investigations funded 
through the public purse or which have been endorsed through subsequent usage within the 
community. These include royal commissions, parliamentary inquiries, coronial inquests, audit 
reports, internal agency reviews and independent reviews. 
4.3 Study method 
4.3.1 Dataset 
The dataset upon which this Chapter is based is a collection of Australian disaster 
inquiries. This includes both post disaster inquiries and reviews of the sector; this distinction is 
often blurred by the reality that most reviews of the sector are triggered by events. The dataset 
includes seven inquiry types: Agency, audit, coronial, governments, independent, parliamentary 
and royal commission. An agency inquiry is an official review by a government agency either 
into itself or another agency. An audit inquiry is generally a performance audit into a specific 
agency or aspect of an agency conducted by a Federal or state government audit office. A 
coroner's inquest is an inquiry to determine the cause of an unexplained, sudden or traumatic 
death or the cause of a fire conducted by state or territory government coroner’s court. A 
governments inquiry is a cross government inquiry conducted by the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) or a collection of politicians and public servants. An independent inquiry 
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is one where the chair is either self-appointed or appointed with autonomy from politicians and 
government officials. A parliamentary inquiry is an inquiry run by either house of the Federal or 
State parliaments in Australia. Finally a royal commission is the highest profile form of inquiry 
in Australia. They are appointed by a Federal or State government and have additional powers 
such as the power to compel testimony. It is important to note that the status and impact of 
inquiries is different depending on type, not only do inquiries make recommendations but they 
can have significant political and policy impact. 
An initial list of inquiries was compiled through the fusion of three existing lists (Casus 
Calamitas Consulting 2013; Casus Calamitas Consulting 2012; Eburn and Dovers 2015) and 
discussions with experts in the sector, the final dataset contains 257 inquiries from 1886 to 
2013. This list was then used to source digital versions of each inquiry from a range of internet 
sources including the original inquiry website, online parliament archives, historical collections 
of inquiries accompanying more recent inquiries and other webpages. Following this process 
174 inquiries were digitally acquired in a searchable version of the Portable Document Format 
or PDF, 9 inquiries were acquired in PDF but were not in a searchable form but just photos of 
the original inquiry. Finally 74 inquiries were not found online. Of the 183 inquiries which were 
acquired many had multiple volumes and parts, for example the Victorian Black Saturday Royal 
Commission is 88 separate PDF documents. In addition inquiries can be made up of reports, 
interim reports, depositions, minutes of meetings and submissions. In this study only interim 
reports and reports were analysed due to practicality and the limited benefit gained from further 
exploration. For example in the 1902 Royal Commission into the Mount Kembla Colliery 
Disaster the commission created 40 documents including depositions and minutes of meetings, 
only three of these documents are the report. These multiple versions meant that 303 PDF 
documents covering 183 inquiries of which 174 were taken forward for further analysis. A 
summary table of these inquiries can be found in Appendix A. 
In addition to the above mentioned inquiries which were not in a searchable form, two 
individual PDFs from inquiries which had multiple documents were not searchable due to 
unknown technical issues. These included: 
 Part 5 of 13 “Part E Term of Reference Three: The Way Forward” from the 2003 
Victorian Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires; and 
 Part 2 of 2 “The Canberra Firestorm: Inquests and Inquiry into Four Deaths and 
Four Fires between 8 and 18 January Volume 2” from the 2006 Coronial inquest 
into Canberra bushfires. 
While not used in the word frequency analysis, Volume 2 of the Canberra firestorm inquest 
was used in the document analysis due to the significance of the event. 
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4.3.2 Word frequency analysis 
Once the dataset of 174 inquiries had been collected, it became clear that reading all 
inquiries would not be possible with the scope of this work due to the 10.2 million words or 
conservatively 20,000 pages of inquiries. For this reason methods to narrow the scope were 
explored. This Chapter aims to identify examples of data uptake and concerns related to the use 
of data, to best achieve this aim diversity is important to ensure that any findings apply to all 
types of sensor data products and all types of hazards. To ensure a representative sample 
arbitrary approaches such as working backwards from the most recent or restricting by state, 
hazard type or inquiry type were not pursued. Instead word frequency analysis of a group of 
data related keywords was used across all 174 inquiries.  
Frequency analysis was run on every word in every report from which the keyword 
frequencies were then extracted. The word frequency data was extracted from each report using 
Sobelsoft’s PDF Word Count & Frequency Statistics Software.  
Twenty keywords were chosen to cover data capture technologies and words generally 
used in relation to data. Keywords were shortened to make sure different versions of a word 
were found such as “sens” was used instead of sensing or sensor. The following is a list of the 
twenty data related keywords with the shortened versions expanded in brackets: 
Data, information, observation, satellite, plane, aircraft, camera, sens 
(sensing/sensor), instrument, measure, radar, forecast, predict, project, 
model, surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, map, meteorol 
(Meteorologist/meteorology) 
 
The word frequency of each keyword was extracted. Steps were taken to ensure that only 
words of the correct context were included in the count. Firstly, out of context words were not 
included such as “planet” and “sensory” under the “plane” and “sensor” keywords. Due to 
inaccuracies in digitisation many words were stored in long strings rather than individual words. 
For example “remotesensing” which is in context and included or 
“andtoimplementappropriatecontrolmeasures” which is out of context and not included. In this 
case many counts were merged such as the example mentioned above of sensing and sensor. 
After the data was cleansed manually the keyword counts from the multiple PDF inquiries were 
merged into a single keyword count for each inquiry. These inquiry wide keywords were then 
converted into a percentage to the total report’s word count to reflect how often a keyword was 
mentioned and not the length of the inquiry’s report. One significant limitation of this method is 
that by merging multiple volumes from an inquiry a data specific report may be diluted in the 
statistics. For this reason all PDFs titles were checked for direct relevance to this thesis. 
Based on the keyword’s percentage of total word count, the top five inquiries with the 
most frequent use of each of 20 data related keywords were identified. Accounting for the many 
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inquiries which were flagged multiple times, the initial 174 inquiries were restricted to 61 
inquiries which had specific data related content.  
4.3.3 Bushfire recommendation classification 
In addition to the word frequency approach, a targeted study was conducted classifying the 
recommendations from bushfire inquiries. This approach restricted the dataset from the original 
257 inquiries to a more manageable 87 inquiries relevant to bushfires and bushfire management. 
Similar to the word frequency analysis 36 inquiries were not readily available and so 51 
inquiries were taken forward for further analysis. The reports that are the subject of this review 
include operational reviews (such as the McLeod Inquiry into the Operational Response to the 
2013 Canberra fires), parliamentary inquiries (such as the New South Wales parliament’s Joint 
Select Committee on Bushfires: Report on the Inquiry into the 2001/2002 Bushfires) coroner’s 
inquiries, Auditors-General reports on fire management and the operation of fire services, and 
commissioned inquiries (such as the Malone review of the Queensland Rural Fire Service).  
These 51 inquiries produced 1728 recommendations. These recommendations were then 
coded into categories which after some iteration created 31 categories. These categories then 
were analysed for similarities and were able to be grouped into six broad themes, three of which 
align with the PPRR emergency management framework. The coding was then independently 
verified by a colleague, Michael Eburn. The six themes were: 
A – Shared responsibility; 
B – Preparedness; 
C – Response; 
D – Recovery; 
E – Fire agency organisation; and 
F – Research and technology. 
Disagreements on the assigned code were discussed and allowed for iterative development 
of the final 31 categories. 
4.3.4 Document analysis 
Document analysis was used to analyse the remaining data relevant 61 inquiries. The 
document analysis began with checking for why inquiries were flagged in the word frequency 
analysis. The report was then tested for usage of any additional data related keywords. Finally 
each report was reviewed in order to identify any further areas of relevance to this thesis. 
Through each of these steps any example of data uptake, usage or awareness was recorded. 
Concerns regarding data were also recorded. If reports were found to not yield content relevant 
to this thesis they were removed from the analysis.  
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Finally all collected examples were summarised and grouped when terms were similar. 
These terms were then analysed for clustering around a particular issue or development of an 
issue overtime.  
4.4 Study results 
4.4.1 Dataset 
As explained in the methods section, 257 Australian disaster inquiries have been analysed 
in order to produce examples of data update and concerns regarding data in formal disaster 
inquiries. This dataset yielded many ideas. Although the overall dataset is not the focus of this 
thesis a basic overview is useful for context. 
Of the 257 disaster inquiries in Australia 61 are independent, 55 are parliamentary, 43 are 
audits, 40 are agency, 28 are coronial, 22 are royal commissions and 7 are governments. By 
region the Federal government has the most inquiries with 60 inquiries closely followed by 
Victoria with 59 inquiries.  
As shown in Figure 9, the main types of hazards which generate inquiries in Australia are 
bushfires with 87 inquiries, all hazards (disaster type ambivalent) with 67 inquiries and 
technical accidents with 34 inquiries. Of the bushfire inquiries 41, or 47% of inquiries, are from 
the Victorian and West Australian governments which indicates the strong history of bushfires 
which cause losses in those states. All hazard inquiries seem to be a Federal government focus 
with 24, or 36% of all hazard inquiries, coming from the Federal government. 
States and Territories also have different exposure to different types of hazards. A simple 
example is the ACT has never had a maritime, oil spill or tsunami inquiry because it is a 
landlocked Territory (excluding discussions of Jervis Bay). One commonly held view within the 
emergency management community is that Queensland is the disaster state due to being 
impacted by a wide range of hazards including: fires, floods, cyclones, earthquakes and 
landslides. As shown in Figure 9 this view is not reflected in the inquiry dataset. Queensland 
only has had 20 inquiries, substantially less than Victoria, New South Wales and Western 
Australia. 
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Figure 9: Number of disaster inquiries by jurisdiction and hazard type. 
 
This dataset is of the number of inquiries and not number of disasters. This distinction is 
important because there are numerous occasions where multiple inquiries are called to address 
the same hazard. For example the 2003 Canberra bushfires had four separate inquiries: the 2003 
ACT independent inquiry into the operational response, the 2003 ACT independent review into 
recovery, the 2005 COAG inquiry into Bushfire Mitigation and Management and finally the 
2006 coronial inquest. 
 
Figure 10: Number of disaster inquiries by jurisdiction and inquiry type. 
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Inquiry statistics are affected by a jurisdiction’s culture. Victoria’s position as the most 
inquiry common state may not be accurate as the 24 of Victoria’s inquiries are agency inquiries 
which may be more a measure of Victoria’s ability to release information on the internet rather 
than a prevalence of inquiries. Further evidence to this is that NSW, a larger state in population 
terms, only has four agency inquiries making it unclear whether Victoria is the inquiry state or 
the state of more open government. 
This dataset is definitely worthy of further study but for the purpose of this Chapter 
provides useful context into the frequency and diversity of disaster inquiries in Australia.  
4.4.2 Word frequency analysis 
As discussed above, of the original 257 inquiries 174 were run through word frequency 
analysis. These frequencies were converted into a percentage of the total word count in order to 
reflect the amount a topic was discussed and not the size of the report. Of the 10.2 million 
words analysed in the 174 inquiries, 37 thousand or 0.37% were flagged as data related 
keywords. Appendix C summarises the 61 inquiries which were in at least one of the top five 
most frequently mentioned data-related keyword. 
In addition to sorting out the most frequently mentioned keywords in an inquiry, the 
accumulative measure of how often all twenty of these data related keywords are in each 
inquiry. For example, data related keywords are most common in governments inquiries with 
0.72% of content, second is audits with 0.6% and third is agency with 0.59%, in last place are 
royal commissions with 0.12% of content being data related keywords. This suggests that the 
lower profile style of inquiry have the most data related discussion and by extension potentially 
technical discussions in general. This is logical due to the tendency to adopt adversarial 
techniques in larger inquiry types such as royal commissions and audits. These inquiry types are 
chaired by former judges and assisted by lawyers who are trained to be adversarial. The 
adoption of a legal mode of inquiry may derive more from custom and practice than inquiry 
requirements (Pascoe 2010; McGowan 2012). This means that the most high profile and 
political inquiry type, the royal commission, is least likely to consider data related topics and 
potentially technical discussions in general. The more political an inquiry, the less technical the 
content of the inquiry. 
 
Finding 17: The more political the structure of an inquiry the less technical the 
content of the inquiry. (Section 4.4.2) 
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4.4.3 Bushfire recommendation classification 
An overview of the 1728 classified recommendations from the 51 bushfire and bushfire 
management inquiries can be found in Table 14. 
Table 14: Summary results categorising 1728 recommendations from 51 
Australian bushfires and bushfire management inquiries between 1939-2013 
including percent of each recommendation type and for the last several 
decades. 
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Table 14 above shows the number of recommendations from 51 bushfire inquiries in each 
of the 31 categories identified by the researchers.  In addition, the percent of each 
recommendation type has been calculated which gives a measure of how inquiries have focused 
on this topic in relation to other topics. This percentage has also been calculated for the last 
several decades to give an indication of the trend of certain topics. For example, community 
warnings and communication are becoming more common with 2.3% of recommendations on 
the topic between 1990 and 1999, 4.9% of recommendations between 2000 and 2009 and 7.2% 
of recommendations between 2010 and 2013. 
 
Finding 18: Data quality has been a minor topic in Australian bushfire inquiries with 
only 53 or 3.1% of the 1728 recommendations made between 1939 and 2013 related 
to mapping or data quality. (Section 4.4.3) 
 
Figure 11 continues with this analysis technique showing how topics have gone in and out 
of fashion as a topic of interest for post event inquiries. Fire bans and weather warnings were 
important topics in the 1960s, less so in the 1970s then went silent until 2010 where they have 
been mentioned several times since. Mapping and data quality were not an issue until the mid-
1980s, they became very relevant in the early 2000s after which they declined. Since 2008 they 
have shown a steady rise as a re-emerging issue. 
 
 
Figure 11: Percent of Australian bushfire inquiry recommendations overtime for 
the following topics: Building codes/land use planning/refuges, fire 
bans/weather warnings, insurance/legal liability and mapping/data quality. 
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 Figure 12 shows that different types of inquiries have tended to have different foci. 
Agency and independent inquiries are more response focused, audits focus on shared 
responsibility whilst parliamentary inquiries and royal commissions focus on preparedness. 
 
Figure 12: Classified bushfire recommendations across subject categories. 
 
4.4.4 Document analysis 
Of these 174 inquiries analysed in the word frequency analysis, the top five inquiries with 
the most frequent use of each of the twenty data related keywords were identified. This could 
have led to 100 inquiries but due to the fact that one data related discussion is likely to use more 
than one data related keyword there were many overlaps. As a result, 61 inquiries were flagged 
by the word frequency analysis for further analysis.  
Document analysis was used to analyse the remaining 61 inquiries. 32 inquiries yielded 
examples of data uptake and/or data concerns. The remaining 29 reports did not yield content 
relevant to this thesis. This was due to flagged keywords being used out of context for this 
thesis, for example ‘adequacy of measures’ or ‘legislative instrument’.  
To understand the state of data uptake and concerns related to data the key examples, in the 
form of quotes, found in the 32 relevant inquiries are presented followed by a synthesis of 
common usage and concerns.  
Although not specifically in the context of presenting sensor data to emergency managers, 
much content about warnings was relevant because it is about how emergency managers should 
present information to the community. Recommendation 1 from the 2011 (Victoria) TriTech 
Lubricants factory fire review from the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner is a 
clear example where design choices are balanced to create better community warnings. These 
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design choices included consistency, relevance, timeliness, accuracy, availability and 
interoperability. Examples of how to communicate to the community is in the scope of this 
study but examples of managing community expectation are out of scope. Specific and relevant 
examples regarding warnings are used to inform this thesis.  
The first objective of this Chapter is to identify cases where data awareness, usage or 
uptake have been an issue. To ensure a widest possible dataset was captured any discussion of 
awareness, usage or uptake of a sensor data product was captured. An inquiry specific list of 
data usage and concerns can be found in Appendix D.  
This cross sector of inquiries intensified by the word frequency analysis showed 35 
mentions of at least 18 different sensor data products which are being considered in decision 
making (uptake), used or emergency managers are aware of the data product. 
In Table 15 each of these 35 mentions have been grouped to show the number of mentions, 
whether the reference is about raw data or a specific data derived product and finally the source 
or domain of the measurements used in the dataset or product. 
Table 15: Data product/source mentions in Australia disaster inquiries. 
Data product/source Mentions Type 
Measurement 
domain 
Weather forecast 7 Product All 
Weather warnings (including fire) 6 Product All 
Satellite hotspots 2 Product Space 
Fire scar/regime mapping 2 Product Space/air 
Satellite or aerial photography 2 Data Space/air 
Ground based (including ships) RADAR 2 Data Ground 
Satellite RADAR 2 Data Space 
Gauges 2 Data Ground 
Aerial visual surveillance  1 Data Air 
Ground based fire look-out towers 1 Data Ground 
Satellite vegetation mapping 1 Product Space 
Seismometers  1 Data Ground 
Satellite positioning 1 Data Space 
Aerial linescan 1 Data Air 
Multispectral imagery 1 Data Space/air 
Handheld thermal cameras 1 Data Ground 
Flood footprints 1 Data Space 
Fire modelling 1 Data Model 
 
Finding 19: Of the 61 Australian disaster inquiries which were analysed in detail 32 
inquiries, or 53%, had examples of data usage across at least 18 different types of 
data. (Section 4.4.4) 
 
68   Chapter 4: Data uptake in Australian disaster inquiries 
 
 
 
In the 31 inquiries there were 111 concerns or discussions about ways to use or improve 
data related products. Of these 31 inquiries 3 inquiries concerns were raised in the context of 
warnings. Many of these concerns were quite similar or a specific component of a more general 
concern. For example 24 hour availability and reliability are both concerns raised in the 
inquiries, but availability is simply one measure of a high reliability system. For this reason the 
concerns were grouped. Table 16 shows the resulting grouping with individual concerns, 
number of mentions and total grouped number of mentions. A detailed inquiry specific 
breakdown is in Appendix E. 
 Table 16: Grouped concerns from Australia disaster inquiries. 
Grouped concerns 
Concern as stated in inquiry  
(Number of mentions) 
Total 
number of 
mentions 
Maturity  
Awareness (1) 
Clarity of message (1) 
Cleaned of extraneous information (1) 
Common boundaries (1) 
Consistency (8)  
Consistent terminology (1)  
Efficiency of the system (1)  
Lack of a manual (1) 
Lack of situational awareness (1) 
Maturity (1) 
Repeatability (1) 
Rigor (1) 
Tightening of connections between staff (1) 
20 
Accuracy 
Accuracy (9) 
Errors of commission (1) 
Errors of omission (1) 
Human error (1) 
Quality (4) 
16 
Timeliness 
Responsive (1)  
Right time (1) 
Timeliness (12) 
14 
Relevant 
Coverage (3)  
Detection without identification (1) 
Extent of detail (1) 
Fitness for purpose (1) 
Relevance (3)  
Right information (1) 
Tailored (1) 
11 
Effectiveness  
Coordination (1)  
Cost (2) 
Effective use (1) 
Effectiveness (1) 
Funding (1)  
National coordinated (1) 
Optimisation (1) 
8 
Reliability 
24 hour availability (1) 
Availability of communications (1)  
Redundancy (1) 
Reliability (3) 
Scalability (1)  
7 
Availability  
Availability (5) 
Frequency (1)  
7 
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More monitoring (1)  
Presentation  
Dissemination (1) 
Omitted data (1) 
Over aggregation (1) 
Presentation (1) 
Right form (1) 
Technical means of filtering/triaging inputs (1) 
6 
Trust 
Misinformation (1)  
Not relied upon (1) 
Rumours (1) 
Trust (3) 
6 
Experience 
Availability of experts (1)  
Experience (1) 
Lack of knowledge (1) 
Training (1) 
4 
Culture  
Authorising environment (1) 
Culture (1) 
Data used too late (1)  
Information flow to decision makers (1) 
4 
Accessibility  
Accessibility (2) 
Availability of maps in the field (1) 
3 
Uptake Uptake (2) 2 
Flexibility 
Flexibility (1) 
Interoperability (1) 
2 
Third party source Third party source (1) 1 
 
One finding from this list is that all data related discussions were concerns, there was no 
discussion about what worked well to compare to what did not. This lack of positive lessons is 
well known and discussed further within Eburn and Dovers (2015). 
 
Finding 20: Based upon Australian disaster inquiries, the circumstance around data 
usage and/or uptake are governed by at least 15 design choices: Maturity, accuracy, 
timeliness, relevant, effectiveness, reliability, availability, presentation, trust, 
experience, culture, accessibility, uptake, flexibility and third party source. (Section 
4.4.4) 
 
4.5 Study discussion 
One of the key aims of this Chapter was to identify what types of data products were being 
used in emergency management and to what extent. During the early stages of the study it 
became clear that using the definition that data uptake is the active inclusion of a dataset to 
inform a decision was too high a bar and would yield a small dataset. For this reason the scope 
of data products was broadened to include data uptake, usage or awareness. This broadened 
scope covering 61 inquiries yielded 35 mentions of 18 different sensor data products. This 
number is low for the quantity of inquiries and the size of the average inquiry. Although 
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mentions of data exist in Australian inquiries, discussion of what evidence contributes to key 
decisions in disasters is limited. Few inquiries questioned the veracity of a data product which 
contributed to a key decision. This seems unusual given poor data quality has contributed to at 
least two high profile disasters outside of Australia. The explosion of the space shuttle 
Challenger in 1986 and the shooting down of an Iranian Airbus by the USS Vincennes in 1988 
were the result of in part poor data quality (Fisher and Kingma 2001). 
Although 18 different sensor data products were identified in the inquiries the traditional 
nature of every product mentioned is striking. All of these products have existed for at least 20 
years. More modern technologies such as Forward Looking Infrared Cameras or FLIR were not 
found. Many reports have quite detailed discussions about disseminating warnings and 
information through social media, that is Agency to Crowd flows, but there were no examples 
within the 61 inquiries of emergency managers using social media as a data source, that is 
Crowd to Agency flows, upon which to base a decision.  
 
Finding 21: Inquiries tend to discuss more traditional technologies but do not 
discuss emerging technologies such as the use of social media as a data source for 
emergency managers. (Section 4.5) 
 
Another finding is that of the 18 sensor data products found in the inquiries, only five of 
them or 28% were products, the rest were raw sensors or data feeds. The implications of this are 
that firstly, it implies that the majority of data used within emergency management has little 
value add. This means that operators must be responsible to interpret the data which is often 
quite complex, this additional work for operators could lead to much of this data being captured 
but never used as evidence to support decision making. Further supporting this finding is that 
the two data products which were mentioned the most, the weather forecast and warnings, are 
both mature data products. In fact the weather forecast and warnings are so mature that their 
original source observations are completely invisible to the user with millions of observations 
from satellites, airborne platforms and ground based sensors contributing to the model of the 
forecast every hour (WMO 2009). This also provides evidence that one individual measurement 
domain such as space, airborne or ground and observation or model does not increase the 
likelihood of usage but integration of multiple domains does seems to increase usage. So with 
relatively low levels of usage of upstream raw data feeds and high levels of usage of 
downstream integrated products leads to a finding that the higher the level of processing and 
integration of a product the more likely an emergency manager is to use it in a decision.  
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Finding 22: The more mature and integrated a sensor data product is the greater its 
usage and uptake. (Section 4.5) 
 
While the 35 mentions of data products was less than expected, data concerns were quite 
common with 111 concerns raised. This could be explained by the historic fixation on 
attribution of blame in these inquiries where explaining what happened or how to improve a 
system is overlooked and consumed by discovering failings and assigning blame (Boin et al. 
2005; Eburn and Dovers 2015). Of the 111 data related concerns many were duplicates and so 
67 specific concerns were identified which were grouped into 15 overarching concerns. Of these 
111 concerns 17 were raised in the context of warnings but were still relevant to the uptake of 
data. When talking about warnings the conversation was generally more mature than about 
sensor data. In fact in the 2011 review of the TriTech Lubricants factory fire the Office of the 
Emergency Services Commissioner in Victoria estimates that “the response of the correct 
brigades to the correct location was delayed by four minutes and 56 seconds”. The accuracy of 
this statement could be questioned as being overly precise but this style of finding is on the rise 
and could appear in future inquiries about data. This overly precise finding uses the evidence 
that acting on evidence at the time it was received rather than four minutes and 56 seconds later. 
This specificity is both persuasive and more actionable meaning it is more likely to drive reform 
in Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and improve organisational culture. This in turn could 
lead to the greater inclusion of highly specific data driven finding in future inquiries. 
Across the inquiries the complexity of discussions was highly variable. In addition, the 
complexity of the discussion was not related to time. For example the 1939 bushfire royal 
commission covers how to balance the strengths and weaknesses of different technologies in 
order to gain maximum coverage and the issues related to what is referred to in defence as a 
barrier surveillance model – that is that one must observe a target more frequently than it can 
move a distance you judge to be significant. This style of discussion shows a level of 
understanding in 1939 which is commonly absent from recent reports which are often boiled 
down to overarching statements such as “emergency managers are reliant on timely and high 
quality data”. 
 
Finding 23: The discussion of data in inquiries is not new or complex with 
discussions in the 1939 bushfire royal commission often more complex than recent 
inquiries. (Section 4.5) 
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The 2013 Munro Review of the Bureau of Meteorology’s extreme weather and seasonal 
forecasting capacity describes the different design choices required to deliver products as 
“quality, timeliness, frequency, accessibility and presentation”. This collection of design 
choices closely resembles some of the 15 overarching concerns identified as part of this study. 
This suggests two points, firstly that the design choices determined in this study are indeed 
relevant and secondly that this topic is being considered within the emergency management 
sector. This consideration may not be framed using the terms used in this thesis like 
contribution to decision making and uptake but more as “how do I increase usage” but either 
way the issues under consideration are similar. 
One of the common discussions within the literature is whether or not inquiries help 
emergency managers to learn the lessons of the past, or whether or not they are simply revisiting 
the same issues without improving intelligence or learning (Eburn and Dovers 2015). The 2011 
report Bushfire Management from the Tasmanian Auditor General actually gives an assessment 
of previous inquiries’ progress in implementing recommendations. For example they assess that 
the COAG 2004 recommendation 5.2 “that the Australian Government and the state and 
territory governments jointly provide additional resources and work in partnership to establish 
and refine a national program of fire regime mapping” is only 25% implemented. For inquiries 
to comment on the implementation of other inquiries more than five years before suggests that 
many of the lessons are not being learned. This finding can be taken further though by a 
quantitative analysis of the 15 concerns, comparing frequency over time as shown in Figure 13. 
In Figure 13 the four most common concerns (Maturity, accuracy, timeliness and relevance) 
have increased dramatically recently. This in isolation could be explained by the large increase 
in inquiries recently but it does not explain the stability of the next most common design 
choices. Effectiveness, reliability and availability are all issues which the sector has been aware 
of for over twenty years but do not appear to have been fixed. One attribute that these three 
items have in common is that they are all highly subjective.  
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Figure 13: Data related concerns in Australian disaster inquiries over time. 
 
This Chapter has improved our understanding of 15 design choices which are related to the 
uptake of a sensor data product but there are limitations of this Chapter. One theme which 
became clear in the concerns was the interconnectivity between the various design choices. The 
2013 Federal inquiry Recent trends in and preparedness for extreme weather events contained a 
clear example of this on page 109 when it said, “However, while weather forecasting is much 
more accurate than in the past, the committee heard that people still need convincing to trust 
and act on this information.” What this quote illustrates it that this individual study may have 
identified many concerns which control whether or not sensor data is used this study has not 
managed to create independent variables. Elements such as uptake, trust and maturity all have 
overlap with other design choices. Due to this overlap Chapter six establishes an independent 
set of variables. In addition the dataset used in this study gives some clues about the relative 
importance of various design choices but on its own the dataset is not large enough and the 
differences are not significant enough to determine a clear weighting between the various design 
choices. 
Data related content is much less covered in inquiries than expected by the author. Using 
the 1728 recommendations from 51 inquiries into bushfire management and response, only 9% 
or 163 of the recommendations were vaguely related (Topics include: Fire bans and weather 
warnings, Mapping and data quality, Assets and technology, Research) to the evidence used to 
make decisions in preparing or responding to disasters. More worrying is that only 0.5% or 8 
recommendations since 1939 focused on data quality and mapping concerns. The low level of 
interest in this seemingly critical information which drives or at least greatly affects decision 
making in disasters is troubling and raises concerns about the value of disaster inquiries in 
Australia. 
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This study found that sensor data has a low level of consideration within Australian 
disaster inquiries. Where sensor data has been considered it is related to data types which have 
existed for several decades. In addition, all discussions of sensor data in Australian inquiries are 
negative; this problem is not limited to the sensor data domain. Finally, data is not considered in 
the context of uptake and hence this research is highly relevant in finding how to use sensor data 
to improve decision making. 
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4.6 Summary of findings  
Finding 17: The more political the structure of an inquiry the less technical the content 
of the inquiry. (Section 4.4.2) 
Finding 18: Data quality has been a minor topic in Australian bushfire inquiries with 
only 53 or 3.1% of the 1728 recommendations made between 1939 and 2013 related 
to mapping or data quality. (Section 4.4.3) 
Finding 19: Of the 61 Australian disaster inquiries which were analysed in detail 32 
inquiries, or 53%, had examples of data usage across at least 18 different types of 
data. (Section 4.4.4) 
Finding 20: Based upon Australian disaster inquiries, the circumstance around data 
usage and/or uptake are governed by at least 15 design choices: Maturity, accuracy, 
timeliness, relevant, effectiveness, reliability, availability, presentation, trust, 
experience, culture, accessibility, uptake, flexibility and third party source. (Section 
4.4.4) 
Finding 21: Inquiries tend to discuss more traditional technologies but do not discuss 
emerging technologies such as the use of social media as a data source for 
emergency managers. (Section 4.5) 
Finding 22: The more mature and integrated a sensor data product is the greater its 
usage and uptake. (Section 4.5) 
Finding 23: The discussion of data in inquiries is not new or complex with discussions 
in the 1939 bushfire royal commission often more complex than recent inquiries. 
(Section 4.5) 
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Chapter 5: Barriers to uptake: Emergency 
management community’s assessment  
5.1 Aim and overview of this chapter 
Chapter three compared four data systems which generated quite different products 
allowing us to identify the design choices which lead to those differences. Chapter four 
expanded on our collection of design choices by logically grouping data related discussions in 
Australian disaster inquiries. However neither of these studies revealed detailed information 
about the relative weighting or interaction of these design choices. 
This Chapter focuses on the emergency management community’s views on the barriers to 
uptake of sensor data. Using a web survey targeted at Australian emergency managers, the study 
explores levels of knowledge about different datasets, differences between specific datasets and 
the relative importance of design choices leading to the uptake of data in emergency 
management. 
Following this Chapter, this quantitative data is combined with the findings of previous 
Chapters into a discussion encompassing the entire topic. Chapter six then forms the basis of a 
framework for maximising uptake of sensor data products in emergency management. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: 
5.2 Study logic ............................................................................................................ 78 
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5.3.1 Research design ............................................................................................. 78 
5.3.2 Data collection procedure ............................................................................. 82 
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5.2 Study logic 
This Chapter collects the views of people involved in emergency management on the topic 
of “Sensor data in disaster decision making”. The survey identifies people’s level of awareness, 
usage and uptake of various existing datasets in order to establish current trends. It also looks at 
existing barriers to uptake based on concerns raised in the previous study. Finally, this survey 
collected quantitative data around the design choices which drive uptake, identified within the 
previous study and the literature. 
The objectives of this Chapter are: 
 To identify the level of awareness emergency managers have of existing sensor 
data products;  
 To identify the main barriers to uptake of data for emergency managers; 
 To understand which datasets are more trusted than others; and 
 To identify which design choices emergency managers believe contribute to the 
use of data in decision making. 
The survey is targeted at members of the Australian emergency management sector while 
not excluding participants from outside the sector. One key sorting mechanism for the survey is 
the location of the participant within the data supply chain: that is acquisition, value add or user. 
See Chapter two for further definitions. 
 
5.3 Study method 
5.3.1 Research design 
This study collected a dataset of generalised beliefs through a web survey to inform the 
research questions through quantitative results. A large structured dataset was collected through 
the use of a web survey. The survey was conducted online because of the simplicity, low cost, 
anonymity, confidentiality, free expression and fair temporal response (D. L. Davis 2004). 
Demographic style questions were general enough to ensure nobody could be individually 
identified while sufficient to enable identification of respondent’s role in the sector. The survey 
was designed to measure specific beliefs held within the target community, the emergency 
management sector. The results from the survey represent beliefs of a cross section of the target 
community, that can then be projected to sufficiently represent the views of the entire target 
community (Davis 2004). 
Key informants were directly involved in the design, testing and collection for this survey. 
By targeting the survey at key informants, such as decision makers within the emergency 
management sector, the survey targeted people with specialist knowledge on the topic making 
further insights more likely (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993).  
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According to Davis (2004) the main sources of error within a survey are: planning, 
collection, analysis and reporting. To reduce the effects of each of these errors the following 
strategies have been used: 
 Planning Error: Impartial evaluation of the survey proposal and methodology 
through the Australian National University (ANU) Statistical Consulting Unit and 
the ANU Human Ethics approval process; 
 Collection Error: Periodic managerial evaluations during the collection period; and 
 Analytical Error: Outside evaluation of the results by research supervisors and 
peers.  
In order to reduce planning error in accordance with Davis (2004), impartial evaluation of 
the research design was required. To achieve this, three groups representing the main 
stakeholder communities each tested and refined the survey, these were the Australasian Fire 
and Emergency Service Authorities Council, the Bushfire & Natural Hazards Cooperative 
Research Centre and the Cooperative Research Centre for Spatial Information. In addition 
further evaluation was carried out following ANU compliance guidelines through a formal 
Human Ethics review process undertaken on the survey (Protocol number: 2014/077). This 
review looked at privacy, security and integrity considerations. On 31 March 2014, 
unconditional approval was gained by the ANU Ethics Committee to proceed with the survey. 
This survey asked 21 questions over 5 pages to identify what drives the uptake of datasets 
within the emergency management sector, a full copy of the survey can be found in Appendix F. 
For this reason the population of interest was the emergency management sector and the 
providers of data to this sector. The rationale for the remaining questions is established in the 
remainder of this section. 
Through careful research design and data collection, the survey data focused on one 
targeted group. This target group created a homogeneous dataset which reduces errors such as 
bias. The target audience can be split into different groups through a stratified sampling strategy 
often referred to as sorting questions. In this survey stratification questions were used for 
experience, employer type, age, location and role in the data supply chain. These questions were 
phrased as follows: 
1. How long have you been involved in emergency management (in any capacity)? 
2. What type of organisation are you primarily associated with? 
3. What is your age? 
4. Where is your current organisation located? 
5. My role in the data supply chain mainly involves: 
Next, it was important to determine the level of awareness of emergency managers to 
different datasets. This information is critical to understanding what level of processing 
emergency managers need in their datasets; for example an upstream product like raw satellite 
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telemetry or a downstream integrated product such as the weather forecast. The following 
questions were asked to judge the respondent’s awareness of different data products: 
6. In your current role, do you use sensor data (data from satellites, planes and ground 
based sensors including social media)? 
7. Do you think sensor data should be used in emergency management decision making? 
8. How aware are you of the following range of sensor data products? Weather forecast; 
Weather warnings; Stream gauge; Flood warning; Seismograms; Earthquake alerts; 
Satellite or aerial imagery (Photo like/optical); Satellite or aerial imagery (RADAR); 
Satellite or aerial imagery (Multispectral); Imagery derived perimeter/extent/footprint 
information for either fire, flood, oil slick or landslide; Burn intensity map; Fuel load 
map; Emergency phone calls (Triple zero); Individual social media message e.g. a 
twitter tweet; Social media trend alert e.g. a trending keyword like earthquake; Satellite 
positioning data e.g. GPS 
9. What types of sensor data do you use in your current role? 
The first formal aim of this study was to identify the main barriers to uptake of data for 
emergency managers. Barriers to access such as training or cost are generic issues which must 
be measured in most surveys of this type. These generic issues are important because rather than 
being dataset or provider specific issues they are generally focused on the industry as a whole. 
To analyse these industry-wide barriers the following questions were raised: 
10. Which of the following issues do you think are relevant to the use of emergency 
management sensor data today? Availability of data; Cost of the data; Cost of data 
systems; Openness and licencing; Skills in the use of the data; Documentation of data 
products; Quality of data; Timeliness of data products; Trust of the data; Other  
11. How much do you think the following factors influence the use of sensor data in 
emergency management decisions? Lack of expertise and knowledge about sensor data; 
Concerns about legal liability in using sensor data in decision making; Government 
directives that limit the flexibility of emergency management decision-makers to use 
sensor data; Emergency management budgets are too tight that sensor data cannot be 
considered; Using sensor data creates difficult political issues; Meeting community 
expectations for emergency suppression makes it hard to consider other goals and 
priorities; In emergency management decisions there is not enough time to take account 
of all the available data including sensor data; Emerging sensor data products are not 
relevant to emergency management decision making 
12. Do you have any comments regarding factors that may encourage or discourage the use 
of sensor data in emergency management decisions? 
The second aim of this study was to understand which datasets are more trusted than 
others. One limitation of the previous Chapter on disaster inquiries is that it did not give detail 
as to which design choices are more important than others. To address this question specific 
comparisons, such as between a university and a government agency, are useful to draw 
people’s attention to issues such as the mandate of the provider. These considerations are often 
not clearly understood in a more direct question. Specific issues were only raised where the 
inquiry study had indicated there might be a problem. In addition questions were raised about 
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the scope of sensor data, these questions allow discussion of potential parallels between more 
trusted data or less trusted data. Questions about which datasets are more trusted than others 
were asked through the following questions:  
13. How likely would you be to base a high consequence decision (e.g. life threatening 
decision) on the following dataset? Data collected by staff within your own 
organisation; Bureau of Meteorology weather forecast data ingested and displayed in 
your organisation’s system; Bureau of Meteorology weather forecast data displayed on 
their public website with commercial advertising; Weather forecast data from a private 
company on their website; Coarse resolution (250 metre) satellite imagery from the 
NASA website; Bushfire hotspots on the Geoscience Australia Sentinel system; 
Bushfire hotspots ingested and displayed in your organisation’s system; A single stream 
gauge measurement; An official warning from the Bureau of Meteorology; A university 
created satellite based fire perimeter map with the associated image; A university 
created satellite based fire perimeter map without associated image due to licencing 
restrictions; A government agency created satellite based fire perimeter map with the 
associated image; A government agency satellite based fire perimeter map without 
associated image due to licencing restrictions; A single tweet from twitter saying there 
is a fire at a location; An alert from a commercial service which tracks trends in social 
media; Emergency phone calls (Triple zero) 
14. Would your answers to question 13 be different if the consequences were lower, e.g. the 
decision had resource implications, but was not life threatening? 
15. Is an emergency phone call (Triple zero) a form of sensor data? 
16. Is social media information a form of sensor data? 
The final aim of this study was to identify which design choices emergency managers 
believe contribute to the use of data in decision making. Following on from the first objective, 
dataset or provider specific design choices play an important role in driving the uptake of data. 
The survey asked for relative weighting for each design choices, so a quantitative dataset could 
be built around the relative importance of the design choices. These design choices were raised 
in both the literature and the inquiries study. The question was raised as follows:  
17.  Which quality factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to 
inform an emergency management decision? Accuracy of a sensor data product; The 
speed which a data product is delivered to the user i.e. Timeliness; Reliability of a data 
products e.g. its ability to be consistently reproduced; The clarity or simplicity of sensor 
data products content and/or presentation; The completeness of a sensor data product in 
coverage and/or presentation; The time it takes to become familiar with how to use a 
product i.e. useability; The consistency within one data product or across a time series 
of data products; The description of how the data product was made i.e. provenance; 
The product complies with relevant standards and meets predefined specifications; The 
quantity of documentation which accompanies the product; The interoperability of the 
data product to connect with your systems 
18. Which reputational factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to 
inform an emergency management decision? The mandate of the provider to be 
producing emergency management data products; The reputation of the provider; Your 
familiarity with the data provider; The popularity of the data product; The business 
model of the data product such as daily weather forecasts vs. a once off burn intensity 
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map; The sensor was owned and/or operated by your country i.e. sovereignty; The 
ability to access the data product securely; The security of the network which 
transported the data product; Whether or not the sensor is civilian or defence operated 
i.e. dual-use 
19. Which data policy factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to 
inform an emergency management decision? Cost of the sensor data product; Access 
restrictions on the raw data which created the sensor data product; Ability to publically 
disclose the source of the data; Ability to publically release the raw data; Restrictions on 
your ability to distribute the data i.e. copyright; The responsibilities and liabilities 
associated with your use and the use of those to whom you distribute the data product 
20. In your opinion, what are the most important features that a sensor data product must 
have if it is going to be used in a decision making process? 
21. Do you have any additional comments on this survey? 
5.3.2 Data collection procedure  
The survey was conducted using the online tool, Survey monkey 
(https://www.surveymonkey.com/ ). This tool was selected due to its simplicity and familiarity 
to the Australian emergency management and spatial sectors. 
As previously discussed, the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities 
Council, the Bushfire & Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre and the Cooperative 
Research Centre for Spatial Information each reviewed this survey before launch to ensure 
relevance and industry specific terminology was used. In addition, these three groups assisted in 
distribution through sending the survey out on mailing lists, posting it on their websites and 
promoting the survey in relevant forums. This assistance provided a high level of penetration 
into the target population. 
Links to the survey were also posted on the emergency management public affairs blog 
and the social networking site Linked In’s emergency management groups. Finally, the Dillman, 
Millar, and Messer (2010) method for increasing response rate was used with regular reminders 
sent to increase response rates.  
5.4 Study results 
5.4.1 Survey statistics and validity 
The survey was opened on 17 March 2014 when initial testing was carried out, with 
official invitation emails being sent out in the first week of May. The collector was closed after 
84 days on 9 June 2014. In total the survey received 230 responses. 
As the survey was posted on social media and re-sent by many recipients, a formal 
response rate could not be calculated. 230 responses is considered a strong response rate for this 
sector. For example, a recent survey focused on the level of economics knowledge within the 
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Australian emergency management sector had a response rate of 59 respondents (Clayton et al. 
2014).  
A verification of Non-Response Bias is an important way of assessing the quality of a 
survey. The standard method of measuring Non-Response Bias is through a follow up survey, 
this was not possible due to the anonymity of participants. It should be noted that Non-Response 
Bias can be minimised through a high response rate (Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992).  Even so, key 
informants further reviewed the survey responses and determined the results as consistent with 
their experience and hence valid. This technique of using key informants to test Non-Response 
Bias has shown promising results in other sectors (White et al. 2007).  
A raw set of survey results are presented in Appendix G. 
5.4.2 Respondent profile 
This survey used a stratified sampling strategy employing five sorting questions to stratify 
respondents by experience, organisation type, age, location and role in the data supply chain. 
Gender information was not collected because this work is about tailoring products to 
emergency managers and provider or user gender is not relevant.  
Table 17: Experience respondent profile. 
Experience Frequency Percent 
Less than 5 years 31 14% 
Between 5-10 years 38 17% 
Greater than 10 years 156 68% 
I am not involved in emergency management 4 2% 
N=229   
 
Table 17 shows the experience respondent profile. In this profile the majority of 
respondents (68%) have over 10 years emergency management experience, with statistically 
valid responses from people with less experience. Four responses outside the sector is not a 
large enough sample to compare people involved or not involved in emergency management.  
Table 18: Organisation type respondent profile. 
Organisation type Frequency Percent 
Federal government 29 12.7% 
State government 164 71.6% 
Local government 9 3.9% 
Research sector 4 1.7% 
Private sector 7 3.1% 
Non-Governmental Organisation 16 7.0% 
N=229   
 
Table 18 shows the organisation type respondent profile.  This profile shows the majority 
of respondents are from State government (72%), Federal government (13%) and Non-
Government Organisations (7%). The bulk of responsibility for emergency management is with 
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State government agencies, hence their high representation is not unusual in surveys on this 
topic. While it could be argued there is a smaller role for Local government, researchers and the 
private sector in emergency management than for the State and Federal governments, the 
response rate of these groups was proportionally lower than expected. This low response could 
be explained by survey fatigue, at least in the research sector, but it could also be explained by 
the phrasing of the question. The question asks about the organisation type and not the specific 
role; this could mean that many State government respondents are involved in research but this 
assertion requires further study. 
Table 19: Age respondent profile. 
Age Frequency Percent 
Under 35 years old 35 15.4% 
35-49 years old 83 36.4% 
50-64 years old 104 45.6% 
65 years or older 6 2.6% 
N=228   
 
Table 19 shows the age respondent profile with a strong distribution of age groups across 
the workforce. A small number of respondents are in the over 65 age bracket some of which 
may be retired. 
Table 20: Location respondent profile. 
Location Frequency Percent 
Population 
(‘000) 
Population 
(%) 
Australian Capital Territory 24 10.5% 368 2% 
New South Wales 59 25.8% 7,218 32% 
Northern Territory 6 2.6% 231 1% 
Queensland 23 10.0% 4,477 20% 
South Australia 29 12.7% 1,640 7% 
Tasmania 14 6.1% 512 2% 
Victoria 41 17.9% 5,538 25% 
Western Australia 15 6.6% 2,353 11% 
Other (please specify) 18 7.9% N/A N/A 
N=229     
 
Table 20 shows the location respondent profile along with the Australian State and 
Territory population from the 2011 census (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2014). This profile 
closely matches the population distribution of Australia with NSW and Victoria having the 
largest number of respondents and population in Australia respectively. This survey shows a 
minor over representation of Tasmania and the ACT and an under representation of Western 
Australia when compared with population in these locations. The ACT’s over representation can 
be explained by the Federal government presence as well as the Territory emergency service. 
Tasmanian and Western Australian underrepresentation is potentially caused by their 
underrepresentation in the groups which distributed this survey. Finally the “Other” category of 
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respondents are made up of 3 respondents who answered ‘national’, ten New Zealand 
respondents, five Nigerian, one Kenyan, one Fijian, one Jamaican and one Chinese respondent. 
Table 21: Role in the data supply chain respondent profile. 
Role in the data supply chain Frequency Percent 
Data collection related tasks 27 12.0% 
Value adding existing datasets 21 9.3% 
User of data 139 61.8% 
Other (please specify) 38 16.9% 
N=225   
 
Table 21 shows the role in the data supply chain respondent profile. Here the strong focus 
on users can be seen. This is positive given these users are the focus of the research and have 
been under represented in previous related research such as Lowell et al. (2011) and Sustineo 
(2011). The “Other” category was made up of a variety of roles but seven respondents listed all 
of the above and three listed a mix of two areas in the data supply chain. The remainder of 
“Other” respondents were generic role titles, such as Director of Training or Manager of 
performance information. 
Finally, question 6 of the survey asked users if they use sensor data in their current role. 
166 or 83% use sensor data in their current role. Question 7 found that 197 or 97% thought 
sensor data should be used in emergency management decision making. 
 
Finding 24: 97% of emergency management survey respondents believe sensor 
data should be used in emergency management decision making. (Section 5.4.2) 
 
5.4.3 Data preparation 
One standard problem with web surveys is incomplete submissions. In this survey there 
were 230 survey respondents, with the smallest number of respondents to a single question 
reaching 175 or 76% of survey responses. Given the large number of “rate between 1-7” 
questions towards the end of the survey this rate is not surprising and still provides a solid 
response rate. Of the initial sorting questions the minimum response rate was 225 or 98%. 
Rather than excluding survey responses, the number of respondents and percentages used in this 
study is based upon the number of responses to that specific question rather than the total 230 
respondents or 225 respondents who proceeded past the sorting questions. 
To allow the data to be analysed in a quantitative manner all non-numerical values were 
removed from the quantitative results. For example, quantitative response answers like “rate 
from 1-7” were corrected from a descriptive answers such as “Not likely at all 1” or “N/A” to 
“1” or “NULL” respectively.  
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5.5 Study discussion 
The survey discussion is structured by analysing the headline results of each question, the 
stratification questions (age, location, experience, sector, role) then by any specific topics setup 
by the question. This section presents results in four subsections which align to the objectives of 
the study: data awareness, barriers to uptake, trust, and design choices leading to uptake. 
 
5.5.1 Data awareness 
In this survey users’ role within the data supply chain was used as a sorting question. The 
types of products respondents actually use in their work was also measured. This is often 
referred to in upstream and downstream terms. For example an upstream product could be a raw 
commodity like uncorrected satellite telemetry and a downstream product could be an integrated 
data product with many data sources such as the weather forecast. Question 9 asked “What 
types of sensor data do you use in your current role?”  
 
Figure 14: Survey response to what types of data is used (Question 9). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 14, usage is higher the further downstream you go. Put another 
way the higher the level of product integration the higher the usage. In order to generate a 
highly integrated data product the following steps are required, firstly raw data is processed into 
a basic product, then specialist products are required to convert from basic measurements into 
variables and these variables are then integrated into a final product. The conversion from basic 
measurement products into specialist variables does not increase usage (both 62% in Figure 14). 
This finding has large implications for data producers and value adders where projects which 
create specialist products then assess usage before proceeding to creating the standard 
downstream integrated products. With no increase in usage found at the specialist variable stage 
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many projects would not proceed to the standardisation stage due to perceived problems. This 
suggests usage should only be assessed after the initial processed data stage or after the standard 
data product stage. 
 Once broken down by location this question shows that the ACT uses more upstream data 
products than any other jurisdiction. 40% of ACT respondents use raw data and 75% use 
processed data. The second highest using jurisdictions are Western Australia of which 23% use 
raw data and the Northern Territory of which 67% use processed data.  One similarity of these 
jurisdictions is their relatively low size or population density in the case of WA – this suggests 
that smaller or sparsely populated jurisdictions use more data than other jurisdictions. In 
addition, as the Federal government is located in the ACT this suggests the Federal 
government’s role as one of the main mechanisms for data capture. 
Question 8 asked users to rate “How aware are you of the following range of sensor data 
products?” This was done on the following scale: Never heard of it, heard of it, know it, used it, 
and based a decision off it. This scale was used to clearly differentiate awareness, usage and 
uptake. 
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Figure 15: Survey response on sensor data product awareness (Question 8). 
 
The survey responses to question 8 and 9 clearly agree that downstream products are more 
used than upstream products. The three highest uptake or “based a decision off it” products were 
weather warnings (67%), weather forecast (66%) and positioning (49%) – all of these products 
are highly integrated downstream products. Conversely the three most “Never heard of it” 
products are all upstream raw or less processed data feeds being stream gauge (21%), 
seismogram (12%) and multispectral imagery (11%). That said seismic hazards are relatively 
small in Australia and so a low level of knowledge about seismometers is not surprising. 
 
Finding 25: The higher the level of product integration the higher the usage. 
(Section 5.5.1) 
 
One key relationship in this thesis is between usage and uptake. Question 8 directly 
measures this distinction through the terms “used it” and “based a decision off it”. This provides 
a clear measure of products people use but would not rely upon. Using this metric the products 
with greater usage than uptake in order are: an individual social media message (22%), social 
media trend alert (19%), emergency phone calls (8%), earthquake alerts (8%) and seismograms 
(6%). The earthquake alert and seismogram logically would have high usage and low uptake 
because of the rapid nature of an earthquake hazard, by the time an alert is issued the event is 
generally over. The other positive numbers should be noted. The top two numbers are the two 
forms of social media on the list but they are also related to the third highest amount being 
emergency phone calls. This suggests that many emergency managers have used social media 
but either do not trust it enough to act on it or do not have the tools/doctrine (Note: Doctrine 
refers to EM doctrine) to incorporate intelligence from social media into their decision making. 
Furthermore, the datasets with the highest usage in relation to low uptake are all subjective 
reports from humans. This suggests a certain distrust in human reports which until recently have 
been the traditional means of contacting the emergency services. 
This question can also be used to measure awareness, usage and uptake. By combining the 
“heard of it” and “know it” categories can give a fair approximation of awareness, “used it” 
accurately reflects usage and “based a decision off it” is in fact an even higher level than the 
working definition of uptake but still a fair approximation. Figure 16 plots the question 8 
responses based on the groupings above and ordered from the lowest level of uptake to the 
highest level of uptake. 
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Figure 16: Question 8 survey responses separated into awareness, usage and 
uptake ordered by uptake. 
 
The above graph shows a broad resemblance to the Gartner Hype Curve showing a large 
initial awareness of new products such as social media which drops off before building back up 
to high levels of uptake for established products such as weather related products. Hype curves 
are a common tool within the technology sector which characterise “the typical progression of 
an emerging technology from user and media overenthusiasm through a period of 
disillusionment to an eventual understanding of the technology's relevance and role in a market 
or domain” (Linden and Fenn 2003, 1). This relationship between survey respondents and the 
hype curve illustrates the long term progression of data products beginning with awareness and 
eventually moving towards uptake of established products. 
5.5.2 Existing industry barriers to uptake 
Many industry-wide barriers are described in the literature such as data availability in 
Andrew (2011) and trust in Haynes, Barclay, and Pidgeon (2008). These existing industry 
barriers have been analysed in a binary fashion in Question 10 of this survey and in a weighted 
fashion in Question 11. It should be noted that emergency managers have been targeted for this 
survey and they may or may not be knowledgeable about EM industry barriers to sensor data 
uptake. 
Question 10 asks “Which of the following issues do you think are relevant to the use of 
emergency management sensor data today?” Respondents can tick as many issues as they wish 
and the results are shown in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17: Survey response on industry-wide barriers to uptake (Question 10). 
 
As Figure 17 shows the most often rated barriers are availability of data (87%), timeliness 
of data products (84%) and skills to use the data (81%). Taken collectively it is clear that most 
emergency managers feel they are not getting products or they do not arrive fast enough to be 
useful or even if they do they are either not skilled to use them or they are presented in a format 
which is too complex to be useful to emergency management decision making. 
 
Finding 26: Availability of data, timeliness of data products and skills to use the data 
are the most common issues facing the emergency management sector. (Section 
5.5.2) 
 
These results sorted by their role in the data supply chain suggest that the higher in the 
supply chain the respondent is the lower the issues with sensor data. Taking an average of all 
issues in question 10 provides a metric to compare how dissatisfied a given stratified group is 
relative to the community. This dissatisfaction metric for the data supply chain suggests more 
dissatisfaction further up the supply chain (producers 57%, value adders 54% and providers 
50%). While a spread of 7% is not significant for an individual issue in question 10, it can be 
considered when using an average of all issues. This suggests that providers and value adders 
feel they are removing barriers but perhaps these developments have not yet changed the views 
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of the user community. A different and perhaps more positive perspective on this is that 
producers have the highest standards for data products, followed by producers then users – this 
is quite positive because it means that the groups with the most responsibility for products aim 
for the highest standard. 
 
Finding 27: Stakeholders higher up the supply chain have higher quality thresholds, 
meaning data producers and value adders often block products which are still useful 
to emergency managers. (Section 5.5.2) 
 
While availability, timeliness and skills are the most common barrier for all groups there 
are some different perspectives on other barriers. The cost of capability development is the 
equal most common barrier for value adders (81%) whereas users view this as a moderate issue 
(46%) and producers a small issue (26%). In addition both users and producers view trust of the 
data as a moderate barrier (55% and 52% respectively) but value adders only view this as a 
minor issue (31%). Finally, users believe data quality is a large issue (71%) while this is only a 
moderate issue for producers and value adders (56% and 50% respectively). These three 
findings together suggest that value adders and to a lesser extent producers are quite optimistic 
about the potential of sensor data but they require more effort or potentially funding to make the 
capabilities meet the expectations of the users. 
Industry barriers from an age perspective suggests that younger people believe that 
openness and licencing is a larger issue (Less 35 – 63%, 35-49 – 57%, 50-64 – 48%) while 
quality concerns increase with age (Less 35 – 59%, 35-49 – 68%, 50-64 – 71%). For these 
values returns of over 65 year olds were too low for statistical valid findings and hence 
excluded.  
The level of experience did not show differing views except for on the topic of trust where 
trust became a larger barrier with more experience (Less 5 years – 40%, 5-10 years – 50%, 
More 10 years – 57%). Respondents not involved in emergency management were not large 
enough for statistical validity. 
Barriers to the uptake of sensor data for emergency management varied greatly by sector 
and hence this information has been represented in Table 22. The largest and smallest values of 
each barrier have been highlighted to enhance readability.  
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Table 22: Survey response by sector for industry-wide barriers to uptake, 
largest and smallest values highlighted (Question 10). 
  
Federal 
government 
State 
government 
Local 
government 
Research 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Non-
Governmental 
Organisation 
Availability of 
data 
81% 88% 89% 75% 86% 93% 
Cost of the data 65% 59% 44% 50% 71% 50% 
Cost of 
capability 
development 
46% 52% 22% 75% 71% 14% 
Openness and 
licencing 
62% 49% 44% 50% 86% 57% 
Skills in the use 
of the data 
81% 81% 78% 100% 86% 79% 
Documentation 
of data products 
35% 32% 22% 50% 14% 36% 
Quality of data 65% 71% 56% 75% 43% 71% 
Timeliness of 
data products 
88% 84% 89% 50% 86% 86% 
Trust of the data 46% 55% 44% 75% 43% 57% 
        
Based on the percentages shown in Table 22 several insights about perceived barriers to 
uptake can be explored. The cost of capability development is viewed as a much larger issue to 
the research and private sectors than all other sectors, this view is potentially stemming from 
self-interest from those sectors for greater investment. Licencing is viewed as a far larger issue 
by private sector followed by Federal government than other sectors, this is important given 
these two groups are commonly considered to hold the main opposite views on licencing with 
government’s need for more open licencing and private sector’s need to protect their intellectual 
property. Researchers not surprisingly believe documentation is a larger issue which potentially 
is caused by the requirement for peer review in that sector. The research sector is also the most 
concerned about quality and trust while being least concerned about timeliness being a barrier to 
uptake. This is not surprising given researchers do not often participate in operational activities. 
Question 11 builds on Question 10 by using a 1-7 judgement about the relative importance 
of various design choices. This question is posed slightly differently to the previous question 
through using phrases rather than individual words and through the wording of the question 
“How much do you think the following factors influence the use of sensor data in emergency 
management decisions?” This makes the respondents view the factors shown in Figure 18 as 
negative influences rather than barriers with the hope that this provides a less binary and more 
quantitative answers. 
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Figure 18: Box plot with mean value of survey response on factors influencing 
data usage (Question 11). 
 
From the above box plot, lack of expertise has the highest average rating (5.8), followed by 
budgetary priority (5.3) and lack of time (5.1). Lack of expertise has the lowest standard 
deviation (1.2) of all other factors. A lack of expertise is essentially the same barrier to access as 
skills which was the third most popular response in Question 10. This agreement gives a high 
level of confidence that the questions were understood and the responses reflect industry views. 
When looking at the sector specific results people outside government have a differing 
view to those within. Political issues had the lowest average (3.1) of all the factors but was rated 
as important by the private sector (5.3) and the NGO sector (4.2). For the budgetary priority the 
private sector (6.3) and research sector (6.0) both have the highest average well above the 
average (5.3). Again the private sector (6.6) and the NGO sector (5.4) were the most concerned 
about government directives limiting flexibility. Finally, the private sector (5.3) and the research 
sector (5.0) are most concerned about legal liability and licencing of sensor data. Groups outside 
government appear to have consistently higher concerns than those within government. One 
potential narrative which links these heightened concerns is that those outside government think 
sensor data is not a budgetary priority, feel concerned that raising data is politically sensitive but 
feel that current government directives including licencing limit the use of these technologies 
during disasters.  
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The amount to which government directives were perceived to limit flexibility is inversely 
proportional to age. For this design choice we see decreasing importance as age decreases: 
under 35 (5.4), 35-49 (4.5) and 50-64 (4.1). This could potentially be related to older staff 
generally being more senior hence having greater involvement in setting government directives. 
Another way of looking at this is that younger people have a higher appetite for risk and hence 
do not feel the need for these directives. Either way this design choice shows a wide variety of 
views (Quartile 3 - Quartile 1 = 3). 
5.5.3 Trust of existing datasets 
Question 13 has been designed to present examples which isolate specific design choices 
leading to trust such as mandate, the effect of advertising, private sector involvement, data 
policy and social media. This question also allows for further examination of previous findings 
about the relationship between uptake and the level of project integration, as found in the 
inquiries study. In addition Question 13 sets up a later comparison to look at the role of 
consequence. Question 13 is a 1-7 likelihood judgement of, “How likely would you be to base a 
high consequence decision (e.g. life threatening decision) on the following dataset?” While 
question 10 showed that trust is only a moderate issue, the term best describes what question 13 
is attempting to determine although the wording of the question itself does not mention trust. 
The results in box plots are shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Box plot with mean value of survey response likelihood to use a 
dataset (Question 13). 
 
Based on the results in Figure 19 an official warning from the Bureau of Meteorology (6.2) 
and data from own organisation (6.1) are the most trusted datasets. The least trusted datasets are 
both from social media being a tweet (2.3) and a trend alert (3.2). 
This data shows several usage patterns such as respondents from the NT trust imagery 
related products more than any other jurisdiction (Coarse res average 4.2, NT 6.0; GA hotspots 
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average 4.6, NT 6.4; Hotspots own average 5.0, NT 5.8 etc.). This style of geographic analysis 
is not the focus of this study as there is little evidence that below national level location plays a 
large role in driving uptake. Instead the analysis of this question focuses on potential design 
choices which may drive the trust of a data product such as mandate, use of advertising, private 
sector involvement, data policy, social media and consequences. 
Official data or data from an organisation with an official mandate is more trusted than 
data from an organisation without a mandate. In this question four datasets related to fire 
perimeter maps were used to identify the importance of mandate in the trust of data. The 
comparison with the associated/source image showed higher likelihood of trust from the 
government agency (5.3) than from the university (4.3) and the same results without the 
associated image from the government agency (4.1) and the university (3.3). Furthermore, the 
research sector is much less likely to trust university created products (University fire map with 
image average 4.3, researchers 2.0; University fire map without image average 3.3, researchers 
2.0) than any other group. The mandate of an organisation increases the trust in their data 
products. 
 
Finding 28: Official data or data from an organisation with an official mandate is 
more trusted than data from an organisation without a mandate. (Section 5.5.3) 
 
In an effort to drive savings, some government websites in Australia, such as the Bureau of 
Meteorology, have been trialling advertising in order to increase revenue 
(http://www.bom.gov.au/advertising/ ). From this data a clear decrease in trust is seen when 
advertising is added to a government agency website dropping from 6.1 without advertising to 
5.2 with advertising. Regardless of the sector of the provider, advertising adversely affects trust. 
 
Finding 29: Advertising concurrent with data displays or portals negatively affects 
trust by emergency managers. (Section 5.5.3) 
 
Data in disasters is either (i) collected by the private sector and provided to the public 
sector emergency management agency, (ii) collected by a public data agency and provided to 
the public sector emergency management agency or (iii) collected by the private sector who 
provides that to a public sector data agency who in turn provides that data to a public sector 
emergency management agency. This survey considered whether the trust of private sector data 
is increased when using a public sector intermediary such as the Bureau of Meteorology. There 
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was a strong preference towards public sector information, with Bureau ingested data into the 
organisation’s own system (6.1) showing much higher results than a private sector website 
(3.8).  
Commercial advertising is primarily a private sector function with the findings above of 
decreased trust in sites with advertising further supported by the private sector being less trusted 
to provide emergency management data than the public sector. Looking at the sorting questions, 
both private sector examples showed the private sector was more likely and Tasmania was 
significantly less likely to use data from private companies (Commercial weather average 3.8, 
private sector 4.7, Tasmania 3.0; commercial social trend average 3.2, private sector 3.9, 
Tasmania 2.1). In addition to these findings free text answers covered this topic with one 
respondent noting, “Some of the datasets are great for ‘situational awareness’ but you'd never 
rely on them for any more than that (i.e. weather forecast data from private company on their 
website vs data from BoM).” Emergency managers show a clear preference to having data 
provided to them from other public sector organisations, however this does not discount private 
sector data being provided through a public sector intermediary. 
 
Finding 30: Emergency managers prefer data products to be delivered to them by a 
public institution even if the data was collected by the private sector. (Section 5.5.3) 
 
Data policy can have dramatic effects on usage as shown in the opening up of the Landsat 
data policy in the early 2000’s (Wulder et al. 2012). Unfortunately data policy is not considered 
by many providers, value adders and users due to its legal nature being seen as out of their field. 
In the survey satellite based fire perimeter maps with or without an associated image due to 
licencing restrictions were considered for both government agencies and universities. In both 
comparisons the likelihood of trust was decreased when licencing restrictions were added with 
government agencies showing a 1.2 value drop and universities showing a 1 value decrease in 
trust. This suggests that licence restrictions not just on the data product but the source data can 
decrease the trust in a dataset. 
 
Finding 31: Licence restrictions on the data product or the original source data can 
decrease the trust in a dataset. (Section 5.5.3) 
 
As already discussed, social media appears to be the least trusted form of data based on 
this survey. This could be explained by social media being new and many people have not been 
exposed to using social media data as a data source in a work context. Supporting this, 
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researchers, developing new applications from modern technology, were the most likely (3.5) to 
use data and local government, with the smallest capacity to implement new technologies, were 
the least likely to trust a tweet (1.6). In an effort to determine how comfortable people are 
treating people as sensors generating observations, questions 15 and 16 specifically asked 
whether emergency phone calls or social media are actually forms of sensor data. Here the 
majority of people are comfortable using humans as a form of sensor generating evidence for 
emergency management decision making, but a minority of people disagree, with the same 
proportion unsure about the concept (Emergency phone calls Yes 67%, 14% no, 19% unsure 
and social media Yes 63%, 20% no, 17% unsure). Social media’s emergence as a potential data 
source is still contested with many people being uncertain about its role. 
 
Finding 32: Social media’s emergence as a potential data source is contested with 
many people being uncertain about its role. (Section 4.5) 
 
Following question 13 about the likelihood of using information in a high consequence 
decision, question 14 asked “Would your answers to question 13 be different if the 
consequences were lower, e.g. the decision had resource implications, but was not life 
threatening?” 53% of respondents stated that consequences would not affect decision making 
with 34% stating that consequence affects decisions and 13% were unsure. These responses 
were surprisingly constant across all sorting questions. Significantly different responses were 
found for people outside the sector and over 65 years old but both of these groups did not have a 
large enough sample for statistically valid conclusions.  Survey comments such as “reliability is 
not so relevant when lives are not at risk” were common but contradictory to the emergency 
management imperative for doctrine, standards and procedure which are to be used regardless of 
situation or consequence. While minimal in the scale of difference in answers, consequences do 
appear to change an emergency manager’s approach to using sensor data.  
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5.5.4 Design choices affecting uptake  
This thesis identifies a set of design choices which influence whether a data product is used 
in decision making or not. While questions 10 and 11 focused on industry or organisational 
wide barriers to uptake, questions 17-19 are focused on the design choices which affect the 
uptake of an individual data product. All three of these questions are the same question but 
divided into different groups of design choices for readability reasons. Questions 17-19 
determines a quantitative 1-7 judgement of, “Which quality, reputational and data policy factors 
affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to inform an emergency management 
decision?” 
 
Figure 20: Box plot with mean value of survey response design choices 
affecting uptake (Questions 17-19). 
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The next Chapter in this thesis is focused on the design choices which lead to the uptake of 
sensor data in emergency management. To avoid repetition the study specific discussion focuses 
on views from the perspective of the sorting questions: age, experience, location, organisation 
type and area in the data supply chain. Appendix H presents the raw averages of questions 17-
19 broken down by each of the sorting criteria. 
As shown in Figure 20, Australian emergency managers believe the most likely design 
choices to inform decision making are accuracy (6.6), timeliness (6.5), reliability (6.5), 
simplicity (6.1), consistency (6.1) and reputation (6.1). The least important variables were dual-
use (3.9), publicly release raw data (4.2), product popularity (4.2) and sovereignty (4.3). Of all 
the design choices the greatest range of answers or standard deviation was with sovereignty 
(2.0) and dual-use (1.9). In addition to the mean and standard deviation the number of responses 
or “N” value is also important because it gives an indication of the most misunderstood design 
choices which were provenance (159), business model (159) and dual-use (162).  
 
Finding 33: Australian emergency managers believe the most likely design choices 
to inform decision making are accuracy, timeliness, reliability, simplicity, consistency 
and reputation. (Section 5.5.4) 
 
Experience in the field showed little variation across the design choices. People with less 
than 5 years’ experience found usability, provenance and business model to be significantly less 
important than the average (Usability 4.7/5.5, provenance 4.5/5.0 and business model 4.2/4.8). 
These three design choices are related to the ease of use or simplicity of a data product but no 
difference was found on simplicity (6.0/6.1). This could potentially lead to the conclusion that 
younger people feel more confident using data products and do not need as much assistance 
themselves but see the value in that assistance being available for other potential users. 
There was a significant difference of opinion across the various states and territories of 
Australia as to what design choices are more important than others. In the ACT useability 
(6.1/5.5), copyright (5.4/4.8) and responsibilities/liabilities (5.8/5.1) are considered more 
important with mandate (4.9/5.6), sovereignty (3.2/4.3), access security (3.9/5.1), network 
security (4.1/5.0), dual-use (3.4/3.9) and cost (4.8/5.3) less important than in the rest of the 
country. This collection of design choices could be explained by the Federal government 
attempting to service many customers in all the states hence valuing open data release and less 
restrictive security while clearly enforcing attribution and liability in their data policies. New 
South Wales considers sovereignty (4.8/4.3) and access security (5.6/5.1) more important. 
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Provenance (5.6/5.0), documentation (5.7/5.1), sovereignty (5.3/4.3), access security (5.7/5.1), 
network security (5.8/5.0), dual-use (5.4/3.9), publicly disclose the source (5.4/4.6) and publicly 
release the raw data (4.8/4.2) are all greater than the national average in the Northern Territory. 
In Queensland mandate (6.2/5.6) and cost (5.8/5.3) are more important with provenance 
(4.2/5.0), documentation (4.6/5.1), interoperability (5.4/5.9) being less important. In South 
Australia the ability to publicly disclose the source (4.0/4.6) is less important. In Tasmania 
many design choices are less important including useability (4.8/5.5), business model (4.3/4.8), 
access security (4.5/5.1), access to raw data (4.5/5.1), publicly disclose the source (3.9/4.6), 
publicly release the raw data (3.5/4.2), copyright (3.4/4.8) and responsibilities/liabilities 
(4.1/5.1) with only provider familiarity (6.1/5.6) being more important than the national 
average. With almost all of the data policy design choices lower than the national average this 
could imply that Tasmania has been less exposed to data policy issues than the rest of the 
country. In West Australian useability (6.2/5.5) and cost (5.9/5.3) are more important with 
provider familiarity (4.9/5.6) being less important. Finally, Victoria has no design choices with 
views more than 0.5 away from the national mean, this is potentially due to greater recent focus 
on data related policy development such as the Victorian Information Network for Emergencies 
(VINE) project. While most states and territories agree on the relative importance of quality 
design choices, significant disagreements exist on reputational or data policy design choices. 
The type of organisation also showed significant variation. Federal government is less 
interested in standards/specifications (4.8/5.5), cost (4.7/5.3) than the rest of the nation. Local 
government, researchers, private sector and NGOs all had 10 or greater design choices which 
were more than 0.5 away from the national mean and can be found within Appendix H. Finally 
State government has no design choices with views more than 0.5 away from the national mean. 
Views vary slightly amongst younger emergency managers but otherwise are quite 
consistent. Emergency managers aged 35-49 and 50-64 do not have views more than 0.5 away 
from the national mean. Under 35s viewed many design choices as more important than the 
national average include product popularity (5.0/4.2), sovereignty (5.3/4.3), access security 
(5.6/5.1), dual-use (4.4/3.9), cost (6.0/5.3), responsibilities/liabilities (5.6/5.1). In fact the 
average of all design choices across age showed under 35’s were generally more concerned than 
other age groups (4.6 vs 4.2 and 4.3). 
Providers and users have similar views with value adders placing less importance on the 
majority of design choices. Providers were more concerned by restrictions on the data they 
provided such as publicly release the raw data (4.9/4.2) and responsibilities/liabilities (5.9/5.1) 
and less concerned with how the product was used such as standards/specifications (4.6/5.5) and 
interoperability (5.4/5.9). Value adders were less concerned about consistency or security than 
the national average as shown through the following design choices: standards/specifications 
(4.8/5.5), documentation (4.6/5.1), access security (4.4/5.1), network security (4.2/5.0) and dual-
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use (3.0/3.9). Users did not express any views which were more than 0.5 from the national 
norm.  
To check the results from questions 17-19, question 20 asked, “In your opinion, what are 
the most important features that a sensor data product must have if it is going to be used in a 
decision making process?” This free text answer had many responses but perhaps the simplest 
analysis of this data is the word frequency analysis technique used in Chapter four. Using the 
same technique, word frequency was extracted, similar words such as timeliness/timely were 
merged and the top six design choices mentioned were: accuracy (53 mentions), timeliness (47 
mentions), reliability (39 mentions), ease (10 mentions), access (8 mentions) and source (7 
mentions). These results agree quite closely with the results from the survey and provide a solid 
dataset of the most important design choices to consider in the next Chapter. 
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5.6 Summary of findings  
Finding 24: 97% of emergency management survey respondents believe sensor data 
should be used in emergency management decision making. (Section 5.4.2) 
Finding 25: The higher the level of product integration the higher the usage. (Section 
5.5.1) 
Finding 26: Availability of data, timeliness of data products and skills to use the data 
are the most common issues facing the emergency management sector. (Section 
5.5.2) 
Finding 27: Stakeholders higher up the supply chain have higher quality thresholds, 
meaning data producers and value adders often block products which are still useful 
to emergency managers. (Section 5.5.2) 
Finding 28: Official data or data from an organisation with an official mandate is more 
trusted than data from an organisation without a mandate. (Section 5.5.3) 
Finding 29: Advertising concurrent with data displays or portals negatively affects 
trust by emergency managers. (Section 5.5.3) 
Finding 30: Emergency managers prefer data products to be delivered to them by a 
public institution even if the data was collected by the private sector. (Section 5.5.3) 
Finding 31: Licence restrictions on the data product or the original source data can 
decrease the trust in a dataset. (Section 5.5.3) 
Finding 32: Social media’s emergence as a potential data source is contested with 
many people being uncertain about its role. (Section 4.5) 
Finding 33: Australian emergency managers believe the most likely design choices 
to inform decision making are accuracy, timeliness, reliability, simplicity, consistency 
and reputation. (Section 5.5.4) 
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Chapter 6: Sector-wide barriers and product 
specific design choices 
6.1 Aim and overview of this chapter 
Chapter’s three to five of this thesis examined different aspects of uptake for data products 
in emergency management. Chapter three looked at how various design choices affect the final 
output of a data product by comparing four medium resolution optical data systems. Chapter 
four examined the findings and recommendations of Australian disaster inquiries to look at how 
data has been used (or not used) in emergency management in Australia. Chapter five collected 
practitioner’s perceptions on what drives uptake and the relative importance of specific design 
choices. This Chapter draws together content from all previous studies and the literature to: 
 Discuss sector-wide barriers to the uptake of sensor data in emergency 
management;  
 Synthesise an exhaustive list of product design choices which affect uptake; 
 Discuss the definition, dimensions, importance and interactions of the above 
mentioned design choices; and 
 Outline methodological weaknesses and future work. 
Following this Chapter, a framework for sensor data product uptake for Australian 
emergency managers is presented. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: 
6.2 Sector-wide barriers to uptake............................................................................. 106 
6.2.1 Availability, timeliness and skills ................................................................. 106 
6.2.2 Producer community issues ......................................................................... 110 
6.2.3 Risk aversion ................................................................................................ 112 
6.3 Establishing a lexicon for data products.............................................................. 115 
6.4 Data product design choices affecting uptake ..................................................... 123 
6.4.1 Quality ......................................................................................................... 124 
6.4.2 Data policy ................................................................................................... 137 
6.4.3 Reputation .................................................................................................... 142 
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6.4.5 Trust ............................................................................................................. 156 
6.5 Summary of findings ........................................................................................... 161 
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6.2 Sector-wide barriers to uptake 
This thesis has a narrow aim, to determine how to improve the design of sensor data 
products to increase the likelihood that an emergency manager will consider it within decision-
making. Before examining the design choices related to data products themselves, it is 
important to consider whether there are broader issues restricting the awareness, usage or uptake 
of sensor data within the Australian emergency management sector. 
These broader sector-wide barriers are covered in the first half of this Chapter. These 
include variables that influence the way decision makers use information such as information 
overload, experience levels of the decision-makers and time constraints (Fisher and Kingma 
2001). The limitations within the value-adder community including internal competition, risk-
aversion and a blame culture are also explored. 
6.2.1 Availability, timeliness and skills 
Chapter five looked at survey responses from the Australian emergency management 
community. Questions 10 and 11 both asked about sector-wide issues affecting the uptake of 
sensor data. Question 10 asked “Which of the following issues do you think are relevant to the 
use of emergency management sensor data today?” The three most commonly rated issues were 
availability of data (87%), timeliness of data products (84%) and skills in the use of the data 
(81%). Question 11 built upon Question 10 by using a 1-7 relative importance judgement asking 
“How much do you think the following factors influence the use of sensor data in emergency 
management decisions?” Again the top three responses, all of which had low standard 
deviations, were as follows: 
1. Lack of expertise and knowledge about sensor data (Mean 5.8, Std dev. 1.2). 
2. Sensor data and its development is not a budgetary priority in emergency management 
agencies (Mean 5.3, Std dev. 1.5). 
3. In emergency management decisions there is not enough time to take account of all the 
available data including sensor data (Mean 5.1, Std dev. 1.7). 
A clear agreement can be seen between question 10 and 11 with skills and a lack of 
expertise, and timeliness, not enough time, the key results. The responses also highlight 
availability and budgetary priority, which while different issues, are related. This section 
focuses on these three key issues facing the industry as identified by the survey conducted in 
Chapter five: availability (including budgetary considerations), skills and timeliness.  
Availability is the most common issue raised when talking about sensor data in disaster 
decision making. 87% of emergency managers raised availability as an issue. Availability 
however has different meanings for different groups of people. It is also a term which 
incorporates other factors including skills, timeliness, quality and cost. It is important to 
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consider these interrelationships when it comes to the availability of sensor data in disaster 
decision making.  
Looking at the stages in the data supply chain, three main problems could be occurring to 
reduce availability. First, there is not enough data. Second, the data which is acquired is not 
reaching the users. Third, the data which is acquired is not reaching users in a usable form. 
Given this section of the discussion is focused upon sector-wide issues and not data product 
specific issues, the third issue of usability will be covered later in this Chapter when discussing 
data product specific issues. The question of whether the data which is acquired is the correct 
type of data, will also be covered in the data product specific section. Two issues therefore 
remain for discussion: not enough data or that data is not reaching users. 
The hypothesis that emergency managers raise availability as an issue because there is not 
enough data being collected is unlikely. As discussed in Chapter three, more data is being 
generated than ever before; and its ability to reach users in real time is growing. With the 
number of devices, most of which are sensors, connected to the internet set to grow from 500 
million in 2003 to over 50 billion by 2020 there seems to be no absence of sensors (Evans 
2011). In addition, the projected growth in Earth Observations is set to grow to over 150 
petabytes in 2030 for the climate domain alone, therefore it is not the quantity of data that is the 
problem (Overpeck et al. 2011). Finally, the World Meteorological Organisation alone generates 
data products for more than 260 processes on the Earth just in the weather and climate. There is 
a large and ever increasing number of sensors, data and data products. It is likely that there are 
some cases where there is not enough on a particular type of data source over a specific 
location, but based on the above evidence this would be the exception.  
This leads to the second hypothesis: that existing data products are not reaching emergency 
managers. This hypothesis encompasses a number of different issues as shown by this free text 
response to the web survey: 
“The timeliness and availability of "sensor assets" is a huge issue in 
disasters. I have experienced this locally during a disaster where it was 
difficult to find a "go to" point of contact in government (even through the 
disaster coordination centre) who understood the range of capability that 
could be brought to bear, and then have the ability to coordinate and act on 
it.” 
This quote brings up four separate issues: timeliness, awareness, governance and skills. In 
addition to these issues, there is also a question of which group of users sensor data may or may 
not be reaching.  
Data not reaching users in time is a key factor in availability. Timeliness is a problem for 
both individual data products and for the sector. The survey results showed that not only is 
timeliness the second largest sector-wide issue, but there is also a strong relationship between 
how big of an issue timeliness is and how close the group is to a disaster. All response related 
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sectors had results greater than 84%, followed by only 50% of researchers believing timeliness 
of data products was an issue within the sector. Timeliness can be considered a sector-wide in 
the sense that governance or cultural issues may mean that information is blocked or slowed 
before it reaches end users.  
Strong governance arrangements for data management and distribution can increase 
timeliness and availability while keeping costs lower. One common call is for greater 
centralisation for this function, one respondent argued:  
 “Australia needs a generic data suite, that is all hazards, that can be used 
across jurisdictions by agencies to provide a source of consistent data” 
Another respondent explains why strong governance can reduce the costs of data collection 
and distribution:  
 “Sensor to budgetary priority in emergency agencies should not be an issue.  
There is enough data from events that would allow a prudent collective 
return on investment business case to be developed that would encompass all 
agencies allowing them to fund their appropriate needs.” 
Although sensor data not being a budgetary priority was the second largest concern in 
question 11 of the survey, governance plays a key role in determining whether budget is a 
problem or not, this in turn means that governance increases availability. Effective governance 
makes data providers easier to discover, reduces duplication and reduces costs of sensor data 
and associated development. 
Skills and training is the third largest sector-wide issue which also is linked to availability. 
This can be best summed up by another survey respondent: 
“There is no use having all the best satellites in the world when our disaster 
management system relies on the locals doing the ground work and not 
having or knowing about such information or assets being available. It's 
kind of like developing an evacuation route map and forgetting to educate 
the locals on what it is, where its found and how to use it.” 
Increasing emergency manager’s ability to use technology is a large issue but potentially 
not as simple as more skills and training. Skills was the third most common issue raised in the 
survey with 81% of respondents flagging it. As described in the free text responses, what is 
needed is “skills in analysis and interpretation”. It could be said however, that data products 
suffer from a “lack of intuitiveness”, as was posed by another respondent. Ten years ago large 
GIS teams used geo-routing algorithms of authoritative government datasets to calculate the 
faster way to get from point A to B. In 2015 it is common place for anybody to do this many 
times a day with their smartphone or computer. Regardless of whether training or intuitiveness 
is a larger problem one fact is clear – in the survey conducted in Chapter five new technologies 
(including social media and drones) from the last decade were either not at all or rarely, 
discussed. This implies that the average emergency manager has not dramatically increased 
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their technical skill in the last decade at a time when data products and services have become 
dramatically more useable and are continuing on that trajectory. As a consequence, the 
responsibility to address emergency manager’s technical literacy is inevitably swayed towards 
useability not training. Both hypothesises, that emergency managers need more technical 
training and that products need to be more intuitive, are correct to a certain degree but as stated 
by this respondent it is more complex than simply these factors: 
“Packaging of sensor data for easy consumption by incident managers is a 
challenge.  Many incident managers are not technically literate so do now 
know how to use the data, or do not trust it. 
 
Accessing sensor data for L1 and L2 (Small and medium) incidents is 
extremely difficult.” 
 
Data availability is different for different scale events and for different audiences. For 
example, in a keynote presentation to the 2011 Australasian Fire and Emergency Service 
Authorities Council Conference, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Commissioner Lee 
Johnson presented Figure 21 explaining the various groups involved in emergency management. 
Unlike most diagrams of this type, people were not split by location or disaster type, but by the 
actual roles they undertake.  
 
Figure 21: Types and levels of disaster practitioners (Johnson 2011). 
 
According to Johnson, emergency managers predominately work in two types of roles: 
disaster operations and incident management.  Disaster operations personnel coordinate the 
response, while incident management personnel are more tactical and deal with specific 
incidents which combine to make up the disaster. This diagram reveals two separate audiences 
for disaster information. Firstly, overall disaster information for politicians, disaster managers, 
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media and interested members of the public is called disaster operations information. Secondly, 
specific incident information for incident managers and affected members of the public is called 
incident management information. From a data collection perspective, data for these two groups 
is often the same, but the product design for disaster operations and incident management must 
be quite different. Data products for disaster operations often generalise information and present 
historical context, while incident management information provides as much detail about the 
current event as possible.  
The survey did not collect data about the specific role of respondents but both the inquiries 
study and survey responses focus the majority of negative feedback on incident management 
information, such as: 
 “I wish our supposedly World Class fire service actually had any of these 
things so that frontline fire officers have all the relevant info when making 
decisions on the fire ground.” 
This leads to the conclusion that data is available but it is not targeted for incident 
management. This finding is supported by the sector breakdown of the survey responses. When 
looking at the sectors of people who flagged availability as an issue, people further away from 
the incident rated the issue as less important than people closer to the incident. 93% of NGOs 
rated availability as an issue while 75% of researchers rated it as an issue. This divide between 
the quality of data for disaster operations and incident managers could be caused by Federal and 
State government disaster mandates. Federal governments often are responsible for data capture 
particularly from larger collection platforms like satellites due to the cost. In Australia the 
Federal government, however, has a limited role in incident management, logically this leads to 
a situation where disasters operations personnel, in both Federal and State government, receive 
more targeted and higher quality data products due to the focus of Federal government resources 
and assets. Using Johnson’s terms discussed in Figure 21, data appears to be more available to 
disaster operations professionals than to incident management professionals. 
 
Finding 34: Sensor data is available to higher level decision makers but less 
available to front line incident management staff. (Section 6.2.1) 
 
6.2.2 Producer community issues 
The previous section explored sector-wide issues related to sensor data in disaster decision 
making. Through reviewing disaster inquiries, surveying emergency managers, and subsequent 
follow up, issues within the producer community have been shown to impact the use of sensor 
data for disaster decision making in Australia. This section will explore these issues. 
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These issues are sector-wide and affect all hazards, data types and quality of data products 
from the highly regarded weather forecast to new products just created. 
In the early 1990s disaster experts coined the term ‘Battle of the Samaritans’ to describe 
inter-organisation competition and disagreement during disasters (Rosenthal, ’t Hart, and 
Kouzmin 1991). This problem has developed in many guises including funding, mandate and 
even technology choices. Many types of responder collaboration are more rhetoric about 
collaboration than actual practical collaboration (Berlin and Carlström 2011). Regardless of the 
true state of collaboration as discussed by Rosenthal et al. (1991): 
“By defining, funding and evaluating network-level projects and outcomes to 
supplement and partly replace existing funding/accountability streams of 
individual organizations, incentives can be created to take collaboration 
seriously, and improve interpersonal and interorganizational trust prior to 
crises.”  
This Battle of the Samaritans has been further explored by Boin et al. (2005) who noted 
that not only do emergency management agencies participate in this battle but also “Agencies 
representing different technologies of crisis coping find it difficult to align their actions” (Boin 
et al. 2005, 12). In testing the survey scientifically trained personnel often suggested comparing 
which technology was ‘better’ demonstrating that different technologies and products are seen 
to complete with each other. What compounds this is that, as emergency management uses more 
scientific information such as sensor data, more scientists are involved. Scientists are by training 
critical and work in a system which promotes the critical assessment of other scientist’s work, it 
is the basis of the scientific profession and it is called peer review. Peer review is exceptionally 
important between scientists but can be misinterpreted when conducted in public. This approach 
can result in confusion among the user community who cannot get clear technical advice on 
which products to trust. 
The technological Battle of the Samaritans has led to many challenging battles (Berlin and 
Carlström 2011). The most traditional battles are between different emergency management 
services or between different levels of government such as between the Federal and State 
governments. Vanden Borre et al. (2011) examine settling divisions between ground based and 
space based observers but there are many other examples. Based on the author’s professional 
experience, traditional adversaries never miss an opportunity to reignite old battles, these 
include, but are not limited to: Providers vs. value adders also known as data providers vs. 
cartographers, and the author’s personal favourite numerical modellers vs. pure observers which 
is a particularly academic battle.  
 
Finding 35: Technologies, often complimentary, participate in the Battle of the 
Samaritans to discredit other technologies and promote their own. (Section 6.2.2) 
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There are many potential solutions to this competitive culture which have been written 
about but all involved a form of aligning goals and objectives through co-production (Newhall 
with IAVCEI Subcommittee for Crisis Prot 1999; Aspinall et al. 2003; Aspinall and Cooke 
2008). 
Coproduction involves including all stakeholders from the conception of a product through 
to its final decommissioning. This approach can ensure that users get products which are not 
driven by a new technological innovation but an actual requirement. Of the 18 sensor data 
products found in the inquiries, only five of them or 28% were actual products the rest were raw 
sensors or data feeds. This implies that the remaining 72% of data feeds failed for some reason, 
potentially political constraints such as discussed above. Furthermore, the two data products 
which were mentioned the most, the weather forecast and warnings, are both mature integrated 
data products with a blend of satellite, aerial and ground data processed using observations and 
models. This also provides evidence that one individual measurement domain does not increase 
the likelihood of usage but integration of multiple domains does increase usage.  
Given the wide variety of data sources and stakeholders the field of sensor data for 
emergency management suffers is prone to a lack of coherence. This not only makes the 
products less useable, but saps trust from data users. Groups who integrate technologies and 
avoid the Battle of the Samaritans are the most used products in the disaster sector.  
 
Finding 36: Integration of technologies and co-production can reduce the Battle of 
the Samaritans. (Section 6.2.2) 
 
6.2.3 Risk aversion  
The inquiries study found only 35 mentions of data products in the 31 most data centric 
disaster inquiries in Australia’s history. Meanwhile 111 concerns or comments placing blame on 
how data was collected or misused were found. This suggests a fixation on assigning blame 
after a disaster through the juridification of inquiries (Boin et al. 2005; Eburn and Dovers 2015). 
As described by Boin: 
“Accountability is hollow when the investigation and debate that lie at its 
heart become ritualized.” (Boin et al. 2005, 102) 
Scientific data is increasingly being used as a basis for important decisions by governments 
and individuals, and as evidence for policy development and policy implementation. There have 
been recent cases of scientific organisations being criticised or successfully litigated against due 
to the miscommunication of their data, or others misusing their data, such as in the 2009 
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L'Aquila earthquake or the 2010 Deepwater Horizons oil spill respectively (Alexander 2010; 
Cartlidge 2011; McNutt et al. 2011). These cases have led to a significant amount of research 
retrospectively studying the use of data in emergency response (Bojanowski 2011; McNutt et al. 
2011; Camilli and D’Emilio 2012).  
In response to the legal risks and blame culture risks, emergency managers fall back on 
rigid doctrine or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Originally doctrine was created to build 
clear command and control, giving clear instructions to all staff so everything goes according to 
the plan. Doctrine is now prevalent in the emergency management sector to protect agencies and 
individuals against blame falling upon them during the inquiry. Blame culture is so prevalent in 
Australia that, a common joke in emergency management sectors is that doctrine says the first 
step in any disaster is to sack the commissioner responsible for that disaster.  
During an anonymised interview with researchers published in Eburn (2012a) one senior 
Australian fire officer described this problem as follows: 
 “… lawyers are writing the plans, or helping us write the plans.  They are 
so prescriptive as to be almost irrelevant.  Every operation has its own 
unique dynamic.  Plans should be, you know, principle based and fairly 
broad and give a large landscape in which to operate with some principles 
in which to comply with. 
But we’re getting so much prescription … Well, that’s great, but then you’ve 
got the documents and then you’ve got the environment which you’ve got to 
operate it within.  I’m yet to be convinced that the two will ever align.  … So 
I don’t think plans are a measure of success because they’re becoming very 
legalistic.” (Eburn 2012a, 8) 
In a follow up piece of research Eburn remarks that: 
“At the moment, the true lesson from the last, and previous inquiries, it is 
that the single most important thing an incident controller must do, is keep 
the paperwork up to date; keep your eye not on the event but the next post 
event inquiry.” (Eburn 2012b) 
Firstly, it is clear that the over use of lawyers and bureaucracy as a protection against other 
lawyers and bureaucracy is not where the public expects emergency managers to be focusing 
their effort and resources. Unfortunately, wasted time and resources are not the only impact of 
this problem. The blame culture created by this situation reduces innovation, and doctrine all 
but eliminates the possibility of emergency managers improvising during a disaster. This rigid 
operating environment in turn affects groups working with emergency managers such as sensor 
data producers and value adders. For example, emergency services doctrine demands the use of 
authoritative government topographic maps even though they are rarely updated and are 
generally out of date by a disaster. In this case Volunteer Geographic Information (VGI) is often 
captured to update a map which is no longer authoritative and hence usage of this product could 
break the doctrine of an agency (Rak 2013). 
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Finding 37: Rigid emergency management doctrine is not conducive to the 
acceptance of new technologies. (Section 6.2.3) 
 
A disaster, by definition, is a situation which is so complex that it has broken the standard 
rules. Therefore professional judgement and improvisation plays a vital role in disaster 
management. In fact, improvisation is well known as a long standing key success factor for 
disasters (Mendonça 2007). The original study into improvisation’s role in disasters looks at the 
role of a coffee bar after an earthquake in Southern Italy which was the key coordination point 
in the recovery, well before formal response organisations were able to respond (Lanzara 1983). 
More recently, improvisation and innovation have been popularised with NASA’s response to 
the Apollo 13 disaster (Boin et al. 2005). As described most succinctly by Ciborra (1999, p. 77), 
“improvisation is a well-grounded process that can be leveraged to face those situations where 
rules and methods fail”.  
Lesson learning, doctrine, improvisation and innovation need to be balanced in disasters. 
This thesis has reviewed Australian disaster inquiries and shown that at times they can provide 
valuable insights and accountability, but often there is no evidence of lessons being learned. 
Lesson learning, particularly for technical matters such as sensor data, must become a more 
systematic and business as usual affair if it is to provide the maximum benefits. There may be 
something to learn from the transport sector where air accidents or traffic accidents are 
investigated by an independent and permanent organisation of subject matter experts. Doctrine 
is an important tool for justifying decisions and simplifying activities during a disaster, but 
according to Eburn (2012a) the sector seems to have focused solely on justifying decisions in 
recent times. Doctrine needs to be used to set out clear boundaries and suggested procedures 
while leaving room for improvisation and innovation where an activity could be too complex or 
too dynamic.   
 
Finding 38: Lesson learning, doctrine, improvisation and innovation need to be 
balanced in disasters. (Section 6.2.3) 
 
One area this thesis has significant implications for is the post disaster inquiry field. 
Contrary to the view that using sensor data products increases complexity, the likelihood of 
greater blame during post disaster inquiries is in fact reduced. Sensor data products can be used 
to justify decision making in disasters during an inquiry. Furthermore, it is common place for 
sensor data products, specifically maps, to be used to assist post disaster inquiries rather than 
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hinder. When, in a post disaster inquiry, emergency managers are asked to explain why a 
decision prioritised one option over another, sensor data can provide a solid, official piece of 
evidence which can be used to help defend emergency management decision making. During 
the case Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales (No 9) [2012] NSWSC 701 
emergency managers were asked to explain why they had prioritised one fire and left another 
which subsequently burned the Warragamba Winery. One piece of evidence used in this case 
was the weather forecast whose wind direction forecasts were an important part of emergency 
management decision making and assisted in this case being dismissed. As discussed in section 
6.2.2 integrated products can aid in their communication. 
 
Finding 39: Sensor data when used as evidence to support decision making 
can reduce blame, particularly in post event inquiries. (Section 6.2.3) 
 
 
6.3 Establishing a lexicon for data products 
This thesis has shown that the literature, the moderate resolution optical data community, 
Australian disaster inquiry authors, and Australian emergency managers through survey 
responses all have different terms which either have an overlapping, similar or same meaning.  
One of the most important first steps in starting a field of study on data product design 
choices is to clarify the terms and establish a common lexicon for all those in the field.  This 
also allows emergency managers and product creators to communicate product requirements 
and the benefits and costs of various choices. Only through such communication can the right 
trade-offs be made in the design of products.  
This section synthesises the dominant academic literature and results from the thesis to 
create a common lexicon for the design choices which drive the uptake of sensor data in 
emergency management. This synthesised list of design choices is then further explored for the 
remainder of the Chapter. 
To generate this synthesised list, a wide net is cast to source all possible design choices 
raised in the literature (quality, legal and reputation) and the results of three studies conducted in 
this thesis. Each possible design choice is considered with the specific emergency management 
context in mind, and then either merged with a different term or dismissed as not relevant.   
One concern raised by archivist or metadata specialists is how to address definitional 
specificity when definitions vary across different communities (Yoo and Harward 2013). 
Discussions about definitional specificity and accuracy have plagued academic communities for 
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centuries. This thesis, however, seeks to find a set of terms that are fit-for-purpose, that is that 
they get to the heart of the issue at hand and are comprehensible to the target audience 
(emergency managers/data users and data producers). This is sufficient because, firstly, this 
thesis is targeted at data production organisations developing products for emergency managers 
and the specificity of this target audience reduces the risk of definitional confusion. Secondly, 
recent advances in metadata technologies mean that different sectors can use different 
vocabularies. one technology specifically focused upon is the Resource Description Framework 
(RDF) as one of the central layers of the third version of the internet or Web 3.0 (Berners-Lee 
2000; Bruce and Hillmann 2004; Duval et al. 2002). The implication of this is that the final 
terms used within this thesis are only important for conveying understanding to the reader. 
Different groups use different terminologies because it gives those sectors a sense of possession 
and ownership over a concept. 
The section presents each possible set of choices in a table format, discussing their source, 
relevance and context, before reducing and refining the lists to consolidate a set a core design 
choices. 
Turning now to the first set of design choices, Wang and Strong (1996) is the most 
accepted data quality work in recent history with over 1700 citations making it one of the most 
cited papers on the topic. Through the use of intuitive, theoretical and empirical studies Wang 
and Strong (1996) established a framework for assessing data quality which is the foundation 
paper on the topic. Wang and Strong’s framework and a mapping to this thesis is outlined in the 
Table 23. The design choices are ordered from most important to least as presented in Wang and 
Strong (1996).  
Table 23: Synthesis of design choices from Wang and Strong (1996) conceptual 
framework for data quality, design choices ordered by relative importance. 
Design choice type 
(source) 
Contributing design choices Action 
Data quality 
(Wang and Strong, 
1996)  
Believability Adopted 
Accuracy Adopted 
Objectivity Covered by believability 
Reputation Adopted and expanded to theme 
Value-added Covered by relevance 
Relevancy Covered by relevance 
Timeliness Adopted 
Completeness Covered by accuracy and maturity 
Appropriate amount of data Covered by usability 
Interpretability Adopted broadened to usability 
Ease of understanding Covered by usability 
Representational consistency Covered by usability 
Concise representation Covered by usability 
Accessibility Covered by usability 
Access security Adopted broadened to security 
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As architects of Europe’s data policy for the Global Monitoring for Environment and 
Security program, Europe’s largest ever Remote Sensing program, Harris and Browning (2003) 
is a definitive work on data policy.  
Unlike many other studies (such as Lowell et al. (2011) and Purdy (2010)), Harris and 
Browning (2003) provide a legally grounded perspective on data policy issues in remote 
sensing. Legal considerations are often instrumental in emergency manager’s decisions about 
whether to use a given data set. In most cases disaster management data is supplied to 
emergency management agencies by other government agencies or the private sector. This 
reality means that the data policy and associated legal conditions used to supply data to the 
emergency management agencies is a critical design choice which can affect the trust of those 
data. For example, if a data provider offers a licence on a bushfire boundary map which only 
grants access to the map and not the underlying dataset, quality or process by which the map 
was created then no assessment of data quality can be made by the emergency management 
agency hence making them distrust that dataset. As described by von der Dunk (2008):  
“It may perhaps come as an unwelcome surprise that such activities, 
normally undertaken with the best of intentions, might be subjected to legal 
scrutiny and run into legal obstacles or at least raise legal issues which may 
make potential rescuers think twice before doing the seemingly obvious.”  
Harris and Browning's (2003) six data policy characteristics are synthesised in the Table 
24.  
Table 24: Synthesis of design choices from Harris and Browning (2003) data 
policy research. 
Design choice type 
(source) 
Contributing design choices Action 
Data policy 
(R. Harris and 
Browning 2003) 
Ownership, privacy and 
confidentiality 
Ownership adopted renamed data 
policy and privacy/confidentiality 
adopted renamed data source 
Intellectual property rights and 
associated legal frameworks 
Grouped under data policy 
Standards and metadata Covered by maturity 
Licensing, distribution and 
dissemination 
Grouped under data policy 
Pricing policy Grouped under data policy 
Archiving policy Grouped under data policy 
 
Artz and Gil (2007) provide a list of criteria for measuring trust and reputation in relation 
to content. Adding reputation and trust allows for consideration of broader issues than quality 
and legal considerations. It opens consideration of the more subjective reasons for uptake, or a 
lack of uptake. Reputation is at essence a measure of how much a community trusts an entity, 
based on their past performance.  
Within economics and marketing literature the role of information on reputation is 
commonly analysed from a game theory and statistical perspective such as in  Kreps and Wilson 
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(1982). While these methods contribute to the discussion later in the thesis they do not provide a 
set of design choices which contribute to reputation and hence a paper from these fields is not 
presented in this section. 
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Artz and Gil (2007) consider trust and reputation in relation to the semantic web. Their 
paper develops a list of design choices that influence content trust on the internet. This presents 
a good proxy for the scenario being considered in sensor data products. A subset of these design 
choices relate to the role of reputation in trust. While these design choices show a large degree 
of overlap with the previously discussed design choices they importantly add consideration of 
design choices in relation to modern technologies.  For this reason Artz and Gil (2007) can be 
used to cover reputational design choices and also to provide some redundancy with other 
existing frameworks previously discussed. The 19 design choices proposed by Artz and Gil 
(2007) are presented and synthesised in the Table 25. 
Table 25: Synthesis of design choices from Artz and Gil (2007) content trust on 
the internet research. 
Design choice type 
(source) 
Contributing design choices Action 
Content trust on the 
internet 
(Artz and Gil 2007) 
Topic considered Covered by relevance 
Context and criticality of the need 
for information 
Covered by relevance 
Popularity of the resource Adopted renamed popularity 
Recognized authority of associations Adopted renamed mandate 
Reputation by direct experience Covered by believability 
Referrals by other users Covered by believability 
Association by other trusted 
resources (e.g., citations) 
Covered by believability 
Provenance and pedigree Covered by maturity 
Expertise of the user Covered by usability 
Perceived bias of source Covered by believability 
Perceived incentive in providing 
accurate information 
Covered by believability 
Absence of other alternative 
resources 
Covered by relevance or mandate 
depending on meaning 
Agreement with other resources Covered by accuracy 
Precise and specific content Covered by relevance 
Likelihood of content being correct 
given what is known 
Covered by believability 
Time of creation of the content Covered by timeliness 
Professional appearance Covered by usability 
Likelihood of deceptive behavior Covered by believability 
Recency of factors under 
consideration 
Covered by timeliness 
 
Transitioning from the academic literature to the studies conducted in this thesis, Chapter 
four on Australian disaster inquiries identified design choices which should be considered in the 
new lexicon. 31 inquiries in total were identified as data focused inquiries and examined in 
detail. In these inquiries 111 concerns or discussions about ways to use or improve data related 
products were identified. Many of these concerns were similar, or a specific component of a 
more general concern. For this reason the concerns were grouped. Table 26 shows the grouped 
concerns created from the Australian disaster inquiry study in Chapter four.  
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Table 26: Grouped concerns from Australia disaster inquiries. 
Design choice type 
(source) 
Contributing design choices Action 
Concern as stated in 
Australian disaster 
inquiry (Chapter 4) 
Awareness Covered by popularity 
Clarity of message Covered by usability 
Cleaned of extraneous information Covered by usability 
Common boundaries Covered by relevance 
Consistency 
Covered by accuracy and usability 
depending on context 
Consistent terminology Covered by usability 
Efficiency of the system Covered by timeliness 
Lack of a manual Covered by maturity 
Lack of situational awareness Covered by relevance 
Maturity Adopted 
Repeatability Covered by maturity 
Rigor Covered by maturity 
Tightening of connections between 
staff 
Covered by maturity 
Accuracy Adopted 
Errors of commission Covered by accuracy 
Errors of omission Covered by accuracy 
Human error Covered by accuracy 
Quality Adopted 
Responsive Covered by relevance 
Right time Covered by relevance 
Timeliness Adopted 
Coverage Covered by relevance 
Detection without identification Covered by relevance 
Extent of detail Covered by usability 
Fitness for purpose Covered by usability 
Relevance Adopted 
Right information Covered by relevance 
Tailored Covered by relevance 
Coordination Covered by believability 
Cost Adopted 
Effective use Covered by believability 
Effectiveness Covered by believability 
Funding Covered by believability 
National coordinated Covered by believability 
Optimisation Covered by maturity 
24 hour availability Covered by reliability 
Availability of communications Covered by reliability 
Redundancy Covered by reliability 
Reliability Adopted 
Scalability Covered by reliability 
Availability Covered by reliability 
Frequency Covered by relevance 
More monitoring Covered by relevance 
Dissemination Covered by usability 
Omitted data 
Covered by usability or believability 
depending on context 
Over aggregation Covered by usability 
Presentation Covered by usability 
Right form Covered by usability 
Technical means of filtering/triaging 
inputs Covered by usability 
Misinformation Covered by believability 
Not relied upon Covered by believability 
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Rumours Covered by believability 
Trust Adopted 
Availability of experts Covered by believability 
Experience Covered by believability 
Lack of knowledge Covered by believability 
Training Covered by believability 
Authorising environment Covered by maturity 
Culture Covered by reputation 
Data used too late Covered by timeliness 
Information flow to decision makers Covered by maturity 
Accessibility Covered by usability 
Availability of maps in the field Covered by usability 
Uptake Subject of investigation 
Flexibility Covered by relevance 
Interoperability Covered by maturity 
Third party source Covered by data source 
 
Chapter five presented a survey of the Australian emergency management practitioners. 
Questions 17-19 asked for a quantitative 1-7 judgement of, “Which quality, reputational and 
data policy factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to inform an 
emergency management decision?” Table 27 shows the design choices surveyed in the three 
questions: 
Table 27: Grouped concerns from web survey results. 
Design choice type 
(source) 
Contributing design choices Action 
Web survey questions 
10-13 (Chapter 5) 
Accuracy Adopted 
Timeliness Adopted 
Reliability Adopted 
Simplicity Covered by usability 
Completeness Covered by accuracy and maturity 
Useability Adopted 
Consistency 
Covered by accuracy and usability 
depending on context 
Provenance Covered by maturity 
Standards & specifications Covered by maturity 
Documentation Covered by maturity 
Interoperability Covered by maturity 
Mandate Adopted 
Reputation Adopted 
Provider familiarity Covered by believability 
Product popularity Covered by popularity 
Business model Covered by relevance 
Sovereignty Covered by data source 
Access security Adopted broadened to security 
Network security Adopted broadened to security 
Dual-use Covered by data source 
Cost Grouped under data policy 
Access to raw data Grouped under data policy 
Publicly disclose the source Covered by data source 
Publicly release the raw data Grouped under data policy 
Copyright Grouped under data policy 
Responsibilities and liabilities Grouped under data policy 
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Finally, in addition to questions 17-19 of this survey a free text response field was offered 
in Question 20 to the question, “In your opinion, what are the most important features that a 
sensor data product must have if it is going to be used in a decision making process?” This free 
text answer had many responses but perhaps the simplest analysis of this data is the word 
frequency analysis technique used in Chapter five. Using the same technique word frequency 
was extracted, similar words such as timeliness/timely were merged and the top 5 factors 
mentioned were: Accuracy (53 mentions), timeliness (47 mentions), reliability (39 mentions), 
ease (10 mentions), access (8 mentions) and source (7 mentions). These results agree quite 
closely with the results from the survey. 
Table 28: Grouped concerns from word frequency analysis of web survey 
results. 
Design choice type 
(source) 
Contributing design choices Action 
Web survey free text 
word frequency 
analysis (Chapter 5) 
Accuracy Adopted 
Timeliness Adopted 
Reliability Adopted 
Ease Covered by usability 
Access Covered by licencing 
Source Covered by data source 
 
The limitations of the above method have been previously explored in Chapter five and 
although the method is subjective, it is only a starting point or hypothesis which is required to 
further progress the stated research questions.  
As a result of the above iterative process of elimination and narrowing, a smaller number 
of key data design choices remain relevant to emergency management. Table 29 is the result of 
the above synthesis with several topics to be explored further during the remainder of this 
chapter including data policy, maturity and trust: 
Table 29: Synthesised list of design choices affecting uptake. 
Headline design choices 
affecting uptake 
Design choices 
Quality 
Accuracy  
Relevance 
Timeliness  
Usability 
Data policy Data policy 
Reputation 
Believability 
Data source 
Mandate 
Popularity 
Reliability 
Security 
Maturity To be established 
Trust To be established 
6.4 Data product design choices affecting uptake 123  
 
 
6.4 Data product design choices affecting uptake 
This section discusses the list of synthesised design choices affecting the uptake of sensor 
data in decision making by emergency managers in Australia. The objectives and structure of 
this section are: 
 Describe each design choice;  
 Present the evidence collected throughout this thesis for why each of these design 
choices are important to uptake; 
 Discuss the various settings and importance of each design choice; and 
 Discuss the interrelationships between different design choices. 
The evidence collected for each design choice will be presented in a summary Table. 
These Tables will bring together every contributing design choice outlined in Section 6.4 from 
the previous six tables (three publications and three studies) used to synthesise the list of design 
choices. All of these contributing design choices will be collected within an evidence table for 
each of the design choices outlined in Table 29. The contributing design choices which were not 
made a design choice in Table 29 will be referred to as design levers and will form the bottom 
level of the framework developed in this thesis. Table 30 is an example of the evidence tables 
used for each of the 16 design choices defined in this section: 
Table 30: Example evidence Table for the design choice. 
Design 
choice/ 
lever 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results (Chapter 
5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 mean 
Example 8 (3/67) 176/17
1 6.1/5.3 1.0/1.4 
Private sector 6.6 53 (1/6) 
 
The Table shows the number of mentions a given design choice had within the disaster 
inquiries study (Chapter four) and its ranking compared with other design choices. Next, the 
Table presents the results from the survey (Chapter five) showing the number of responses 
which mentioned that given issue and the mean number of responses.  Next the mean is 
presented along with the mean of all responses, indicating the relative importance of the design 
choice. Next the standard deviation is presented along with the mean standard deviation which 
indicates the spread of responses. The outliers for each respondent profile then demonstrate 
different opinions across different groups including age, experience, role and location. The final 
column in the Table shows the word count and ranking out of six used within the free text 
response in question 20 of the survey (Chapter five). Note that the previous section can 
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highlight a contributing design choice in the literature which did not appear in any of the three 
studies hence will appear as a blank row. 
6.4.1 Quality 
Quality is a headline design choice made up on four design choices: accuracy, relevance, 
timeliness and usability. 
Wang and Strong (1996) established a framework for assessing data quality using several 
groups to describe fifteen key features of data quality under the following areas: intrinsic data 
quality, contextual data quality, representational data quality and accessibility data quality. 
The reason why this thesis does not simply adopt this framework is clearly stated in the 
conclusion in Wang and Strong (1996, p. 21), “to improve data quality, we need to understand 
what data quality means to data consumers (those who use data).” This thesis is targeted at 
improving data products for Australian emergency managers which alters the data quality 
priorities. For example, rather than being the 9th most important design choice, timeliness takes 
on high priority in an emergency management context. Due to the need to tailor a framework for 
a given audience data quality holds different meanings to different audiences. 
ISO 9000:2005 defines quality as the “degree to which a set of inherent characteristics 
fulfils requirements”. Simply, data quality measures how much a representation, such as a data 
product, reflects an object or process, such as a flood moving across the landscape. This 
involves many different design choices. The synthesis of terms based on available evidence 
demonstrated that accuracy, relevance, timeliness and usability and are key features of quality 
for emergency management products.  
Due to the breadth and diversity of opinions on data quality, not many direct observations 
were made on the term quality in studies, the only study involving quality directly was the 
inquiries study whose results is summarised in the Table 31. 
Table 31: Design choices and levers for quality and related evidence. 
Design 
choices 
and levers  
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 mean 
Quality 4 (5/67)      
 
The synthesised lexicon established in Section 6.3 presents three groups of design choices: 
quality, data policy and reputation. Accuracy, relevance, timeliness and usability which make up 
quality, all score highly in all three ranking studies presented in this discussion. For this reason, 
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quality is the most important of the three groups of design choices when you examine the 
relative importance of its contributing design choices. Quality is key to increasing the uptake of 
data in emergency management. Quality also has many links with reputation related design 
choices. These links are covered in the reputation section of this Chapter. 
6.4.1.1 Accuracy  
Accuracy is the first design choice under the quality headline design choice. 
Quality is a measure of how much a representation, such as a data product, reflects an 
object or process. This includes a measure of how well the product is presented to an audience 
and how well the product represents the true or accepted values the object or process. Accuracy 
is the measure of the latter – the closeness of agreement between an observed value and the true 
value. Two other terms require definition to understand accuracy, these are error and 
uncertainty. Error is the amount by which an observation differs from its (unobservable) true 
value. Uncertainty, while highly context specific, is the measure of error about a given 
measurement or circumstance.  
Accuracy can refer to many different aspects of a data product such as positional, temporal 
or thematic accuracy. Table 32 summarises the generic and specific quality indicators used by 
the Global Earth Observation System of Systems clearinghouse. 
Table 32: Generic and specific quality indicators used by the Global Earth 
Observation System of Systems clearinghouse (Yang et al. 2013). 
Generic quality indicators Specific quality indicators 
Positional accuracy  
Absolute external positional accuracy 
Gridded data positional accuracy 
Relative internal positional accuracy 
Completeness 
Completeness commission 
Completeness omission 
Logical consistency  
Conceptual consistency 
Domain consistency 
Topological consistency 
Format consistency 
Temporal accuracy  
Accuracy of a time measurement  
Temporal consistency  
Temporal validity  
Thematic accuracy  
Quantitative attribute accuracy 
Non-quantitative attribute accuracy 
Thematic classification correctness 
 
 
Accuracy is generally a quantitative measure, such as 98% accurate which means that 2% 
of the product is attributed to error or random probability. Accuracy is changed through 
improvements in the processing or interpretation of a data product such as discovery of a new 
algorithm. This type of discovery is common, the following papers are all examples of new 
breakthroughs to improve the accuracy of one specific type of moderate resolution optical data: 
Masek et al. (2006); Irish et al. (2006) ; (Zhu and Woodcock 2012); and Li et al. (2012). These 
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new algorithms and processing techniques generate imagery to represent the Earth’s surface so 
accurately that the effects of the atmosphere, terrain shadow, clouds and cloud shadows can be 
removed or masked.  
Table 33 summaries the design choices for accuracy and their related results from the 
various studies conducted in this thesis. 
Table 33: Design choices and levers for accuracy and related evidence. 
Design 
choices 
and levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results (Chapter 
5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 mean 
Accuracy 9 (2/67) 178/17
1 6.6/5.3 0.7/1.4 
 53 (1/6) 
Consistenc
y 
8 (3/67) 176/17
1 6.1/5.3 1.0/1.4 
Private sector 6.6  
Completen
ess 
 175/17
1 5.7/5.3 1.0/1.4 
Research sector 6.3 
Private sector 6.4 
 
Errors of 
commissio
n 
1 (=67/67)      
Errors of 
omission 
1 (=67/67)      
Human 
error 
1 (=67/67)      
Agreement 
with other 
resources 
      
 
Australian emergency managers believe the most likely design choices to inform decision 
making is accuracy. Accuracy is the most obvious and commonly considered form of data 
quality because if a product is not accurate then it may not be able to relate the observed object 
or feature to the data which was acquired for that purpose. For this reason accuracy is arguably 
the most important design choice leading to the uptake of a data product in disaster decision 
making because without accuracy a data product does not represent information that is useful to 
emergency managers.  
Consistency can be discussed in the context of both accuracy, i.e. consistency across a 
product, and usability, i.e. consistency of user experience. Depending on the literature 
completeness can be a function of either accuracy or maturity. In this thesis completeness more 
logically aligns with maturity hence is discussed in the maturity discussion of this Chapter. 
6.4.1.2 Relevance 
Relevance is the second design choice under the quality headline design choice. 
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According to Sperber and Wilson (1987, p. 700) relevant information is “information 
likely to bring about the greatest improvement of knowledge at the smallest processing cost”. 
This process of communicating relevant information is inherently complex because it requires 
that the sender of information knows enough about the receiver to be able to improve the 
receiver’s level of knowledge. Relevance not only requires a judgement of the receiver’s level 
of knowledge but also a level of knowledge about how the receiver views and describes the 
world, this is called context. Finally this exchange must take place “at the smallest processing 
cost” which means that it must be precise and not require further consideration, or processing 
on behalf of the recipient, to maintain relevance. The assumptions that a sender of information 
must know the level of knowledge of a receiver, their context and deliver the message as 
precisely as possible makes relevance subjective and complex. 
Based on the above definition, for a data product to be relevant it must be presented at the 
correct level of technical knowledge for the receiver, in their local vocabulary or context and 
finally be delivered as succinctly as possible. To achieve optimal relevance according to Sperber 
and Wilson (1987, p. 704) you must satisfy two related criteria: 
 (a) The set of assumptions / that the communicator intends to make manifest 
to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to 
process the ostensive stimulus. 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could 
have used to communicate.  
What this means is that a data product must add more knowledge to an emergency 
manager than the effort it takes to understand that information. Furthermore the product must be 
delivered in the emergency manager’s optimal circumstance. This means that all presentational 
design choices must be tailored to the emergency manager including but not limited to delivery 
format, delivery medium and level of processing.  
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Table 34 summaries the design choices for relevance and their related results from the 
various studies conducted in this thesis.  
Table 34: Design choices and levers for relevance and related evidence. 
Design 
choices 
and levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Relevance 3 (=9/67)      
Business 
model 
 159/171 4.8/5.3 1.6/1.4 Research sector 5.5 
Private sector 5.6 
NGO sector 4.0 
 < 5 yrs. experience 
4.2 
Location TAS 4.3 
 
Coverage 3 (=9/67)      
Detection 
without 
identification 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Right 
information 
1 (=67/67) 
    
  
Frequency 1 (=67/67)      
More 
monitoring 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Tailored 1 (=67/67)      
Lack of 
situational 
awareness 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Responsive 1 (=67/67)      
Right time 1 (=67/67)      
Flexibility 1 (=67/67)      
Common 
boundaries 
1 (=67/67)      
Value-
added 
 
   
  
Topic 
considered 
      
Precise and 
specific 
content 
      
Absence of 
other 
alternative 
resources 
      
Context and 
criticality of 
the need for 
information 
      
 
Since relevance is a function of the individual user’s knowledge and context, the settings 
for each design choice vary with each user. The Table above provides examples of potential 
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design levers. These levers can be divided into fitness for purpose (reflecting the users 
knowledge) and context specific. Fitness for purpose means that the data product is pitched at 
the audience at the correct level, i.e. the product adds to the audience’s knowledge.  For 
example, in the border protection community rapid detection of a vessel is generally not enough 
information to increase a user’s knowledge. They would require identification of the vessel to 
make it worth their while consulting a new source of data. Context specific means you must 
present the product in the manner in which it would be expected within that community. This 
means regardless of whether the product creator believes their product is superior if it is present 
out of the audience’s context it takes more time to understand hence lowering its relevance and 
increasing the likelihood of not being used in a time sensitive decision.  
Relevance and coverage are in the top ten most mentioned terms in the inquiries study. In 
the survey the highest score any design choices source is 4.8 for business model which is below 
the 5.3 mean for the survey. Relevance comes up consistently in multiple contexts. 
The absence of other alternative resources is related to both relevance and mandate 
depending on meaning. When the safety of human life is involved it is important to have a 
justification of every choice made in the management of that emergency. To manage this 
requirement emergency managers often default towards “authoritative” data product or products 
which are official and made by an entity with a mandate to produce the data product. For this 
reason when there are multiple data products available for a given variable in a disaster, 
emergency managers often choose the authoritative data product even if there is significant 
evidence that there is a higher quality (or more relevant) data product available.  
Relevance, specifically business model, has significant links with timeliness. For a data 
product to be relevant it must be available when required. Data products and many data 
collection platforms, mostly satellites, can operate in two main business models – ad hoc 
production or rolling production for data products and tasked capture or ongoing capture for 
data collection. Rolling production and ongoing capture is significantly more expensive. Ad hoc 
production and tasked capture generally require long lead times, sometimes of several days 
when scheduling a capture into an orbiting satellite. Disasters require information at short 
notice, this means that by the time a disaster has been declared it is often too late to commence 
ad hoc capture before the data loses its relevance.  
This reality is shown in the inquiries study where the three products with the highest usage 
are all ongoing capture and rolling production products (weather warnings, weather forecast and 
positioning). This suggests a need to move from creating maps in response to a fire disaster to 
mapping all fires in case any of them become disasters. As described in the Council of 
Australian Governments’ report Natural disasters in Australia: Reforming mitigation, relief and 
recovery there is a need for a “fundamental shift in focus towards cost-effective and evidence-
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based disaster mitigation” and that this shift “represents an historic move beyond disaster 
response and reaction, towards anticipation and mitigation”. 
6.4.1.3 Timeliness  
Timeliness is the third design choice under the quality headline design choice. 
In the context of sensor data, timeliness relates to the time it takes to convert and transport 
an observation to the decision maker in a relevant format. Wang and Strong (1996) present 
timeliness as the age of a dataset. This definition is limited because it leaves some ambiguity 
about whether it refers to the age of a data set or the age of a data product, i.e. when the product 
became available to a user. This distinction is important in emergency management and so 
timeliness is taken to mean the time from capture to delivery of the data product to the user.  
As discussed in Chapters two and three, making a product available involves moving the 
observation from the data collection platform to a processing facility, processing the observation 
into the variable desired by the decision maker, checking or validating that the calculated 
variable is accurate, representing that variable in the desired format and transporting that data to 
the decision maker. Each of these steps can take from milliseconds to months depending on the 
size of the dataset, the amount of automation and various other design choices. 
One related term is currency. According to Loshin (2010) currency is: 
“the degree to which data is current with the world that it models.  Currency 
can measure how up-to-date data is, and whether it is correct despite the 
possibility of modifications or changes that impact time and date 
values.  Currency rules may be defined to assert limits to the lifetime of a 
data value, indicating that it needs to be checked and possibly refreshed.”  
Currency refers to shelf life while timeliness refers to delivery speed. Given currency is a 
function of how often data is captured, it will be incorporated in discussion of the technical 
selection of the data source, Section 6.4.3.2. 
Table 35: Design choices and levers for timeliness and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Timeliness 12 (1/67) 
177/171 6.5/5.3 0.7/1.4 
Local Govt. Sector 7.0 
Research sector 7.0 
47 (2/6) 
Efficiency of 
the system 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Data used 
too late 
1 (=67/67) 
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Time of 
creation of 
the content 
 
   
  
Recency of 
factors under 
consideration 
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Timeliness is a measure of time between data acquisition and product delivery, as it is 
generally measured in minutes or years. In Australia emergency management has been split into 
four phases for the past 20 years, these phases are Prevention, Preparedness, Response, 
Recovery or PPRR for short (Attorney-General’s Department 2009; Emergency Management 
Australia 2004; Cronstedt 2002). Depending on what the data will be used for the requirement 
in terms of timeliness changes. Figure 22 illustrates “implied service levels” or timeliness 
metrics for different circumstances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Prevention, Preparedness, Response, Recovery emergency 
management framework. Adapted from (National Governors’ Association. 
Emergency Preparedness Project 1979; Cheyne 2011). 
 
Harris (2014) argues that, timeliness is not only an important design choice in increasing 
the uptake of a data product in disaster decision making but could potentially be the most 
important design choice. Australian emergency managers rated timeliness as the second most 
likely design choices to affect decision making. It is important because if a product does not 
arrive before the decision it is supposed to inform then it cannot be used. The following two free 
text responses from the survey expand on this point: 
“No matter how good the sensor data is - if the emergency has passed before 
the sensor information has arrived then it is tantamount to being irrelevant.” 
Prevention Preparedness 
Response Recovery 
Implied Service Level: 
Months to years 
Major Activity: 
Risk mapping, capability 
development, education 
Implied Service Level: 
Weeks to Months 
Major Activity: 
Positioning assets, warning, 
forecasting and awareness raising 
 
Implied Service Level: 
Minutes to Hours 
Major Activity: 
Alerting, first response, 
data capture and crisis 
communications 
 
Implied Service Level: 
Days to Weeks 
Major Activity: 
Event analysis, clean up 
and grieving/blame 
allocation 
 
  Potential emergency 
 
     Emergency 
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“As an example from personal experience, a map produced by professional 
cartographer and available 6 hrs after the data is received is no use to a fire 
crew, (though it will be of great value to the subsequent Royal Commission) 
whereas a sketch map traced onto a photocopied sheet available 5 minutes 
after the helicopter lands is much more use in dealing with the incident.” 
 
As discussed in Chapter three, there is an inverse relationship between accuracy and 
timeliness (Ballou and Pazer 1995; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994). Wright (2001) was the first 
to apply this to emergency management. He illustrated the inverse relationship held in the 
context of flash floods. Figure 23 shows the trade-off between warning time and flood forecast 
accuracy. 
 
Figure 23: Trade-off between timeliness and accuracy for flash flood situations 
(Wright 2001). 
Where Wright's (2001) analysis is limited is that timeliness and accuracies for data 
products are not always fixed quantities, they can be adjusted. Wright (2001) argues that if data 
products do not meet the user’s requirements then you should try another data product. This 
misses the fact that data producers have a large number of design choices that can influence 
timeliness and accuracy. This area of influence is central to this thesis. 
Through many post-event inquiries the following line is a reoccurring theme, 'we made the 
decision based upon the best available data at that time'. Noting the inverse relationship between 
timeliness and accuracy this raises the following three questions: 
1. Do decision makers need to request the latest data before they make a decision or 
disclose when a decision is about to be made? 
2. What quality of data product is required to make what decision particularly when 
the choices are poor quality or no data? 
3. Can you dynamically update the quality of a dataset as time progresses before the 
next dataset becomes available? 
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Currently the status quo is such that decision makers expect data producers to generate 
products to an accuracy they define as high enough through trial and error. Then producers 
attempt to reduce the timeliness as fast as possible. This process is generally conducted with 
little consultation such as through annual conferences or during disaster responses. In some 
cases cooperative approaches between producers and users are used but this is still not focused 
on designing the optimal timeliness vs. accuracy. While the cooperative approach is preferable 
because other approaches involve a highly inefficient iteration process where the producer takes 
the product away then comes back with the next version. In addition all of these approaches are 
driven by the technology and are models where the producer is pushing the technology onto the 
user. A different approach which has become increasingly popular within the literature is that of 
coproduction (Ostrom 1996; Jasanoff et al. 2004). Applying this process to emergency 
management data product development would involve emergency managers taking a step back 
from technology and clearly stating what information they need, to what accuracy and how 
quickly. Following this the emergency manager would be involved available to the creators to 
clarify requirements as they arouse.  What appears to be missing is a clear statement from the 
decision maker is how, in detail, they would decide to trade-off between information type, 
quality and timeliness. This concept is often known as opportunity cost. 
Timeliness is also linked with blame in disaster inquiries. Data producers and value adders 
have noted the increasing risk to data custodians being blamed during and after disasters. In an 
effort to lower custodial risks, producers and value adders use three common choices. They can 
stop producing the product, add restrictions/indemnities to their data policy, or increase their 
accuracy thresholds for the product. Higher accuracy thresholds set by data suppliers mean that 
many data products will not meet the timeliness requirements to achieve relevance in a given 
disaster. The conclusion of this is that the blame culture developing around emergency 
management is leading to less sensor data evidence being considered in decision making. It 
would seem that disaster inquiries aim to increase evidence based decision making during 
disasters but in the area of sensor data may be having the opposite effect. 
Finding 40: The balance between accuracy and timeliness is complex and must be 
actively managed. (Section 6.4.1.3) 
 
According to the 2009 Victorian operational debrief report for the 2008/09 fire season, 
“the flexibility of current mapping systems can compromise consistency and speed of 
production” (Fox and Major 2009, 40). This assertion has serious consequences. As discussed 
in the relevance section, tailoring to the user community is essential to ensure a product is 
relevant. One design choice to increase the likelihood of a tailored solution is increasing the 
flexibility of the product or delivery system so users can customise the platform to suit their 
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needs. While the specific example is not clear, Fox and Major (2009) appear to have used a 
system where so much customisation has been offered that it has reduced the timeliness and 
hence relevance of a sensor data product.  
6.4.1.4 Usability 
Usability is the fourth and final design choice under the quality headline design choice. 
Usability is a measure of the ease of use of a user interface.  According to Nielsen (2012), 
usability can be broken into 5 contributing design choices: 
1. Learnability: How easy is it for users to accomplish basic tasks the 
first time they encounter the design? 
2. Efficiency: Once users have learned the design, how quickly can 
they perform tasks? 
3. Memorability: When users return to the design after a period of not 
using it, how easily can they re-establish proficiency? 
4. Errors: How many errors do users make, how severe are these 
errors, and how easily can they recover from the errors? 
5. Satisfaction: How pleasant is it to use the design? 
Usability has historically focused on unquantifiable design choices such as presentation or 
simplicity but more recently the term has been used to describe regulatory requirements such as 
disability accessibility features of a website or data product. Usability also maintains the focus 
on the requirements of the specific user group differentiating it from simplicity which is a 
universal term. 
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Table 36: Design choices and levers for useability and related evidence. 
Design choices 
and levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting 
a decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Usability  
177/171 5.5/5.3 1.3/1.4 
Private sector 5.4 
< 5 yrs. 
experience 4.7 
Location ACT 6.1 
Location TAS 4.8 
Location WA 6.2 
 
Simplicity  
176/171 6.1/5.3 1.0/1.4 
Research sector 
6.7 
 
Consistency 8 (3/67) 176/171 6.1/5.3 1.0/1.4 Private sector 6.6  
Ease      10 (4/6) 
Accessibility 2 (=12/67)      
Availability of 
maps in the field 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Clarity of 
message 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Cleaned of 
extraneous 
information 
1 (=67/67) 
 
   
  
Consistent 
terminology 
1 (=67/67)      
Extent of detail 1 (=67/67)      
Fitness for 
purpose 
1 (=67/67) 
    
  
Dissemination 1 (=67/67)      
Over 
aggregation 
1 (=67/67)      
Presentation 1 (=67/67)      
Right form 1 (=67/67)      
Technical means 
of 
filtering/triaging 
inputs 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Omitted data 1 (=67/67)      
Appropriate 
amount of data 
 
   
  
Ease of 
understanding 
 
   
  
Representational 
consistency 
 
   
  
Concise 
representation 
 
   
  
Expertise of the 
user 
      
Interpretability       
Professional 
appearance 
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Although efforts like the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) have tried to 
quantify usability (Caldwell et al. 2008), generally usability is considered to be a more 
subjective design choice. Usability does not exist as a binary usable or not usable. A data 
product can have poor usability, through a continuum of adequate usability then a threshold is 
crossed and a product could be highly usable. Many design choices such as availability of a 
product in a certain format are simple to identify but usability can also include highly subjective 
user requirements. As one survey respondent describes: 
“Granularity of data - too much information can impede interpretation; vs. 
too little information makes it hard to make an informed decision.” 
This example shows that usability is more than implementing more accessibility features in 
a data product or system but ensuring that the scale of problem and product are aligned. The 
subjectivity of usability is also related to the level of experience of the user. As discussed in the 
web survey, less experienced staff feel that the time it takes to become familiar with a dataset is 
less important than more experienced staff implying that they feel they can adapt or learn faster. 
Australian emergency managers rated simplicity and consistency as equal fourth most important 
design choice to improve uptake.  
 
Finding 41: No product is too complex to be simple to use. (Section 6.4.1.4) 
 
Usability has some links with accuracy and believability. As discussed previously and in 
Yang et al. (2013) some communities, including the GEOSS clearinghouse, consider 
consistency to be a measure of accuracy. This refers to logical consistency within the actual data 
but in the context of usability it can also refer to consistency of a user experience when using a 
system. Omitted data is sometimes required to make sure the data product is pitched at the 
correct audience in the context of the granularity of data but it can also be a negative when 
excluded to manipulate results.  As such usability has a relationship with believability which is 
discussed later in the chapter. 
6.4.2 Data policy 
Data policy is a headline design choice with no contributing design choices but several 
design levers – this is due to its consistently low rating of importance in all studies.  
Data policy is a legal policy area which focuses on the access and usage constraints placed 
on data and the codifying of these constraints into a legal instrument such as a licence. In von 
der Dunk (2008), “Legal aspects of using space-derived geospatial information for emergency 
response” summarises the main legal issues for data for emergency response as: copyright, 
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access, liabilities and dual use. The first three of these are data policy design choices and the last 
is a data source design choice. 
Turning to what elements constitute data policy,  Harris and Browning (2003) outline six 
data policy characteristics. They are: ownership, privacy and confidentiality; intellectual 
property rights and associated legal frameworks; standards and metadata; licensing, distribution 
and dissemination; pricing policy; and archiving policy. Of these six design choices four are 
considered data policy design levers, standards/metadata fall under maturity and 
ownership/privacy/confidentiality are a mix of data policy and reputational design choices.  
Based on a synthesis of von der Dunk (2008) and Harris and Browning (2003) the 
following design levers contribute to data policy in the emergency management context. Note 
that archiving, which was identified by Von der Dunk, has been rolled into responsibilities: 
1. Ownership 
2. Intellectual property 
3. Pricing policy  
4. Responsibilities 
5. Licencing 
All of these issues are, however, tightly interconnected. For example, intellectual property 
rights are described in licences and implemented through pricing policies. For this reason all of 
the five data policy design choices are covered under the data policy section rather than as 
individual sub headings. This condensation is required to address the interconnectivity of the 
design choices and reduce duplication.   
Ownership of a data product has been a moderate but continuing issue when using 
commercial data sources according to the survey responses. Historically ownership of data was 
generally maintained by the party who collected the data and this data was distributed using 
licencing agreements. In the situation where data was collected under a contract, such as the 
aerial photography sector, the purchaser retains ownership not the collector of the data. 
Questions about the risks of purchasing data from a third party could lead to groups, including 
emergency management agencies, to move to greater data collection within government. 
Intellectual Property (IP) and copyright are restrictions placed on a user by the data 
supplier. These restrict the distribution of either a product or products derived from the original 
work. In many cases even after a distribution right has been negotiated copyright must be 
clearly displayed on the distributed product or subsequent derived product. All of these 
restrictions are described within the licence. While IP or distribution rights vary, the commercial 
sector has historically had restrictive distribution conditions. More recently shifts to allow the 
purchasing of open distribution rights as standard in the government and scientific community 
are becoming common place (Harris and Baumann 2015). 
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Pricing policies are a description of how much a product will cost based upon a number of 
different models. The two most common pricing models are usage based models where different 
pricing allows for a different number of users and distribution based models where how a 
product is distributed determines the product’s cost. 
Finally, responsibilities, and in particular liabilities, are a complex and contentious area 
often overlooked in most data polices. Responsibilities can take many forms. Archival 
responsibilities and liabilities are two common examples. Archival responsibilities are policies, 
often legislative, which prescribe how or for how long a data product must be stored. One 
example of national legislation is the Australian Archives Act of 1983 which prescribes that all 
government entities must keep all records for at least seven years from creation or acquisition. 
Therefore even if nobody is using a product it must be archived for that length of time. Archival 
responsibilities can also require deletion of a data product. For example satellite data is 
sometimes distributed through regional distributors whom after their distributorship has ended 
are required to purge their archive of the data product they were distributing. Liabilities are 
potential debts which could be associated with the use or misuse of a product by a value adder 
or user. For example, if data is sold to a military who uses the data to target a missile strike 
which then misses its target; does that make the data provider liable? Liabilities are of particular 
concern in emergency management where misuse of a data product could lead to loss of life 
which is a greater risk than many providers in the public and private sector are willing to accept. 
Licencing is a legal tool or document which outlines or codifies all of the ownership, IP, 
copyright, distribution and usage constrains of a data product. Historically licences have been 
specific to each data product and are renegotiated with each new purchase of a data product, but 
more and more standard licences are being used to reduce the costly process of renegotiating a 
licence (Harris and Baumann 2015).  
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Table 37 summaries the design choices for data policy and their related results from the 
various studies conducted in this thesis. 
Table 37: Design choices and levers for data policy and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Data policy       
Cost 
 
2 (=12/67) 
 
175/171 5.3/5.3 1.7/1.4 
Fed Govt sector 
4.7 
Private sector 6.1 
Age under 35 6.0 
Location ACT 4.8 
Location QLD 5.8 
Location WA 5.9 
 
Copyright  
166/171 4.8/5.3 1.8/1.4 
Research sector 
3.3 
Location ACT 5.4 
Location NSW 5.3 
Location TAS 3.4 
 
Access to raw 
data 
 
167/171 5.1/5.3 1.6/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
3.6 
Research sector 
4.3 
Private sector 5.6 
NGO sector 5.6 
Location TAS 4.5 
 
Publicly 
release the raw 
data 
 
170/171 4.2/5.3 1.8/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
3.6 
Private sector 4.7 
NGO sector 3.4 
Provider role 4.9 
Location NT 4.8 
Location TAS 3.5 
 
Responsibilities 
and liabilities 
 
164/171 5.1/5.3 1.5/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
5.6 
NGO sector 4.6 
Age under 35 5.6 
Provider role 5.9 
Location ACT 5.8 
Location NSW 5.6 
Location TAS 4.1 
 
Access      8 (5/6) 
Ownership       
Intellectual 
property 
      
Licencing       
Pricing policy       
Archiving policy       
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With the exception of pricing policy (referred to in the survey as cost), all data policy 
design choices had a lower than average response rate in the survey. This low response rate 
implies that there is a lower level of understanding about data policy design choices than about 
quality or reputational design choices. While this result could be interpreted as data policy not 
being an important design choice, Chapter three and academic studies showed the dramatic 
effects of  data policy changes particularly with the Landsat case study (Wulder et al. 2012). In 
addition, data policy design choices have a larger number of outliers than quality or reputational 
design choices which implies that while overall data policy may be less important there are still 
specific issues which matter greatly to specific groups. These results are hence interpreted as 
data policy being a highly subjective design choice which is relevant but only to certain data 
products. 
 
Finding 42: Data policy may not be understood by many but is a choice which can 
have large impacts on usage and uptake. (Section 6.4.2) 
 
The design choice of whether or not ownership is necessary is a clear binary choice. The 
survey rated ‘data collected within their own organisation’ as the third most likely data design 
choice to increase uptake, implying that data collected or at least processed within your own 
organisation or government is preferable.  
IP has a variety of different settings related to distribution, source data and copyright. 
Distribution rights can be unlimited or restricted to any combination of individuals, 
organisations or market sectors such as Australian researchers only. The source data which 
created a data product can also be restricted, while generally it is either known or not disclosed 
but it can also be falsely disclosed. While copyright is not required to make a licence it is almost 
always required to ensure data producers get credit for their product.  
Pricing policies are generally specific to the licence for a given product. In general, 
different licences are aligned with different IP collections such as a single user licence for a 
price, an enterprise 500 user licence for a large price or an open licence for free. 
Responsibilities are varied and can be placed upon any aspect of the data product, for 
example archiving, discovery or liabilities of misuse. Liabilities are held by the data owner and 
all parties seek to reduce their own liabilities by shifting them down the supply chain.  
Data policy is not considered by many providers, value adders and users due to its legal 
nature being seen as out of their field. The survey showed the likelihood of trust decreases when 
licencing restrictions are added. For example, government agencies showed a 1.2 value drop and 
universities showed a 1 value decrease in trust when licencing restrictions were added. This 
suggests that licence restrictions not just on the data product but the source data can decrease the 
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trust in a dataset. Increases in usage (as shown in the Landsat example) and the survey results 
point towards a sector-wide trend of making data open.  
Licencing is a tool which codifies the issues described above. In the majority of cases a 
licence is codified as a standard document but increasingly licences are also being written or 
codified as a machine readable document. For example, all versions of the creative commons 
licence are available as a standard document and a machine readable version. 
Data policy design choices such as cost and licencing have strong links with maturity and 
believability. Both maturity and believability require an understanding of where a product has 
come from its provenance.  If provenance is obstructed by a high cost or restrictive licence then 
these choices can lead to a reduced level of uptake. Knowledge of how a product is created is 
increasingly moving from being a desired feature to becoming a standard with many global 
transparency initiatives requiring open data (Rao and Sridhara Murthi 2006). 
6.4.3 Reputation 
Reputation is a headline design choice made up of six design choices: Believability, data 
source, mandate, popularity, reliability and security. 
Reputation is the measure of how much a community trusts you  (Botsman 2012). Given 
reputation is a view from a person or persons it is inherently subjective and highly context 
specific. For example you may have a good reputation for an accurate weather forecast but a 
poor reputation for a highly unusable website. In addition reputation can apply at different 
scales, as one survey respondent described it: 
“Reputation is based on the first hand observation, hence when data 
providers are not the source of the data both must be considered.” 
This means an organisation or individual has different reputations for different products 
and projects. Also noted by the respondent is that reputation is formed by historical experience. 
This reality means that reputation takes a long time to build but can be lost quickly. 
 
Finding 43: Reputation takes a long time to build but can be lost very quickly. 
(Section 6.4.3) 
 
There are numerous examples of attempts to establish reputation systems or trust 
measurement systems. For example,  Kostoulas et al. (2008)  developed a decentralized 
reputation based trust model for establishing trust between different groups of first responders 
or for information dissemination between first responders. The system focuses on measuring the 
trustworthiness of information which already exists within the network through referrals.  
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Referrals are one method of establishing reputation but this thesis contends that there are a 
large collection of design choices which contribute to reputation. A critical component of 
understanding reputation in the context of this thesis is that reputation is a measure of how an 
individual or organisation is perceived. While Botsman (2012) argues that reputation is a direct 
measure of trust this thesis takes reputation to mean a collection of design choices which 
contribute to trust. This is further explored in the trust section later in this Chapter. 
Organisational culture, including the culture of including or excluding information from 
decision making, was also raised by one survey recipient who explained: 
“Sometimes decisions are made at a high level based on a minimal scope of 
data steam rather than the wider picture ("Tunnel Vision"). This can be a 
negative to effective use of real time data.” 
This thesis is focused on data product design choices that increase the likelihood of uptake 
of a product in decision making. As such culture is somewhat at the boundary of this thesis but 
it presents a potential future piece of work about how to change organisational culture to be 
more receptive to receiving data. 
Table 38: Design choices and levers for reputation and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Reputation  
175/171 6.1/5.3 1.1/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
5.6 
Research sector 
6.7 
 
Culture 1 (=67/67)      
Competence       
Care       
Fairness       
 
Reputation is measured on a continuum from good reputation to poor reputation. The 
question of measuring reputation is discussed in Marsh (1994) and is discussed in more detail 
later in this Chapter. In the survey different groups varied in their weighting of reputation 
related design choices. For example, mandate was viewed as the key design choice contributing 
to a good reputation by respondents from Brisbane while the Federal government view mandate 
as far less important. Australian emergency managers believe reputation is the equal 4th most 
likely design choice to influence uptake. There are strong links between reputation and trust as 
well as reputation and quality.  
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6.4.3.1 Believability 
Believability is the first design choice under the reputation headline design choice. 
According to Hovland et al. (1953) believability is the credibility of a source or message. 
He argues that believability can be measured in two primary dimensions: trustworthiness and 
expertise. This implies that you can trust someone with no expertise, and you can be an 
untrustworthy expert, but to be believable you require a mix of both. Unpicking this further, 
credibility is a subjective perception so different people can judge different data products or data 
producers differently (Fogg and Tseng 1999). 
Believability is a group of design choices which relate to the plausibility of a product. This 
could include the product being clear and simple but also that the source data has not been 
manipulated to change the result, conflicts of interest and producing an effective and efficient 
product. 
Table 39: Design choices and levers for believability and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Believability       
Provider 
familiarity 
 
173/171 5.6/5.3 1.3/1.4 
Research sector 
6.7 
NGO sector 6.3 
Location TAS 6.1 
Location WA 4.9 
 
Coordination 1 (=67/67)      
Effective use 1 (=67/67)      
Effectiveness 1 (=67/67)      
Funding 1 (=67/67)      
National 
coordinated 
1 (=67/67) 
   
  
Misinformation 1 (=67/67)      
Not relied 
upon 
1 (=67/67) 
   
  
Rumours 1 (=67/67)      
Availability of 
experts 
1 (=67/67) 
   
  
Experience 1 (=67/67)      
Lack of 
knowledge 
1 (=67/67) 
   
  
Training 1 (=67/67)      
Omitted data 1 (=67/67)      
Credibility       
Integrity       
Objectivity       
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Reputation by 
direct 
experience 
 
   
  
Referrals by 
other users 
 
   
  
Association by 
other trusted 
resources 
(e.g., citations) 
 
   
  
Perceived bias 
of source 
 
   
  
Perceived 
incentive in 
providing 
accurate 
information 
 
   
  
Likelihood of 
content being 
correct given 
what is known 
 
   
  
Likelihood of 
deceptive 
behaviour 
 
   
  
 
 Believability is impacted by a wide variety of choices. In order to try and specify what 
some of these are, the web survey asked respondents to compare the likelihood that they would 
use different data products only altering the producer and data policy. Firstly, regardless of 
sector, advertising in a product adversely affects the believability of a data product potentially 
due to perceived bias from attempting to generate profit from a natural disaster. This profit bias 
extends not just to advertising but also to the private sector itself and so it is better for the 
private sector to provide data during a disaster to emergency services and the public through a 
public sector intermediary with a good reputation and mandate. One way to measure 
believability is referrals by other users. This attribute is strongly related to provider familiarity 
which was rated as above average importance but highly important within the smaller sectors 
such as the research sector and NGOs.  
Usability and believability are both connected with accuracy as a measure of how well the 
product reflects the observed phenomenon. Usability reflects the user’s ability to simply 
understand the product, and believability is the subjective measure of whether what is shown 
and how it is presented reflects the user’s understanding of the phenomenon. One specific 
design choice where these differences become clear is omitted data. If too much data is removed 
from a product (in an effort to improve useability) then users may develop a perception that data 
is being hidden. For example, United States positioning and imaging satellites degrade their 
signal for national security reasons. This interference with the original signal is designed to 
reduce the quality of a signal but reduces the reputation of the data product as well. 
6.4.3.2 Data source 
Data source is the second design choice under the reputation headline design choice. 
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Data source describes the technical selection of the data source and matching of a data 
source to a given set of requirements. This is fundamental to the product but also taken as a 
given by most sensor data professionals. Data source can also refer to the selection of the 
sensor, this style of consideration is covered under relevance within the quality section.  
In the instances where national security or defence sensor data can be acquired its quality 
is often higher than what is generally available to emergency managers or the private sector, but 
the decision to use a military source is a binary choice with the subsequent restrictions being 
described within the product’s data policy.  
Table 40 outlines the key choices that are impacted by data source.    
Table 40: Design choices and levers for data source and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Data source       
Sovereignty  
167/171 4.3/5.3 2.0/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
3.4 
Private sector 5.1 
NGO sector 3.8 
Age under 35 5.3 
Location ACT 3.2 
Location NSW 4.8 
Location NT 5.3 
 
Publicly 
disclose the 
source 
 
167/171 4.6/5.3 1.8/1.4 
Research sector 
6.3 
Location NT 5.4 
Location SA 4.0 
Location TAS 3.9 
 
Dual-use  
162/171 3.9/5.3 1.9/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
2.5 
Research sector 
5.0 
Private sector 4.7 
NGO sector 2.9 
Age under 35 4.4 
Provider value 
adder 3.0 
Location ACT 3.4 
Location NT 5.4 
 
Third party 
source 
1 (=67/67) 
 
     
Source      7 (6/6) 
Privacy       
Confidentiality       
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Using data from a military source can be restrictive because it often involves additional 
steps in the delivery of a data product such as masking the source of the data or only allowing 
distribution of the data within sovereign borders all reduce the usability of a data product and 
generally also reduce the timeliness. 
On the other-hand the data suggests that respondents like data that is sourced domestically 
because importance is placed on sovereignty and national self-reliance. 
All this said, the use of military sensor data within emergency management is small. It 
should be noted that in the unlikely occasion where a military data product is used, data 
providers care greatly about each of the above design choices. This was shown in the low 
response rate all data source design choices received in the web survey. 
 
6.4.3.3 Mandate 
Mandate is the third design choice under the reputation headline design choice. 
Mandate refers to an official recognition that a given individual or organisation has been 
told to undertake a specific task. An example of this is that weather agencies, such as the 
Australian Bureau of Meteorology, have the only mandate in most countries to issue weather 
warnings to the public. There can be many different types of mandate including official 
mandates, historical mandates and informal mandates. An official mandate occurs where a role 
or responsibility is bestowed through a legal document, such as legislation, upon a given entity. 
A historic mandate occurs where an entity establishes a mandate through precedent. Finally an 
informal or implied mandate occurs where a group believes that an entity is the best placed to 
carry out a role or responsibility. 
Table 41: Design choices and levers for mandate and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Mandate  
171/171 5.6/5.3 1.4/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
6.3 
Research sector 6.3 
NGO sector 4.8 
Location ACT 4.9 
Location QLD 6.2 
 
Recognized 
authority of 
associations 
 
   
  
Absence of 
other 
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alternative 
resources 
 
In the context of emergency management, whether an individual or organisation has an 
official mandate or not is a binary decision.  
In most cases, official emergency management mandates are only found within 
government agencies. In Australia, the majority of these are in state government agencies. As 
discussed in Chapter five, official data or data from an organisation with an official mandate is 
more trusted than data from an organisation without a mandate.  
Mandate has some links with relevance when you consider the absence of alternative 
resources. Often the most relevant data is the only data which exists and sometimes this comes 
from an organisation without any mandate to collect, value add or distribute that data such as 
crowd sourced content, particularly Volunteer Geographic Information (VGI). In the case of 
VGI the data can be highly relevant yet lack the mandate and hence not be used. This issue was 
explored in Section 6.2.3 regarding risk aversion. 
6.4.3.4 Popularity  
Popularity is the fourth design choice under the reputation headline design choice. 
Popularity refers to the level of awareness of a product, i.e. how well known it is across the 
general population. It does not refer to provider popularity (how well known the producer is) or 
familiarity (how well known someone is with a product). These are covered by believability. 
Table 42: Design choices and levers for popularity and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Popularity       
Product 
popularity 
 
174/171 4.2/5.3 1.6/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
3.5 
Research sector 5.3 
Age under 35 5.0 
Provider role 5.1 
Location ACT 3.7 
 
Awareness 1 (=67/67)      
Popularity of 
the resource 
 
   
  
 
How to measure popularity is highly sector specific when talking about online data 
products. The number of downloads, unique website hits and total website hits are all common 
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metrics. While all these metrics are useful for communicating relevance, popularity can be 
difficult to define because it can use many different specific measurements for example 
popularity can refer to awareness, usage or uptake. While most of the community do not value 
popularity it is of importance to the research sector, data providers and those under 35 years old. 
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6.4.3.5 Reliability 
Reliability is the fifth design choice under the reputation headline design choice. 
Reliability is a formal metric of the proportion of time a system is available and its ability 
to cope with rapid usage changes, related to scalability.  
Table 43: Design choices and levers for reliability and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting 
a decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Reliability 3 (=9/67) 176/171 6.5/5.3 0.8/1.4  39 (3/6) 
Availability 5 (4/67)      
24 hour 
availability 
1 (=67/67) 
    
  
Availability of 
communications 
1 (=67/67) 
    
  
Redundancy 1 (=67/67)      
Scalability 1 (=67/67)      
 
Reliability is generally measured as a percentage of the time which a system is available 
and not down due to failure or scheduled maintenance. For example, a standard system could 
have 95% uptime whereas a mission critical system, which is involved in safety of life 
application such as emergency management, may have an uptime of 99.999%. Reliability 
appears in all three of the numerical studies. 
Reliability has links with usability because it is often unavailable due to an outage then it 
becomes less usable. 
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6.4.3.6 Security 
Security is the sixth and final design choice under the reputation headline design choice. 
Security is traditionally defined as being free from danger or threat. In the context of data 
products, security refers to the protection of data collection, process, distribution and storage of 
the product. Importantly this involves both physical aspects, such as locks on data centre doors, 
and digital aspects such as block shift alternation technology which alerts users when source 
data has been changed. Other potential security issues include authentication, authorisation, 
access control, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, auditing and privacy (Havlik et al. 
2011, 3889). 
Table 44: Design choices and levers for security and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Security       
Access 
security 
 
172/171 5.1/5.3 1.7/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
3.9 
Private sector 5.6 
NGO sector 4.6 
Age under 35 5.6 
Value adder role 4.4 
Location ACT 3.9 
Location NSW 5.6 
Location NT 5.7 
Location TAS 4.5 
 
Network 
security 
 
170/171 5.0/5.3 1.7/1.4 
NGO sector 4.3 
Value adder role 4.2 
Location ACT 4.1 
Location NT 5.8 
 
 
Security is generally a compliance task which must be completed, rather than something 
which can be weaker or stronger. This perception can rapidly change following a security 
breach after which security is clearly viewed as an important reputational design choice. 
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6.4.4 Maturity 
Maturity is a headline design choice with six design choices as defined by Bates and 
Privette (2012): software readiness, metadata, documentation, product validation, public access 
and utility. 
While maturity is commonly discussed in the context of physiology or finance, probably 
the simplest and clearest definition of maturity comes from agriculture. Maturity is when the 
fruit is ripe or at a state where it is fit to be consumed. This concept of ripeness, or fitness, is 
often overlooked when trying to rush a product to customers or promote a new breakthrough. 
Chapter two explored the maturity of various moderate resolution data systems using a 
simplified version of the NOAA Climate Data Record maturity model described by Bates and 
Privette (2012). In this system maturity is judged by a score of 1-6 in six different thematic 
areas including: software readiness (stability of code), metadata (amount and compliance with 
international standards), documentation (description of the processing steps and algorithms for 
scientific and general communities), product validation (quality and amount in time and space), 
public access (availability of data and code), and utility (uses by broader community). Scores of 
1-2 are for new systems not yet ready for decision making, 3-4 are known as Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC) products which are tentatively ready for decision makers, and finally, scores of 
5-6 are at Full Operating Capability (FOC) and available for use in decision making with 
confidence. This model was demonstrated in comparing four systems in Chapter three. 
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Table 45: Design choices and levers for maturity and related evidence. 
Design 
choices and 
levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 
mean 
Maturity 1 (=67/67)      
Interoperability 1 (=67/67) 
 
176/171 5.9/5.3 1.4/1.4 
NGO sector 5.4 
Provider role 5.4 
Location QLD 5.4 
 
Standards & 
specifications 
 
173/171 5.5/5.3 1.5/1.4 
Fed Govt sector 4.8 
Research sector 
6.7 
Provider role 4.6 
Value adder role 
4.8 
 
Documentation  
174/171 5.1/5.3 1.4/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
4.5 
Research sector 
6.5 
NGO sector 4.5 
Value adder role 
4.6 
Location NT 5.7 
Location QLD 4.6 
 
Completeness  
175/171 5.7/5.3 1.0/1.4 
Research sector 
6.3 
Private sector 6.4 
 
Provenance  
159/171 5.0/5.3 1.6/1.4 
Local Govt sector 
4.4 
Research sector 
6.7 
NGO sector 5.5 
< 5 yrs. experience 
4.5 
Location NT 5.6 
Location QLD 4.2 
 
Lack of a 
manual 
1 (=67/67) 
    
  
Tightening of 
connections 
between staff 
1 (=67/67) 
 
   
  
Optimisation 1 (=67/67)      
Authorising 
environment 
1 (=67/67) 
    
  
Information 
flow to 
decision 
makers 
1 (=67/67) 
 
   
  
Repeatability 1 (=67/67)      
Rigor 1 (=67/67)      
Provenance 
and pedigree 
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More often than not the lowest score across the different elements of maturity is used to 
measure maturity. This means it is important to ensure that the entirety of a data product is 
mature.  
According to the survey of Australian emergency managers, maturity is of moderate 
importance. There are countless examples of products being released to consumers before they 
were ready, such as buggy computer games or defective cars. These experiences show that 
releasing immature products can be costly financially but also costly to a product’s reputation. 
When accounting for the large reputational risk of releasing a product before it is ready, 
maturity can be seen almost as an initial design choice which must be addressed before looking 
at improving other design choices.  
Further supporting the importance of maturity are the findings of the inquiries study in 
Chapter four. During this study 18 sensor data products were found in the inquiries, of which 
only five, or 28%, were actual products. The rest were raw data feeds otherwise known as 
immature data products. The two data products which were mentioned the most, the weather 
forecast and warnings, are both well-established mature data products. In fact the weather 
forecast and warnings are so mature that their original source observations are completely 
invisible to the user with millions of observations from satellites, airborne platforms and ground 
based sensors contributing to the model of the forecast every hour. This suggests that an 
emergency manager is more likely to use a mature integrated data product as part of a decision 
than an immature raw data feed.  
Maturity has strong links with data policy design choices specifically around provenance. 
One central concept of scientific maturity is being able to demonstrate the quality of a product 
and where it has come from. This is achieved through a systematic description of the steps used 
to create a product and is generally referred to as provenance. One large difference between 
public and private sector emergency management data systems right now is the disclosure of 
how a product was created by the public sector and the private sector not disclosing provenance 
in an effort to protect their intellectual property. This difference may partially account for the 
differing levels of trust of the public and private sectors found within the survey.  
There are many examples of provenance systems which hope to address this challenge 
(Missier et al. 2010; Moreau et al. 2008; Yue, Gong, and Di 2010). A highly relevant and 
evolving discussion within the data community is around the idea of Sarbanes–Oxley for 
science. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a United States law which required firms in the 
financial sector to improve disclosure of financial details in order to reduce fraud after the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals. The concept of full transparency could also be expanded to 
science as explained in Michaels (2006): 
“At present, there is virtually no oversight or independent review of 
corporate decision making as it relates to the sequestration of scientific 
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data… The importance of ensuring that data interpretation is independent of 
conflicts of interest is tragically illustrated by the debate on the 
cardiovascular effects of Merck’s painkiller Vioxx (rofecoxib). In early 2000, 
the results of a clinical trial showed that participants who took Vioxx for an 
average of nine months had a significantly higher risk of heart attack than 
those taking the comparison painkiller, naproxen (sold under the brand 
name Aleve). Since the comparison was between two biologically active 
products, scientists could have interpreted these results to mean either that 
Vioxx increased heart-attack risk or that naproxen reduced it. Unfortunately, 
Merck’s researchers chose to promote the latter interpretation, ignoring 
other evidence that supported the former. Fortunately, among the clinical 
trials Merck had initiated was one in which Vioxx was compared to a 
placebo. When participants who took the drug for more than eighteen 
months suffered twice as many heart attacks and strokes as those taking the 
placebo, the trial was halted, and Vioxx was removed from the market. FDA 
scientists subsequently estimated that Vioxx was responsible for between 
88,000 and 139,000 heart attacks—thirty to forty percent of which were 
probably fatal—in the five years the drug was on the market.” 
 
This escalating tension between open science and protection of intellectual property will 
continue for many years but will likely be less important for emergency managers than the 
public safety concern. It is this concern for public safety that could lead to greater transparency, 
rather than protection of intellectual property, in times of a disaster. 
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6.4.5 Trust 
Trust is the overarching objective of all headline design choices and hence encompasses all 
design choices.  
Trust therefore, is what increases the uptake of sensor data in emergency management 
decision making. As described by one of the free text responses: “timeliness is more important 
that quality but data will only be trusted if quality is understood”.  
Trust according to the Oxford dictionary is a “firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability 
of someone or something”. This definition is a clear example of how the literature views trust – 
a series of factors (reliability, truth and ability) which all affect an entity’s ability to trust 
something. (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995, 712) define trust as: 
"The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party." 
Put simply, trust is being certain in your expectation that something will happen in the way 
that you expect it to happen. Another common and more structured definition of trust comes 
from Olmedilla et al. (2005, p. 5) in the artificial intelligence and semantic web field: 
“Trust of a party A to a party B for a service X is the measurable belief of A 
in that B behaves dependably for a specified period within a specified 
context (in relation to service X).”  
An everyday example of this is rubbish collection. A person can trust that the local council 
will collect their rubbish every Thursday based on that they have witnessed this for the past 12 
years and their belief that the government has the ability and the willingness to continue to do 
so. 
In a recent survey of more than 50 Australian CEOs from critical infrastructure related 
organisations (Kay and Goldspink 2012) trust was considered to be the most important cultural 
characteristic to organisational resilience by a factor of three. The study found that “trust is 
often discussed as a moral concept but that was not the case in these interviews. In relation to 
organisational resilience, trust was broadly described as a prediction by an individual about how 
others (including organisations) are likely to act” (Kay and Goldspink 2012, 21). 
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The complexity of the concept of trust arises in attempting to articulate and analyse the 
factors, or, as discussed in this thesis, the design choices, which lead to trust and their relative 
weighting in any given context. For example, the literature of the past fifty years raises the 
following aspects leading to trust:  
 Confidence, reliance, expectation and hope (Giffin 1967);  
 Ability, benevolence, integrity (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995); 
 Competence, openness, caring, reliability (Mishra 1996);   
 Predictability, congruity, reliability, integrity, openness, acceptance, sensitivity, 
(Acrement 2002); and  
 Competence, care, fairness, openness, credibility, reliability and integrity (Poortinga 
and Pidgeon 2003). 
Each of these eighteen terms has specific and intricate meaning which presents a 
bewildering diversity of definitions. They can however, be grouped into three common themes. 
Confidence, ability and competence all contribute to the ability of an entity party to do 
something. Reliance, reliability, predictability, congruity and credibility all contribute to 
evidence that an entity has done something in the past. Expectation, integrity, benevolence, 
openness, caring, acceptance, sensitivity and fairness all contribute to a belief that an entity will 
do something in the future. These themes present a simplified yet comprehensive, trust is the 
belief that an entity can, has and will do something. These themes all contribute towards an 
entity's measure of trustworthiness.  
More recently the computer science field has increasingly become interested in 
understanding trust as it is a central concept in building the third version of the internet - Web 
3.0. This concept is more commonly known as the semantic web which is described in Figure 
24. 
 
Figure 24: Positive Semantic web stack (Berners-Lee 2000). 
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The summary of Web 3.0 and the semantic web is that information must contain 
descriptive information or metadata about its location, audience, vocabulary, provenance, 
validation and security all of which collectively contribute to the trust in that piece of 
information. There are strong parallels between semantic web research and the use of sensor 
data products in emergency management suggesting potential future work in combining these 
two complimentary fields. 
Context is critical when considering trust. For example, you could trust an Australian 
hydrogeologist to provide information about floods in Australia but you would not trust that 
same person to provide information about forest fires in rural China. Trust in one context will 
not necessarily guarantee trust of the same person or thing in a different context or situation 
(Bizer and Oldakowski 2004; Botsman 2012).  
Trust can be found in fields as diverse as psychology (Giffin 1967), philosophy 
(Yamamoto 1990), medicine (Breakwell 2000), volcanology (Haynes, Barclay, and Pidgeon 
2008), semantic web (Artz and Gil 2007; Dividino et al. 2009), risk analysis (Poortinga and 
Pidgeon 2003), management (Acrement 2002) and media (Seo et al. 2012). Hence, this implies 
that an entity could be trusted for their skills and actions in a given discipline or context but that 
trust does not directly translate into a different discipline. 
Finding 44: Trust is the overarching term to encompass all design choices. (Section 
6.4.5) 
 
Earle and Cvetkovich (1995) discuss a further dimension concerning similarities in belief, 
or “value similarity”. In this dimension trust is a social bond between the trustor and the trustee. 
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2004, p. 1476) expand on this concept of value similarity by discussing 
people who “share identities and/or have a similar understanding of a specific situation”. While 
value is a valid dimension to understand trust, it should be noted that its effect on trust is 
considered by some studies such as Haynes et al. (2008)  to be a less important factor. 
Scale is another key dimension when considering trust. Trust can cover an entire 
organisation, a person, a product or a particular feature of a specific product: for that reason this 
thesis refers to entities to encompass all possible recipients of trust. Within the semantic web 
community scale is described through two terms: ‘entity trust’ covers an organisation or person, 
whilst ‘content trust’ covers a specific product or dataset (Gil and Artz 2007). Although some 
terms have been created in an attempt to specify scale, such as brand trust or organisational 
trust, these terms are not common or applied consistently across multiple domains (Mayer, 
Davis, and Schoorman 1995). 
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The final dimension to be discussed is consequence. Consequence, or the effect of a 
decision, plays a large role in determining trust, as shown for genetically modified foods in the 
UK (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2005). Consequence is particularly relevant when thinking about 
disasters because the consequences are high and regularly life threatening. 
From these various definitions and dimensions of trust, there are a huge number of 
similarities between previously discussed design choices and trust. In fact in many cases, the 
design choices leading to trust have already been directly referenced in this Chapter. Trust is the 
key determinant of whether an emergency manager will consider a data product in decision 
making and is being taken as the overarching term which encompasses all of the design choices 
described in this Chapter. 
Table 46: Design choices and levers for trust and related evidence. 
Design 
choices 
and levers 
# 
mentions 
in 
inquiries 
(Chapter 
4) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) 
Rate between 1-7 the likelihood of affecting a 
decision survey questions 17-19 results 
(Chapter 5) 
Value/Average 
# 
mentions 
in survey 
question 
20 
(Chapter 
5) 
# (rank/ 
# design 
choices) Count Mean SD 
Outliers  
Group ≤ or ≥ 0.5 mean 
Trust 3 (=9/67)      
 
Although trust is a subjective term it can be treated as a measurable quantity. Every day 
everyone makes numerous trade-offs or judgements which lead to a decision to trust an entity. 
This next section explores the various methods for measuring trust that have been applied to 
data management. This measure of trust is not a binary measurement; you do not simply trust or 
distrust an entity. Instead there is a continuum upon which something is highly distrusted, 
through to an area of uncertainty about trust where most people still choose to distrust an entity, 
then a threshold is crossed upon which trust is established (Marsh 1994). This continuum is 
shown in Figure 25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Positive and negative thresholds for trust adapted from Marsh 
(1994). 
Amount 
of trust 
in other 
‘distrusted’ 
‘trusted’ 
Positive Threshold 
Negative Threshold 
Degrees of 
trustedness 
160   Chapter 6: Sector-wide barriers and product specific design choices 
 
 
 
 
Finding 45: Trust is measured on a continuum from distrusted, through to an area of 
uncertainty about trust where most people still choose to distrust an entity, then a 
threshold is crossed upon which trust is established. (Section 6.4.5) 
 
Artz and Gil (2007) describe four common methods for measuring trust: Policy-based 
trust, reputation-based trust, general models of trust, and trust in information resources. These 
areas have been researched in depth and are common across many fields (Marsh 1994). Policy 
based trust, also known as a universal trust model, is a method where a policy is used to 
establish or declare trust of a given group, for example users often tell their computers to trust 
content from a specific website. Reputation, referral or rating based trust is established by 
aggregating referrals to create a measure of trust. A tradition example of reputation based trust 
is referee checks in an interview process but it also used to check the quality of flood data using 
references from peers (Kussul et al. 2013). General models of trust refer to a variety of 
approaches which weight design choices that contribute to trust, for example using Bayesian 
logic to communicate decisions for managing volcanic eruptions (Aspinall et al. 2003). Finally, 
trust in information resources or trust in data is a subtype of general models of trust which 
include data specific concepts like quality, accuracy and provenance.  
An example of trust in data is journalism, where information is tested using source 
checking, or acquiring information from multiple sources in order to determine if that 
information can be trusted. Trust in data, or content trust, is the same as trust with the added 
quality related dimensions of information resources such as accuracy and provenance (Gil and 
Artz 2007). One intricacy which becomes important when considering content trust is the role 
of the middleman. Often when using a dataset, the provider of the data is not the creator of that 
data and so when talking about content trust one must consider the trustworthiness of both 
groups. 
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6.5 Summary of findings  
Finding 34: Sensor data is available to higher level decision makers but less available 
to front line incident management staff. (Section 6.2.1) 
Finding 35: Technologies, often complimentary, participate in the Battle of the 
Samaritans to discredit other technologies and promote their own. (Section 6.2.2) 
Finding 36: Integration of technologies and co-production can reduce the Battle of the 
Samaritans. (Section 6.2.2) 
Finding 37: Rigid emergency management doctrine is not conducive to the 
acceptance of new technologies. (Section 6.2.3) 
Finding 38: Lesson learning, doctrine, improvisation and innovation need to be 
balanced in disasters. (Section 6.2.3) 
Finding 39: Sensor data when used as evidence to support decision making can 
reduce blame, particularly in post event inquiries. (Section 6.2.3) 
Finding 40: The balance between accuracy and timeliness is complex and must be 
actively managed. (Section 6.4.1.3) 
Finding 41: No product is too complex to be simple to use. (Section 6.4.1.4) 
Finding 42: Data policy may not be understood by many but is a choice which can 
have large impacts on usage and uptake. (Section 6.4.2) 
Finding 43: Reputation takes a long time to build but can be lost very quickly. (Section 
6.4.3) 
Finding 44: Trust is the overarching term to encompass all design choices. (Section 
6.4.5) 
Finding 45: Trust is measured on a continuum from distrusted, through to an area of 
uncertainty about trust where most people still choose to distrust an entity, then a 
threshold is crossed upon which trust is established. (Section 6.4.5) 
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Chapter 7: Emergency management sensor 
data product uptake framework  
7.1 Aim and overview of this chapter 
This Chapter presents an emergency management sensor data product uptake framework. 
This framework condenses the findings in this thesis and the lexicon for data products 
established in Chapter six. 
The first section of this Chapter outlines the emergency management sensor data product 
uptake framework. The purpose of the framework is explained before presenting the framework 
itself. Advice is provided on how to implement the framework through the different stages of a 
product’s development. 
Case studies are then used to illustrate complex applications of the framework and provide 
examples of best practice. Topics include the relationship between timeliness and accuracy, 
building trust over time, relationships with end users and product simplicity. 
The aims of this Chapter are to: 
 Present the emergency management sensor data product uptake framework; and 
 Highlight key aspects of the framework by using case studies to illustrate best 
practice of sensor data product uptake in emergency management.  
The Chapter is structured as follows: 
7.2 Emergency management sensor data product uptake framework ....................... 164 
7.2.1 Purpose of the framework ............................................................................ 164 
7.2.2 The framework ............................................................................................. 165 
7.2.3 Implementation of the framework ................................................................ 168 
7.3 Case studies ......................................................................................................... 170 
7.3.1 Moderate resolution optical data systems ................................................... 170 
7.3.2 European Commission’s Emergency Management Service Mapping ......... 173 
7.3.3 Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC and the Phoenix fire spread model .... 176 
7.3.4 United States Geological Survey (USGS) Earthquake Hazard Program’s 
onePager or Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response system 
(PAGER) ..................................................................................................... 179 
   7.4 Summary of uptake framework ..........................................................................  
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7.2 Emergency management sensor data product 
uptake framework 
7.2.1 Purpose of the framework 
In order to present the findings of this thesis, a framework has been developed to help 
guide product creators in understanding and addressing key design choices that affect uptake.  
The framework draws on the concept of a ‘data adoption framework’ which has been used 
outside the emergency management field, for example QA4EO Secretariat (2007) and Vanden 
Borre et al. (2011). One example of a framework for satellite-derived fire products is Trigg and 
Roy (2005) study of resource managers in southern Africa. This thesis updates this concept to 
restrict the scope to sensor data products and focus on uptake rather than adoption. The 
framework proposed is thus called an ‘emergency management sensor data product uptake 
framework’. From this point on this will be referred to as ‘the framework’. 
The purpose of the framework is to guide those who are involved in sensor data product 
development towards choices they should actively consider in the design process. The 
framework is designed to be tailored, it is not a step by step process because what is prioritised 
will depend on the desired outcome or target user group. Users need to input more than just 
knowing the algorithm or accuracy. The purpose of this framework is to stimulate an informed 
conversation between sensor data product creators and end users about requirements. 
It should be noted that the framework only applies once certain technical criteria have been 
met. Datasets can only become products if the measurements used have a high enough accuracy 
and precision to resolve the desired variable and if the models used to relate the physical 
processes to the measurements are effective. Section 2.3 provides further detail on this point. If 
data producers are working with datasets that are not high enough accuracy to produce useful 
observations or variables, the framework will not be able to assist in creating a useful product.  
In addition, it should be noted that uptake takes longer and costs more to achieve than 
usage. Targeting design choices to improve uptake will generally increase development costs 
and timeframes. Employing this framework to achieve uptake should only be considered if it is 
clear that uptake is the desired objective of the product. Emergency management applications 
are often highly operational, subject to legal proceedings and involve decisions which could 
lead to the loss of a human life. For these reasons, consideration of whether a dataset is 
appropriate for emergency management uptake is critical before developing a sensor data 
product for this purpose. 
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7.2.2 The framework 
The framework aims to increase the likelihood of a sensor data product being used in 
emergency management decision making by improving the way product creators engage with 
emergency management practitioners and design products to meet their needs. It is based on a 
synthesis of existing research, case study analysis, disaster inquiry analysis and surveys of 
emergency managers.  
The central proposition of this framework is that every aspect of a sensor data product 
involves a decision made by the product’s creator. These design choices are a mix of conscious 
decisions, such as presentational choices, and subconscious, often ignored, design choices, such 
as the source data's data policy, or the data delivery business model.  
First and foremost, the framework aims to add more value to a product than the time spent 
understanding and implementing the framework. The framework is designed to be transparent 
so that creators and users can see why design choices have been made so trust is not eroded by 
unexplained decisions. Finally, it is designed to be reportable, so that discussing the 
implementation time and cost requirements of a product are practical. 
Beyond this it aims to be simple. Simplicity does not just mean ease of use but also 
simplicity in the sense of design choice independence. The effort required to adjust a design 
choice can vary greatly and so the ability to pick and choose which design choices should be 
altered must be as independent of other design choices as possible.  
The framework organises design choices into a hierarchical structure so that individuals 
building a new feature can directly track how design levers related to that feature contribute to 
the overarching design objectives. This traceability is also useful in the other direction where 
managers supervising the development of a product can gain a greater understanding of which 
features impact what design choices.  
The framework is hierarchical and consists of four nested levels: an objective; headline 
design choices; design choices; and design levers. The headline design choices cluster all design 
choices into four main groups: quality, data policy, reputation and maturity. Under the design 
choices there are design levers which are the means of achieving the design choices. In short, 
design choices are what users want and design levers are how to achieve those choices. Data 
product design choices cover many fields, including traditional technical scientific and 
engineering fields, as well as non-technical areas such as the law, public policy and marketing. 
All of these fields must be considered to fully grasp the implications of uptake. 
Design choices related to quality, data policy, reputation and maturity all contribute 
towards the likelihood of an emergency manager incorporating a data product in decision 
making. This likelihood can be summarised as a measure of trust. Trust is a measure of the 
belief that someone or something can, has and will do something: more specifically trust is a 
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collective measure of the design choices of a data product. This means if a data product aligns 
all design choices with a given user it is likely to be highly trusted, and therefore more likely to 
be considered in decision making. Conversely, the findings of this research suggest that if a data 
product ignores some design choices, and does not tailor design choices to a given user, users 
will be less likely to trust the product and unlikely to consider that product in decisions.  
Table 47 shows the full suite of design choices collected in the course of this research. 
While this list is the most comprehensive list collected, technological developments will 
inevitably create new design choices and hence this list will evolve over time. This list is not 
supposed to be a comprehensive list of technical design levers but an illustration of options to 
affect the higher level choices. Less important but highly context specific design choices have 
been marked with an *. 
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Table 47: Emergency management sensor data product uptake framework. 
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7.2.3 Implementation of the framework  
This framework is aimed at creating an informed conversation between sensor data product 
creators and emergency management decision makers before a product is developed. It 
articulates which design levers should be pulled to create a product that meets the user’s needs. 
This conversation in itself will build buy-in, trust and understanding of a product which will 
lead to greater uptake.  
This framework can be implemented in three iterative steps. Firstly, establish a joint 
understanding between creators and users about the potential design choices of a product. 
Secondly, prioritise design choices for a given product based on user requirements and 
resources available. Finally, with a clearly defined set of requirements, identify a technical 
product specification or development path to a product. 
Reflecting on the technology curves outlined in section 2.5, and in figure 26 below, it can 
be seen that the decisions outlined in the framework are not one off choices but should be 
developed, built on and revisited over the life of a product. 
 
 
Figure 26: Technology lifecycle models adapted and expanded from Linden and 
Fenn (2003). 
 
The framework can be implemented across two stages of the product cycle: before product 
launch and after product launch. While products traditionally launch as hype begins to recover 
and quality on the performance S-curve climbs, this is not always the case as the case studies 
will show. The focus of the pre product launch stage is to ensure that the product is ready before 
release and to provide clear guidance as to what “ready” means so that product creators can 
prioritise competing technical and financial barriers and deadlines.  
The second stage is about continuous improvement. After a product has been launched, 
both internal and external feedback is received which allows for the rapid increase in product 
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quality. This is reflected in the performance S-curve. Unfortunately, many data products are not 
improved after launch and miss this opportunity for rapid, and often cheap yet dramatic, 
improvements in product quality. Continuous improvement of products also offers a useful 
method of building tighter links between product creators and users leading to a greater sense of 
buy-in to the data product.  
Bates and Privette (2012) divide the time after product launch into the Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC), where products have not climbed the performance S-curve, and Full 
Operating Capability (FOC) where products are mature and available for use in decision making 
with confidence. To illustrate the point that building maturity is an iterative process, Table 48 
summarises the authors observations about the indicative levels of maturity, investment, usage 
and uptake during the life cycle of a product. 
Table 48: Indicative levels of maturity, investment, usage and uptake across a 
data product’s lifecycle. 
 Bates and 
Privette (2012) 
maturity rating 
Amount of 
investment 
Usage  
(excluding 
uptake) 
Uptake 
Research to Proof of 
Concept 
0 Low Nil Nil 
Proof of Concept to 
Development 
0 Low/medium Nil Nil 
Development to Initial 
Operating Capability 
1-2 High Low Nil 
Initial Operating 
Capability to Full 
Operating Capability 
3-4 Medium/high Medium Low 
Full Operating 
Capability 
5-6 Low/medium Low High 
 
The hierarchical nature of the framework illuminates what levers data producers have at 
their disposal. Through understanding the typical progression of hype, quality, usage and uptake 
in a data product the typical maturity and investment levels can be described.  
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7.3 Case studies 
The framework is broad and high level and can be applied in a variety of different ways. 
For this reason rather than putting forward an inflexible step by step approach, this thesis uses 
case studies to explore how to utilise different aspects of the framework. 
A broad cross section of data products have been selected in order to provide a breath of 
advice on how to apply the framework. Within each case study, the findings from the literature, 
from all the three studies (Chapters three to five) and from the subsequent discussion (Chapter 
six) will also be expanded upon. 
Each case study will begin with a broad overview of the product or organisation. 
Following this the case study’s approach to quality, data policy, reputation and maturity will be 
briefly discussed. The maturity of each case study product will also be assessed using the 
NOAA maturity model described in Bates and Privette (2012), except for the first case study 
which is based upon Chapter three. The focus of each case study will be to explore a specific 
implication of using the framework.  
7.3.1 Moderate resolution optical data systems 
In the framework, quality consists of both accuracy and timeliness. However, as Wright 
(2001) has demonstrated, there is an inverse relationship between the two. In implementing the 
framework, active decisions about how to balance the two, based on user requirements will need 
to be made.  
Chapter three presented a case study comparing the USGS’s Earth Explorer system, the 
South Dakota State University’s Web Enabled Landsat Data (WELD) system, Geoscience 
Australia’s Australian Geoscience Data Cube (AGDC) and the Institute of Remote Sensing and 
Digital Earth in the Chinese Academy of Science’s (RADI-CAS) Satsee system. The case study 
showed that even with the same input data, choices can be made that affect timeliness and 
accuracy. 
Figure 27 provides a visual depiction of the extent to which each system prioritised 
timeliness and accuracy. The plot is based on the author’s interpretation of the four system’s 
specifications, while not quantitative, the plot provides a visual demonstration of the inverse 
trend. 
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Figure 27: Chart showing the relationship between timeliness of each system 
and the accuracy of each system. 
 
From this graph SatSee is clearly the fastest system and AGDC has the highest accuracy 
products. These were active choices made by those designing these products. The AGDC 
employs every possible correction including two types of cloud/cloud shadow masking, two 
types of atmospheric correction, sun sensor geometry corrections and topographic corrections 
all to maximise accuracy. On the other hand SatSee does not even wait for the entire dataset to 
be transferred from the ground station, before it sends out compressed quicklook images with no 
corrections. 
Design choices can contribute towards accuracy and timeliness in direct and indirect ways. 
For example data policy is an often overlooked design choice whose complexity often 
contributes towards reduced timeliness of a product.  
There is a misperception by users that a product’s timeliness and quality is fixed by the 
sensor choice. But the SatSee and AGDC example shows that timeliness and quality can be 
adapted. The same data source can even be reproduced a number of times in different ways to 
suit different purposes. For example, on receipt, a product could be processed rapidly with poor 
accuracy, meeting emergency response timeliness requirements. Immediately following, or even 
in parallel with the release of this product, the data could be processed again to a higher 
accuracy but with reduced timeliness. Finally, after all ancillary datasets are available, perhaps 
after several days, a definitive product could be processed to the highest quality the product can 
achieve but with poor timeliness. This staged approach is shown by the SatSee system 
generating a poor accuracy preview product in minutes, the United States Earth Explorer system 
producing a medium accuracy rapid product in hours and the Australian Geoscience Data Cube 
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producing a high accuracy final product in days. This approach of reprocessing allows for 
greater usage and uptake of already acquired data while still allowing for high timeliness 
products to be generated. 
Product refinement with users currently only takes place through ad hoc trial and error. 
Consultation often only takes place at annual conferences or during disaster responses. This 
leads to a highly inefficient iteration process where the creator takes the product away then 
comes back with the next version. In most cases the creator is pushing the technology onto the 
user at times of heightened tension. Such choices, however, require clear guidance from users 
on what they require. It is the user that should carefully prioritise the trade-offs involved. 
A different approach which has become increasingly popular within the literature is that of 
coproduction (Ostrom 1996; Jasanoff et al. 2004). Applying this process to emergency 
management data product development would involve emergency managers taking a step back 
from the technology and clearly stating what information they need, to what accuracy and how 
quickly. Following this, the emergency manager would be available to the creators to clarify 
requirements as they arise.   
Timeliness is also linked with blame in disaster inquiries. Data creators have noted the 
increasing risk to data custodians of being blamed during and after disasters. In an effort to 
lower custodial risks, producers and value adders use three common choices. They can stop 
producing the product, add restrictions/indemnities to their data policy, or increase their 
accuracy thresholds for the product. Higher accuracy thresholds set by data creators mean that 
many data products will not meet the timeliness requirements to achieve relevance in a given 
disaster. It would seem that while disaster inquiries aim to increase evidence based decision 
making during disasters in the area of sensor data it may be having the opposite effect. 
The balance between accuracy and timeliness is a critical relationship to be managed when 
generating sensor data products for emergency management. Through careful consideration of 
the design levers leading to the accuracy and timeliness design choices shown in Table 47 this 
relationship can be managed and tailored to a specific sensor data product. 
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7.3.2 European Commission’s Emergency Management Service 
Mapping  
This case study examines how long trust can take to build. In 2015, the product which 
could have the largest impact on emergency management is Europe’s Copernicus initiative, 
formally the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security initiative. The Copernicus 
initiative is launching a fleet of satellites and associated downstream services to improve 
decision making in all types of applications including emergency management.  
The emergency management service of Copernicus, known as Emergency Management 
Service Mapping (EMS-M), undertook development and testing in a highly transparent and 
staged manner. The results of this has been high levels of buy-in and trust. Individual disaster 
type products were developed from 2003 to 2009, after which a preoperational system was 
launched and operated between 2009 to 2012 (European Space Agency 2015).  
In 2015, the EMS-M is an operational monitoring system using cutting edge science and 
technology to make disaster products. This project continues to promote transparency and build 
trust in its products by presenting not only active disasters but also statistics on historical 
operations on the front of their website (see Figure 28). This simple step means potential users 
know instantly that this organisation has a proven track record in the field. 
  
174   Chapter 7: Emergency management sensor data product uptake framework 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: European Commission's Copernicus Emergency Management 
Service Mapping Tool. 
EMS-M has a strong focus on product quality with accuracy and timeliness standards 
defined and published (European Space Agency 2015). The facility approaches the previously 
discussed accuracy/timeliness trade off by generating products in three different modes: 
mapping in rush mode, mapping in non-rush mode and external validation. Product relevance 
and usability have been addressed during the extensive and iterative development times taken 
before the facility went operational. The EMS-M’s data policy is as open as could be expected 
from a private sector operated facility with primarily private sector data sources. Products are 
openly licenced with data sources and algorithms acknowledged within the product. Source data 
can be requested on a case by case basis. EMS-M has a good reputation built over many years 
of development. It has a clear government mandate and generates products from only well-
known sources increasing believability. Reliability targets are defined and published with 
compliance targets against these standards published for each product. Finally, using the NOAA 
maturity model described in (Bates and Privette 2012), EMS-M has an average maturity of 4.8 
and minimum value of three, these results are described further in Table 49. 
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Table 49: Maturity of the European Commission’s Emergency Management 
Service Mapping capability using an adapted (Bates and Privette 2012) maturity 
framework. 
Characteristic European Commission’s Emergency Management Service Mapping capability 
Software 
Readiness 
5, Minimal code changes expected; Stable, portable and reproducible 
Metadata 
5, Complete at file and collection level. Stable. Allows provenance tracking and 
reproducibility of dataset. Meets international standards for dataset 
Documentation 
6, Public C-ATBD and OAD; Multiple peer-reviewed publications on algorithm and 
product 
Product Validation 
4, Uncertainty estimated over widely distributed times/location by multiple 
investigators; Differences understood. 
Public Access 3, Data and source code archived and available; caveats required for use.  
Utility 
6, Used in published applications; may be used by industry; assessments demonstrating 
positive value 
Average 4.8 
Min 3 
 
While EMS-M’s development, which commenced in 2003, may seem lengthy it 
demonstrates that it takes time to build the high levels of trust and buy-in required to create an 
emergency mapping system which covers all of Europe. Marsh (1994) showed that trust is not 
binary but is built over time. EMS-M is an example of a product that has been iterated over such 
a length of time that it has moved from the initial negative to the positive trust threshold before 
becoming operational. 
Moving on to a different product, the weather forecast, we can also see how time has built 
trust. The oldest and most trusted emergency management sensor data product, the weather 
forecast, still focuses on building trust. The 2013 Australian Federal inquiry Recent trends in 
and preparedness for extreme weather events contained a strong example of the role of trust, 
“while weather forecasting is much more accurate than in the past, the committee heard that 
people still need convincing to trust and act on this information”. Almost 33 years after quality 
tracking of the weather forecast began, even the weather forecast must continuously improve its 
products in order to maintain and improve its uptake and increase its trust. Figure 29 shows the 
increases in accuracy of the 10, 7, 5 and 3 day weather forecasts, demonstrating the concerted 
effort which has gone into long term continuous improvement. 
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Figure 29: Long term increase in the 3, 5, 7 and 10 day weather forecast 
accuracy for the North and South hemispheres (ECMWF 2014). 
 
This further shows that continuous development and improvement is important in building 
trust. Trust takes time to build but is easily lost. Using the curves described in Figure 26 the 
traditional progression of a data product can be tracked. An awareness of the positive and 
negative trust thresholds allows producers to know a product is trusted and ready for operational 
applications. 
 
7.3.3 Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC and the Phoenix fire spread 
model  
This case study examines best practice for engaging with a user community. The Bushfire 
and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre (BNHCRC) is an Australian research 
organisation which connects researchers, public sector emergency managers and the private 
sector. With input from BNHCRC and its predecessors, Australia has developed AS/NZS 
4360:2004 or the Australian/New Zealand Standard of Risk Management. This standard 
provides an overarching framework for how to view and manage all types of disasters.  
Under AS/NZS 4360:2004, BNHCRC has developed the Bushfire Risk Management 
Model (BRMM) which outlines the impact of various management strategies on fire 
characteristics across the landscape. One component of BRMM is the Pheonix fire spread 
model, developed by the University of Melbourne, which allows for analysis of impact on assets 
and the landscape. The Pheonix fire spread model is one component within the BNHCRC’s 
Bushfire Risk Management Model which is one application of the Australian/New Zealand 
Standard of Risk Management (Tolhurst, Shields, and Chong 2008). 
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As the Bushfire Risk Management Model is not a publically accessible system, there is 
limited documentation outside the literature on the Pheonix fire spread model. Data quality and 
policy cannot be assessed due to the lack of definitive information on the model. Even so, 
Pheonix’s reputation is high given the stage of development of the product. It is tested within 
academic journals (Saeedian et al. 2010) and used within the previously mentioned industry 
standard Bushfire Risk Management Model. In addition, it overcomes previous issues with GIS 
approaches increasing the believability of spread models (Tolhurst, Shields, and Chong 2008). 
Pheonix’s maturity can be determined based upon the publically available data as an average 
value of 3.5 and a minimum value of two. 
 
Table 50: Maturity of the University of Melbourne’s Pheonix fire spread model 
using an adapted (Bates and Privette 2012) maturity framework. 
Characteristic University of Melbourne’s Pheonix fire spread model 
Software 
Readiness 
4, Some code changes expected 
Metadata 
3, Research grade; meets international standards; ISO or FGDC for collection; netCDF 
for file 
Documentation 2, C-ATBD Version 1+; paper on algorithm reviewed 
Product Validation 3, Uncertainty estimated for select locations/times 
Public Access 3, Data and source code archived and available; caveats required for use. 
Utility 
6, Used in published applications; may be used by industry; assessments demonstrating 
positive value 
Average 3.5 
Min 2 
 
The Pheonix fire spread modelling tool is relevant because it situated itself within the user 
community during development. This led to an unusually high reputation for a system of this 
level of development. Specifically, it has a high level of engagement with users, not just 
producers and value adders. This is made possible through the existence of BNHCRC, whose 
membership brings together researchers, government agencies and the private sector into a 
single organisation which allows for this style of inclusive research. 
This thesis has discovered numerous examples of sensor data product creators having the 
goal of improving emergency management and then maintaining consultation with the 
emergency management value adders rather than end users (Lowell et al. 2011; Sustineo 2011), 
tailoring a product to emergency managers without consulting users (Ji and Zhu 2012) or stating 
a technology will benefit emergency managers with zero consultation or tailoring (Gray et al. 
2011; Yue, Gong, and Di 2010).  
Consulting with the decision makers who will consider the evidence from a sensor data 
product in a decision, is critical because their standards and requirements will be different to 
these of the data producers and value adders. The survey conducted in Chapter five found that, 
the further up the supply chain, the higher the product quality standards, meaning data 
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producers and value adders are likely to block products which could prove useful to emergency 
management users. 
This finding has profound implications, suggesting that the value adders advising 
emergency managers on capability development when preparing for disaster season may in fact 
be blocking access to products which could be of use to decision makers. This case study shows 
that, this bias of producers and value adders to hold a product until it is perfect, is easily 
detected and solved when the actual end user is present through the development of a sensor 
data product. 
What makes the Pheonix fire spread model impressive is that it’s entire technical 
development occurred within the user community through the BNHCRC. This inclusive 
approach has meant that technical staff developed products in partnership with end users. As a 
result, Pheonix has a higher reputation as a product under development than most products 
which have been completed. Developing data products in partnership with the true end user is 
critical.  
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7.3.4 United States Geological Survey (USGS) Earthquake Hazard 
Program’s onePager or Prompt Assessment of Global 
Earthquakes for Response system (PAGER) 
This case study examines how even highly complex products can be packaged in a simple 
manner to build quality and reputation. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
Earthquake Hazard Program’s Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response system 
(PAGER) analyses sensor data related to earthquakes and tsunami and generates a single page 
brief outlining the potential risks of that event. The product is generated less than 15 minutes 
after each event and the system generates around five briefs each day. Figure 30 is an example 
of the single page output summarising the entire suite of USGS earthquake related products 
onto one page after the 2011 Japan Earthquake. 
 
Figure 30: USGS Earthquake Hazard Program’s onePager brief of the 2011 
Japan Earthquake (USGS 2011). 
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The PAGER system’s high accuracy is recognised in over forty peer reviewed papers 
which it publishes on its website. It generates an automated brief in less than 15 minutes which 
cannot be generated manually by most countries. The data policy of PAGER is completely open 
including data, algorithms and code. All data sources are civilian and open source suggesting 
high levels of believability. The USGS is the mandated US agency for earthquakes and tsunami. 
Using the adapted Bates and Privette (2012) maturity framework the average maturity is six and 
minimum value is six. 
Table 51: Maturity of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) Earthquake 
Hazard Program’s Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response 
system (PAGER) capability using an adapted (Bates and Privette 2012) maturity 
framework. 
Characteristic European Commission’s Emergency Management Service Mapping capability 
Software 
Readiness 
6, No code changes expected; Stable and reproducible; portable and operationally 
efficient 
Metadata 
6, Updated and complete at file and collection level. Stable. Allows provenance 
tracking and reproducibility of dataset. Meets current international standards for dataset 
Documentation 
6, Public C-ATBD and OAD; Multiple peer-reviewed publications on algorithm and 
product 
Product Validation 
6, Observation strategy designed to reveal systematic errors through independent cross-
checks, open inspection, and continuous interrogation; quantified errors 
Public Access 6, Record is publically available for Long-Term archive; Regularly updated 
Utility 
6, Used in published applications; may be used by industry; assessments demonstrating 
positive value 
Average 6 
Min 6 
 
“Granularity of data - too much information can impede interpretation; vs. 
too little information makes it hard to make an informed decision.” 
The above quote from a survey respondent as part of this thesis captures the difficult 
balance of how much data should be presented in a sensor data product. This concept is a central 
theme in many of the design choices identified in this thesis particularly: utility, relevance, 
usability and believability. These design choices can increase or decrease the headline design 
choices of maturity, quality and reputation. Simplicity therefore covers a wide variety of design 
choices, not just presentational choices.  
Simplicity of brand contributes directly towards a product’s believability. This means that 
as much as possible products should be amalgamated into a consistent and familiar brand. This 
concept was discussed in the case study in Chapter three. The PAGER system even keeps its 
data policy simple, maintaining consistency across data, algorithms and code.  
The inquiries study reinforced that simplicity increases a product’s likelihood of uptake. 
This study also found that the relationship between different types of data, uptake and usage is 
heavily dependent on the level of maturity and integration with users. While many raw or 
upstream datasets are used in emergency management, to become widely used, highly mature 
and integrated downstream products, such as the weather forecast are required. According to the 
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studies conducted in this thesis, the three most used products in emergency management are all 
highly integrated downstream products: weather warnings, weather forecast and positioning. 
Conversely the three least known products are all upstream raw or less processed data feeds: 
stream gauge, seismogram and multispectral imagery. 
Probably the greatest achievement of the PAGER system is how such a technical system 
has been distilled into a succinct, one page product. Table 52 shows the number of observations, 
measurements and variables used to generate this product. 
 
Table 52: Observations, measurements and variables used in USGS PAGER, 
influence by Cheyne (2011). 
Product stage and type Example products used to generate the USGS PAGER 
product 
Data/observations Raw seismic waves, historical earthquake records, city 
population records, historical economic loss records, 
historical earthquake damage records, individual topographic 
records 
Information/measurements Earthquake detection, historical earthquake database, global 
exposure database, historical economic and engineering 
impact database, global topographic map, fatality estimation 
model, economic loss estimation model. 
Knowledge/variables onePAGER brief, earthquake detection and alerting system,  
 
USGS’s PAGER system is a powerful example of an immensely complex series of 
products being seamlessly integrated into a simple product, whose result is greater than the sum 
of its parts. One common problem in integrating products is the technological “Battle of the 
Samaritans” where engineers and scientists conduct critical peer review of products in front of 
users in order to gain advantage over solutions which may compete with their own (Boin et al. 
2005). One impressive feature of the USGS PAGER is that it has overcome tensions between 
different sources of data, between numerical modellers and pure observers and between 
operational personnel and researchers.  
No product is too complex to be simple and simplicity increases uptake. 
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7.4 Summary of uptake framework 
Uptake is the highest form of contact with a data product i.e. when a product is used within 
decision making. Uptake of sensor data products within emergency management is a function of 
trust. The emergency management sensor data product uptake framework can be used to inform 
decisions leading to uptake. 
Trust is determined by four headline design choices: quality, data policy, reputation and 
maturity. Quality is a function of the following design choices: accuracy, relevance, timeliness 
and usability. Data policy is a less important headline design choice but highly context specific. 
Reputation is a function of the following design choices: believability, mandate, reliability, 
security and data source. Maturity is a function of the following design choices: software 
readiness, metadata, documentation, product validation and utility. All of these design choices 
can be affected by a diverse range of technical and non-technical design levers. 
To apply this framework, tailoring to the specific user community is key. Each case study 
highlighted a specific implication of using the framework. Firstly, the balance between accuracy 
and timeliness is a critical relationship to be managed when generating sensor data products for 
emergency management. Secondly, trust takes time to build. Thirdly, developing data products 
in partnership with the true end user is critical. Finally, no product is too complex to be simple 
and simplicity increases uptake. 
Sensor data products can be designed to improve the likelihood that they will be used in 
decision making. This framework increases the likelihood of an informed conversation between 
sensor data product creators and emergency management decision makers before a product is 
developed. It articulates which design levers should be pulled to create a product that meets the 
user’s needs. This conversation in itself will build buy-in, trust and understanding of a product 
which will lead to greater uptake.  
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
8.1 Summary of thesis findings 
The overarching research question of this thesis was, “How can sensor data products be 
designed to maximise their uptake in emergency management decision making processes in 
Australia?” To answer the core research question several sub questions were posed:  
1. How is sensor data being used in the Australian emergency management sector? 
2. What do emergency managers believe are the impediments and opportunities to greater 
inclusion of sensor data products in emergency management decision making 
processes? 
3. What choices can sensor data product creators make to change how a product is 
received by emergency managers? 
4. What recommendations can be made to sensor data product creators targeting 
emergency management uptake? 
This thesis used a range of approaches to answer the overarching research question and sub 
questions. Firstly, it drew together disparate literature from a range of technical and non-
technical disciplines. This work was both an original synthesis of existing knowledge and a 
foundation upon which the rest of the thesis is based. 
Building upon the existing literature, three studies were designed and conducted in order to 
answer the core research question. Firstly, a comparative case study of four data delivery 
systems, which use the same input data source, revealed the impact various design choices can 
have on the resulting product. Secondly, a study of 257 disaster inquiries identified how sensor 
data is used in Australian emergency management, and what issues currently exist in the sector, 
as evident in post-event analysis. Finally, a survey of 230 emergency managers created a dataset 
which allowed detailed comparison about the relative importance of different design choices 
and provided valuable insights into how practitioners view uptake.  
The findings from the literature and the three studies were then synthesised into a 
comprehensive lexicon to describe sector-wide barriers, as well as data product specific barriers, 
to the uptake of sensor data in emergency management decision making. As a new field, 
merging a range of disciplines, this is the first time a common lexicon has been established. 
This allows for ongoing discussion and research on the topic. This synthesis then provided the 
foundation for the emergency management sensor data product uptake framework. Throughout 
this work, the critical but previously poorly understood role design choices play in sensor data 
product development was brought to the fore. 
This thesis has developed and presented a new synthesis and a number of specific findings 
that advance our understanding of product uptake, thus increasing the likelihood of uptake of 
sensor data in emergency management decision making. 
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This thesis yielded 45 findings which contribute to answering the overarching research 
question. The findings were highlighted in the section in which they were made, using call out 
boxes. Findings originate from key points in the literature, study findings and through the 
original synthesis of content.  
This thesis answered sub question 1 (How is sensor data being used in the Australian 
emergency management sector?) through a discussion of historical and current usage with a 
focus on how sensor data has been reported in Australian disaster inquiries. 
The thesis found that sensor data has been used in all stages of the emergency management 
spectrum including prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. It identified examples of 
sensor data being used in at least 68% of all disaster types. In addition, Australia has a long 
history of using platforms like sensors to improve emergency management decision making, 
with the first example in 1939.  This thesis identified nine operational facilities dedicated to 
using satellite information for emergency mapping in Europe and Asia, showing just how 
important and common sensor data is within modern emergency management. 
The inquiries study showed, however, that little formal attention has been paid to the role 
of sensor data in emergency management in Australia. This means it is at least underreported 
and under analysed, if not underutilised. Of the 61 Australian disaster inquiries which this thesis 
analysed in detail, only 32 inquiries, or 53%, had examples of data usage. Data quality, a key 
component of sensor data, has been a minor topic in Australian bushfire inquiries with 53 or 
3.1% of the 1728 recommendations made between 1939 and 2013 related to mapping or data 
quality. Where usage was discussed, only 18 data types were raised across all forms of sensor 
data.  
In summary, the potential of sensor data is clear and it has been used effectively in 
emergency management. It is therefore noteworthy that inquiries, which are formal assessments 
of the sector, gave such little consideration to this source of information. This low level of 
coverage in inquiries demonstrates that while present, sensor data has not penetrated the 
activities of the sector to a large degree. This suggests that the real problem is uptake rather than 
technical issues.  
Not enough evidence was available to draw extensive lessons on how sensor data has been 
used in decision making, let alone identify problems and successes. The lack of systematic 
consideration shows that there is more work to be done in understanding the absence of sensor 
data in post disaster inquiries. 
Furthermore, there was almost no formal consideration of new technologies to improve 
decision making in Australian disaster inquiries. All technologies referenced were well 
established and legacy technologies rather than new technologies.  
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Finally, this thesis found that the more political the structure of an inquiry the less 
technical the content of the inquiry, meaning sensor data was rarely discussed in royal 
commission style inquiries. 
In answer to sub question 2 (What do emergency managers believe are the impediments 
and opportunities to greater inclusion of sensor data products in emergency management 
decision making processes?) this thesis discovered many relevant impediments and 
opportunities. 
Chapter two demonstrated that within the academic community there is an active and 
diverse debate around improving the technical or implementation issues of using sensors for 
emergency management. Unfortunately, the way this translates into usefulness in the emergency 
management field is often unclear. Fundamentally, Chapter two revealed a lack of research and 
understanding into how to optimise sensor data products for emergency managers.  
The survey in Chapter five highlighted that there are many opportunities for sensor data 
within Australia, with 97% of Australian emergency managers believing sensor data should be 
used in emergency management decision making. These opportunities were found to be 
particularly relevant to the public sector, with emergency managers preferring data products to 
be delivered to them by a public institution even if the data was collected by the private sector. 
The evidence suggested that current trends towards open licencing for public sector data 
increase the trust in a dataset, and that the more mature and integrated a sensor data product is 
the greater its usage and uptake. Finally, official data or data from an organisation with an 
official mandate was seen to be more trusted than data from an organisation without a formal 
mandate. All of these findings showed that there are many opportunities for the public sector to 
better leverage sensor data for emergency management. 
This thesis also identified several common impediments to using sensor data. Availability 
of data, timeliness of data products, and skills to use the data, were the most common issues 
facing the emergency management sector. This thesis found that sensor data is available to 
higher level decision makers but less available to front line incident management staff. In 
addition, advertising concurrent with data displays or portals was shown to negatively affect 
trust by emergency managers. The survey found that the further up the supply chain you are, the 
higher your product quality standards. This suggests that data producers and value adders could 
themselves be blocking products useful to emergency managers.  
This thesis focused on the exploration of design choices, addressing the question posed in 
sub question 3 (What choices can sensor data product creators make to change how a product is 
received by emergency managers?) 
This thesis found that product creators have a myriad of design choices which can be 
altered in order to affect the use and uptake of a sensor data product. This myriad of choices 
covers fields as diverse as traditional technical scientific and engineering fields as well as non-
186   Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 
 
technical areas such as the law, public policy and marketing. Furthermore, the number of 
choices is increasing due to open data, technological and scientific developments.  
These design choices were systematically formed into a framework which consists of four 
hierarchical levels: an objective; headline design choices; design choices; and design levers. The 
headline design choices cluster all design choices into four main groups: quality, data policy, 
reputation and maturity. Under each headline design choice there is a larger number of design 
choices which are controlled themselves by design levers. In short, design choices are what 
users want and design levers are how to achieve those choices. The overarching objective of the 
framework is trust. 
Finally, this thesis made diverse findings related to sub question 4 (What recommendations 
can be made to sensor data product creators targeting emergency management uptake?). 
This thesis used a triangulation of literature, inquiries and survey data to identify choices in 
designing a product that can be expected to impact uptake. These choices were grouped into a 
framework the purpose of which is to prompt a thorough and informed conversation between 
users and product creators to ensure they make the right design choices for the product at hand. 
The framework includes levers under each design choice which for the first time connects in a 
coherent manner the product creator’s technical decisions, with the higher level product design 
choices that the user cares about. Product creators can see immediately how their design choices 
may affect uptake of a product. This thesis argues that there is no one size fits all way to apply 
the framework, but each of its elements must be actively considered in product development. 
There are several complex trade-offs in using the framework. The balance between 
accuracy and timeliness is complex and must be actively managed. Next, no product is too 
complex to be simple to use. Finally, reputation and trust take a long time to build but can be 
lost very quickly. 
It is, however, a two-way street. Emergency managers must be imaginative because if they 
underestimate a creator’s capability to tailor the design choices of a sensor data product they 
dramatically limit the potential usage and uptake of that product. Product creators in turn must 
work with true end users, decision makers, to understand the requirements and limitations of the 
product they are developing. 
Not all products are suitable for emergency management uptake. If data producers are 
working with datasets that are not high enough accuracy to produce useful observations, or 
variables then uptake is not likely. In addition, targeting design choices to improve uptake will 
generally increase development costs and timeframes.  
In addition to addressing the sub research questions, the following 45 findings have been 
grouped by topic to reflect patterns to the findings. These groupings have yielded seven key 
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findings which show the key foci for the thesis and simplify the 45 findings into a simpler brief 
list of messages from this thesis. 
Key finding 1: Rapidly growing problems like the increasing threat of disasters 
can only be effectively matched by an exponentially growing technological 
solution such as intelligence extracted from sensors 
 Finding 1: Impacts of natural disasters are a rapidly growing problem (Section 2.2) 
 Finding 3: Sensor numbers, quality and delivery speed are exponentially growing (Section 
2.3) 
 Finding 5: The Stretton Royal Commission in 1939 shows how long Australia has used 
spatial intelligence to improve emergency management decision making (Section 2.4) 
 
Key finding 2: Sensor data can operationally, effectively and efficiently provide 
intelligence to improve decision making and reduce complexity in disasters 
 Finding 6: Scientific literature has shown that sensor data has been used in at least 68% 
of disaster types (Section 2.4) 
 Finding 7: Sensor data can be used in all stages of the emergency management 
framework: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery (Section 2.4) 
 Finding 8: Dedicated operational satellite mapping facilities for disasters are common in 
Europe and Asia (Section 2.4) 
 
Key finding 3: Public sector sensor data agencies must lead the long term 
sector-wide development of sensor data products for disaster management 
both inside and outside their agencies  
 Finding 9: While there is an active and diverse academic debate around improving the 
technical or implementation issues of using sensor data for emergency management, the 
utility to emergency managers is often unclear (Section 2.4) 
 Finding 11: There is a lack of research and understanding into how to optimise sensor data 
products for emergency managers (Section 2.4) 
 Finding 12: There is a gap in the literature and a need to research what changes to sensor 
products will increase the likelihood that an emergency manager will incorporate a sensor 
product in their decision making (Section 2.4) 
 Finding 27: Stakeholders higher up the supply chain have higher quality thresholds, 
meaning data producers and value adders often block products which are still useful to 
emergency managers. (Section 5.5.2) 
 Finding 28: Official data or data from an organisation with an official mandate is more 
trusted than data from an organisation without a mandate. (Section 5.5.3) 
 Finding 29: Advertising concurrent with data displays or portals negatively affects trust by 
emergency managers. (Section 5.5.3) 
 Finding 30: Emergency managers prefer data products to be delivered to them by a public 
institution even if the data was collected by the private sector. (Section 5.5.3) 
 Finding 31: Licence restrictions on the data product or the original source data can 
decrease the trust in a dataset. (Section 5.5.3) 
 Finding 35: Technologies, often complimentary, participate in the Battle of the Samaritans 
to discredit other technologies and promote their own. (Section 6.2.2) 
 Finding 36: Integration of technologies and co-production can reduce the Battle of the 
Samaritans. (Section 6.2.2) 
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 Finding 37: Rigid emergency management doctrine is not conducive to the acceptance of 
new technologies. (Section 6.2.3) 
 
Key finding 4: Sensor data products can be tailored to a far greater degree 
than most emergency managers, sensor data value adders and sensor data 
product creators realise 
 Finding 13: Consumers who underestimate a creator’s capability to tailor the design 
choices of a sensor data product dramatically limit the potential usage and uptake of that 
product (Section 3.3) 
 Finding 14: Product creators have a myriad of design choices which can be altered in order 
to affect the uptake of a product (Section 3.3) 
 Finding 15: Open data, technological and scientific developments have meant that product 
creators can now increasingly change and tailor sensor data products (Section 3.3.3) 
 Finding 16: In most cases no system is better than another. They are simply choosing a 
different collection of design choices to target a different groups of users, therefore different 
agencies and countries interpret user’s needs in different ways (Section 3.4.3) 
 Finding 20: Based upon Australian disaster inquiries, the circumstance around data usage 
and/or uptake are governed by at least 15 design choices: Maturity, accuracy, timeliness, 
relevant, effectiveness, reliability, availability, presentation, trust, experience, culture, 
accessibility, uptake, flexibility and third party source. (Section 4.4.4) 
 Finding 33: Australian emergency managers believe the most likely design choices to 
inform decision making are accuracy, timeliness, reliability, simplicity, consistency and 
reputation. (Section 5.5.4) 
 
Key finding 5: Australia is not learning lessons about how to use technology 
for the management of disasters  
 Finding 17: The more political the structure of an inquiry the less technical the content of 
the inquiry. (Section 4.4.2) 
 Finding 18: Data quality has been a minor topic in Australian bushfire inquiries with only 
53 or 3.1% of the 1728 recommendations made between 1939 and 2013 related to 
mapping or data quality. (Section 4.4.3) 
 Finding 19: Of the 61 Australian disaster inquiries which were analysed in detail 32 
inquiries, or 53%, had examples of data usage across at least 18 different types of data. 
(Section 4.4.4) 
 Finding 21: Inquiries tend to discuss more traditional technologies but do not discuss 
emerging technologies such as the use of social media as a data source for emergency 
managers. (Section 4.5) 
 Finding 23: The discussion of data in inquiries is not new or complex with discussions in 
the 1939 bushfire royal commission often more complex than recent inquiries. (Section 
4.5) 
 Finding 38: Lesson learning, doctrine, improvisation and innovation need to be balanced 
in disasters. (Section 6.2.3) 
 Finding 39: Sensor data when used as evidence to support decision making can reduce 
blame, particularly in post event inquiries. (Section 6.2.3) 
 
  
8.1 Summary of thesis findings 189  
 
 
Key finding 6: Sensor data for disaster management is not meeting its hype in 
Australia 
 Finding 10: The distinction between awareness, usage and uptake is critical in assessing 
the effectiveness of a sensor data product (Section 3.2) 
 Finding 24: 97% of emergency management survey respondents believe sensor data 
should be used in emergency management decision making. (Section 5.4.2) 
 Finding 26: Availability of data, timeliness of data products and skills to use the data are 
the most common issues facing the emergency management sector. (Section 5.5.2) 
 Finding 34: Sensor data is available to higher level decision makers but less available to 
front line incident management staff. (Section 6.2.1) 
 
Key finding 7: Building a trusted sensor data product takes long term 
consistent strategy and support 
 Finding 4: Not all data is high enough quality to become an observation, variable or product 
(Section 2.3) 
 Finding 22: The more mature and integrated a sensor data product is the greater its usage 
and uptake. (Section 4.5) 
 Finding 25: The higher the level of product integration the higher the usage. (Section 5.5.1) 
 Finding 40: The balance between accuracy and timeliness is complex and must be actively 
managed. (Section 6.4.1.3) 
 Finding 41: No product is too complex to be simple to use. (Section 6.4.1.4) 
 Finding 42: Data policy may not be understood by many but is a choice which can have 
large impacts on usage and uptake. (Section 6.4.2) 
 Finding 43: Reputation takes a long time to build but can be lost very quickly. (Section 
6.4.3) 
 Finding 44: Trust is the overarching term to encompass all design choices. (Section 6.4.5) 
 Finding 45: Trust is measured on a continuum from distrusted, through to an area of 
uncertainty about trust where most people still choose to distrust an entity, then a threshold 
is crossed upon which trust is established. (Section 6.4.5) 
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8.2 Summary of contribution 
This research has made an original synthesis of existing literature in several key areas. 
Firstly, it clarified terminology around assessing the impact of a product by distinguishing 
between awareness, usage and uptake in a digital supply chain. It further coined not just the 
term design choices, but also the definitions of each of the design choices identified within this 
thesis. This thesis fused together scholarly knowledge from the emergency management, sensor 
data and management of digital products fields to generate a new cross-disciplinary topic. 
Finally, several of the findings listed in this thesis were an original synthesis of existing 
knowledge. These syntheses have established a clear foundation upon which original 
contributions have been made, while ensuring that this work builds on previous research. 
This thesis undertook three independent and varied studies in order to approach the 
research question from all relevant angles. This thesis generated two new research datasets: the 
Australian disaster inquiries database and the survey of sensor data in emergency management 
decision making dataset. The thesis established a emergency management sensor data product 
uptake framework. The framework presents the findings of the thesis in a succinct and usable 
format. The majority of findings presented in this thesis have been original contributions.  
While there are limitations to the thesis, the approach taken is valid and the contributions 
usable in both research and practical contexts. The design choice lexicon for data products in 
emergency management builds on existing data adoption frameworks allowing product creators 
to better target sensor data products to emergency manager’s needs. Furthermore, the 
methodical and broad range of approaches used to define this data adoption framework allows 
for lessons to be learned in how to create data adoption frameworks and tailor data products to 
audiences more generally. 
8.3 Policy implications 
With increasing population, urbanisation and climate change the frequency, intensity, 
spatial extent, duration and complexity of natural and human induced disasters are set to 
increase during the 21st century (Handmer and Dovers 2013; Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change 2012). Sensor data is one of the few means of reducing complexity and 
determining what is happening at any point in time, to inform what should be done next within 
these complex situations (Boin et al. 2005).  
Consumers who underestimate a creator’s capability to tailor the design choices of a sensor 
data product dramatically limit the potential usage and uptake of that product. Product creators 
in turn must work with true end users, decision makers, to understand the requirements and 
limitations of the product they are developing. In a policy sense this requires emergency 
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management practitioners to clarify what they need as requirements and not jump straight to 
product specifications. 
As shown with the evolution of the weather forecast, it can take decades of long term 
vision and development to climb the adoption curve and to reach the potential accuracies 
described in a performance S-curve. This long term consistent support is difficult to achieve 
given that most projects are required to achieve results within a relatively brief project or 
funding period and then are considered finished. 
As part of the survey of Australian emergency managers the trust of identical datasets 
produced by organisations with and without mandates to generate disaster products, specifically 
universities compared with government agencies, were compared. The results showed the 
highest level of trust in products from government agencies with clear mandates. Sensor data 
development must be undertaken by, or in collaboration with, groups who have an accepted, 
public good emergency management mandate. 
One area this thesis has significant implications for is the post disaster inquiry field. 
Contrary to the view that using sensor data products increases complexity, the likelihood of 
greater blame during post disaster inquiries is in fact reduced. Sensor data products can be used 
to explain and justify decision making in disasters during an inquiry. Furthermore, it is common 
place for sensor data products, specifically maps, to be used to assist post disaster inquiries. 
Often in a post disaster inquiry, emergency managers are asked to explain why a decision 
prioritised one option over another. Sensor data is a solid, official piece of evidence which can 
be used to help defend emergency management decision making.  
Data producers and value adders have noted the increasing risk to data custodians being 
blamed during and after disasters. The blame culture developing around emergency 
management may lead to less sensor data evidence being considered in decision making. Data 
custodians may reduce their offerings to emergency managers unless clear policy and legal 
guidance is given to those running inquiries around the use of sensor data as evidence in post 
disaster inquiries. 
This research suggests that the more political an inquiry the less technical the content of 
the inquiry. For example, agency led inquiries are more likely to discover technical issues than 
royal commissions. For this reason sensor data can be used to support all inquiries as an 
evidence source for describing what happened, but if technical issues are involved more targeted 
and less political inquiries are more likely to provide useful lessons.  
Inquiries tend to discuss traditional technologies rather than emerging technologies. One 
example of this is the use of social media as a data source for emergency managers. Although of 
critical importance, data quality has been missed by almost all Australian disaster inquiries. 
Steps are required to reform inquiries to ensure they learn the most useful lessons from disasters 
in order to improve future policy and practice. It could be argued that reform is required to the 
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criteria for holding, governance and powers of inquiries in order to deal with this rapidly 
changing field.  
This research could have large implications for the insurance industry and policy makers. 
Greater access to nationally consistent risk information such as long term hazard history maps 
can be used to more accurately price insurance policies at a time when disaster insurance is 
growing rapidly. This area requires further research. 
8.4 Research implications, limitations and future work 
This thesis focused on improving data creator’s understanding of what design choices 
increase the likelihood of product uptake in decision making. Organisational culture was out of 
scope for this research but it presents an important future area of work about how to change 
organisational culture to be more receptive to receiving evidence from external or technological 
sources. The by-product of this research would be an increase in the complexity of decision 
making through the consideration of new data sources, but with the ultimate goal of decreasing 
the complexity of a decision and reducing complexity in the disaster.  
Today, trust and reputation on the web are generally only assessed through referral based 
metrics. One example of referral based metrics are ratings, reviews and amalgamations on sites 
like Amazon and eBay. Web 3.0 will be implementing many forms of automated reputation 
assessment systems. There are strong parallels between the research in the semantic web and 
data adoption frameworks. Exploring the synergies could lead to automated methods of 
measuring agency specific trust in a data product, through a customised calculation of a 
product’s metadata. These systems could be useful to emergency managers who regularly need 
to assess the trustworthiness of new data products which are only created during disasters. 
With data fusion becoming more common, more sophisticated approaches are required to 
assess the accuracy of products with multiple sources of data. In addition, consistent accuracy 
measurement techniques need to be developed. While adding complexity to quality assessment 
techniques, Bayesian style quality assessment approaches may be required in the future across 
all evidence in emergency management decision making. This could include human intelligence 
sources such as triple zero emergency calls. This style of assessment would ensure a consistent 
measure of quality is applied across all types of data. 
The Australian disaster inquiries database developed in this thesis was used for a very 
specific purpose. This dataset is worthy of further analysis, specifically around jurisdictional 
trends and the correlation between jurisdiction, inquiry type and risk. 
This thesis uses a small number of technological lifecycle models like the Hype curve and 
performance S-curve. Future studies could expand on the framework to include more 
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quantitative models like the Technology Task Fit (TTF), Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
and the Unified Theory of Acceptance of Technology (UTAUT). 
Detailed jurisdictional analysis was not undertaken for the survey data as this style of 
geographic analysis was not the focus of the study. That said, further analysis would be useful 
as individual jurisdictions have varied population, risks, requirements and interests. 
This thesis is targeted at Australian emergency managers but has lessons which could 
apply to the global emergency management sector. Furthermore, the research into data uptake 
frameworks could be broadened to applications outside of emergency management. 
Uptake has not been directly observed in this thesis it has only been indirectly reported in 
survey results and was not specifically mentioned in inquiries. Direct uptake would require an 
emergency manager stating that they changed a decision based upon data. This limitation is well 
understood and has been largely addressed through the constant iteration of findings. That aside, 
future studies could look to apply this framework in real life case studies over time to 
quantifiably measure the impact on uptake. 
The framework presented in this thesis was not able to prioritise levers for specific user 
requirements due to the time limitations of this research. This prioritisation could be considered 
as future work. 
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8.5 Concluding remarks  
Rapidly growing problems are most effectively addressed by rapidly growing, if not 
exponentially growing, solutions. With disasters becoming larger, more complex and more 
frequent, greater situational awareness is required to reduce complexity. Sensor data has only 
just begun to be used in mainstream society and many emergency manager’s imaginations have 
not yet caught up with what will soon be yesterday’s technologies. 
The Australian continent is the least dense of the populated continents on the planet and 
yet it has far less sophisticated monitoring systems than many other nations. Australia uses only 
18 different types of satellite data to measure all public policy challenges, at a time when the 
World Meteorological Organisation uses 28 types of satellite data to monitor climate and 
weather alone. This lack of uptake is troubling.  
Low sensor uptake in Australia can be solved and used to help improve the quality of 
disaster response. 97% of Australian emergency management professionals surveyed believe 
sensor data should be used in emergency management decision making. Through long term and 
consistent vision, including funding, highly trusted sensor data products can be established 
which can inform all Australians where disasters are likely to occur, detect new disasters, track 
active disasters and estimate the impact of disasters in real time from anywhere on the planet. 
This information, in turn, could give emergency managers the force multiplier required to deal 
with the impending rise of the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration and complexity of 
natural and human induced disasters. 
The sensor data product uptake framework for Australian emergency management has the 
potential to increase the usage of sensor data in Australia and uptake of sensor data in 
emergency management decision making. 
If one message is to be taken away from this research it is that: sensor data products can be 
designed in order to improve uptake and they are not simply a function of the sensor. Full 
consideration should be given to the range of design levers available. 
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Appendix A: Disaster inquiries in Australia  
Table 53: Australian disaster inquiries between 1886 and 2014 and status within Chapter four study. 
Note: “Not online” means that the inquiry could not be acquired digitally. “Analysed” means the inquiry was acquired and analysed. “Acquired, 
text not accessible” means the inquiry was acquired but could not be analysed within the word frequency analysis because the PDF file was not 
accessible or was read protected. 
Year State Inquiry type Disaster type Title Status 
1886 NSW Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission on Collieries Not online 
1887 NSW Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission on the Bulli Colliery Accident Not online 
1901 NSW Royal Commission Technical accident 
Royal Commission to Inquire Into the Fatal Accident which Took Place at the Broken Hill South Mine, Broken Hill 
on the 24th May, 1901 Not online 
1902 VIC Royal Commission Technical accident 
Royal commission to investigate the subject of locomotive spark arresters as a means of preventing the occurrence 
of destructive fires in the working of the Victorian railways  Analysed 
1903 NSW Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission of Inquiry Respecting the Mount Kembla Colliery Disaster  Analysed 
1903 NSW Royal Commission Technical accident 
Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the cause of the fatal accident at the mine of the sulphide corporation 
company (limited), commonly known as the “Central Mine” Broken Hill, on the 8th October, 1902 Not online 
1909 VIC Coronial Technical accident Coroner’s enquiry into the Sunshine railway disaster Not online 
1913 Tas Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission on the North Mount Lyell Mining Disaster  Analysed 
1922 QLD Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission on Mount Mulligan Colliery Disaster Not online 
1923 Federal Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission on the circumstances attending the supposed loss at sea of the steamship “Sumatra” Not online 
1925 QLD Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Traveston railway accident Not online 
1926 NSW Royal Commission Technical accident Report of Royal Commission on Coal and Shale Mines Not online 
1927 NSW Royal Commission Bushfire Royal Commission of Inquiry on Bush Fires in the State of New South Wales Not online 
1937 VIC Royal Commission Technical accident Royal commission on certain matters relating to the state coal mine Wonthaggi. Interim and Second Report  Analysed 
1939 VIC Royal Commission Bushfire 
Royal commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to prevent the bush fires of January 1939 and to 
protect life and property and the measures to be taken to prevent bush fires in Victoria and to protect life and 
property in the event of future bush fires Analysed 
1944 VIC Royal Commission Bushfire 
Royal commission to inquire into the place of origin and the causes of the fires which commenced at Yallourn on 
the 14th day of February 1944; the adequacy of the measures which had been taken to prevent damage; and the 
measures to be taken to protect the  Analysed 
1956 QLD Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission Appointed to Enquire Into Certain Matters Relating to the State Coal Mine, Collinsville Not online 
1957 NSW Independent Flood Report on the River Murray flood problem : (with particular reference to the 1956 flood) Not online 
1961 WA Royal Commission Bushfire 
Royal Commission appointed to enquire into and report upon the bush fires of December, 1960 and January, 
February and March, 1961 in Western Australia. The measures necessary or desirable to prevent and control such 
fires and to protect life and property  
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
1964 Federal Royal Commission Technical accident Royal Commission on Loss of H.M.A.S. Voyager Not online 
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1967 Tas Governments Bushfire 
Fire Prevention and Suppression—Report of Committee appointed by His Excellency the Administrator-in-Council 
to make recommendations with respect to future measures in consequences of the Bush Fire Disaster of 7th 
February, 1967 Not online 
1968 VIC Parliamentary Fire Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board. Committee of Enquiry Not online 
1971 VIC Royal Commission Technical accident Royal commission into the failure of West Gate Bridge  
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
1971 NSW Agency Flood Inter-Departmental Committee of Inquiry into Nepean-Hawkesbury Flood Problems. Interim and Final report Not online 
1973 VIC Parliamentary Flood Northern River flooding inquiry, 1973 : evidence presented to Victorian Parliamentary Public Works Committee Not online 
1974 NT Independent Bushfire A report arising from an enquiry into the Northern Territory fire service Not online 
1977 VIC Parliamentary Bushfire 
Report of the Board of Inquiry into the occurrence of bush and grass fires in Victoria – Inquiries following 2002–
2003 bushfires  Analysed 
1977 Federal Independent Fire Board of Inquiry into the Fire at the Naval Air Station, Nowra, New South Wales Not online 
1978 NSW Independent Fire Committee of Inquiry into the NSW Fire Brigades (Parkinson Committee) Not online 
1979 Federal Parliamentary Biological The Adequacy of Quarantine Not online 
1979 SA Parliamentary Fire Committee of Inquiry into South Australian Fire Services  Not online 
1983 VIC Agency Bushfire A Study of Civilian Deaths in the 1983 Ash Wednesday Bushfires Victoria, Australia.  Analysed 
1983 NSW Coronial Bushfire Inquiry into a fire at Royal National Park, Grays Point  Not online 
1983 VIC Agency Bushfire Fire protection and fuel-reduction burning in Victoria Not online 
1983 SA Independent Bushfire Report of the Review Team on the South Australian bushfires Not online 
1983 SA Agency All hazard Final report and recommendations of the State Disaster Plan (Welfare) Review Committee  Not online 
1984 VIC Independent Bushfire 
Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on bushfire preparedness in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash 
Wednesday fires 16 February 1983 – Inquiries following 2002–2003 bushfires Analysed 
1984 Federal Parliamentary Bushfire Bushfires and the Australian Environment Not online 
1984 Federal Parliamentary Bushfire 
The 1982/83 Bushfires: Implications for national cooperation and coordination based on direct State and Territory 
forest service experience – major conflagrations report Not online 
1985 SA Independent Bushfire Review of electricity distribution policies in bushfire prone and environmentally sensitive areas  Not online 
1985 WA Independent All hazard Review of emergency services Not online 
1986 Federal Parliamentary Technical accident Passenger coach safety Analysed 
1986 ACT Parliamentary Fire Committee of Enquiry into the A.C.T. Fire Brigade  Not online 
1987 Federal Independent Technical accident 
Report of the committee of inquiry into a fire which occurred on 18 March 1987 in a radioisotope processing cell, 
Building 54 at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories.  Not online 
1988 ACT Independent All hazard Purdue Report on management training Not online 
1989 Federal Parliamentary Technical accident 
Visits to Australia by Nuclear Powered or Armed Vessels: Contingency Planning for the Accidental Release of 
Ionising Radiation 
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
1989 NSW Parliamentary All hazard Coastal development in NSW: Public concerns and government processes Not online 
1989 QLD Independent Fire Commission of Review of Fire Services in Queensland  Not online 
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1991 NSW Parliamentary All hazard Coastal planning and management in NSW: A framework for the future, Volume 1 Not online 
1991 ACT Independent All hazard Hannan Group review of the effectiveness of fire and emergency service organisations Not online 
1992 NSW Parliamentary All hazard Coastal planning and management in NSW: The process for the future, Volume 2 Not online 
1992 ACT Independent All hazard Purdon Report Not online 
1993 QLD Independent All hazard Review of the Bureau of Emergency Services Not online 
1993 ACT Independent All hazard MacDonald review of emergency services Not online 
1993 Tas Independent Bushfire Bushfire management in Tasmania’s forests : an audit of the fire management activities of the Forestry Commission Not online 
1994 VIC Parliamentary Fire Report of the Public Bodies Review Committee into the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board Analysed 
1994 Federal Parliamentary All hazard Disaster Management Not online 
1994 NSW Parliamentary Bushfire the report of the Select Committee on Bushfires – COAG Bushfire Inquiry Not online 
1994 QLD Independent Bushfire Audit of bushfire strategies:Queensland Emergency Services  Not online 
1994 ACT Independent Bushfire McBeth review of bushfire hazard–reduction practices Not online 
1994 Tas Independent Bushfire Review of Vegetation-Based Fire in Tasmania – major conflagrations report Not online 
1994 WA Independent Bushfire 
Report of the Fire Review Panel Conducting a Review of the Department of Conservation and Land Management’s 
(CALM) prescribed burning policy and practices and ‘Wildfire Threat Analysis – major conflagrations report Not online 
1995 ACT Independent Bushfire Glenn Bushfire Taskforce Not online 
1996 NSW Coronial Bushfire 
New South Wales Bushfire Inquiry : findings. Inquiry into the cause and origin of the bushfires occurring in New 
South Wales between 31st December, 1993 and 14th January, 1994 and Inquests into the manner and cause of death 
of Norman John Anthes, Robert Eglinton Page, William John Roach and Pauline Mary O’Neil  Not online 
1996 NSW Audit Fire New South Wales Fire Brigades : fire prevention  Not online 
1997 VIC Coronial Fire 
Inquest findings, comments and recommendations into fire and nine deaths at Kew Residential Services on 8 April 
1996  Not online 
1998 Federal Independent Technical accident Board of Inquiry Into the Fire in HMAS Westralia  Analysed 
1998 NSW Audit Bushfire The Coordination of Bushfire Fighting Activities  Analysed 
1998 Federal Parliamentary Biological The Incidence and Management of the Ovine Johnes Disease in the Australian Sheep Flock Not online 
1999 VIC Agency Bushfire Reducing the Risk of Entrapment in Wildfires: A Case Study of the Linton Fire  Analysed 
1999 Federal Parliamentary Technical accident Report 87: Loss of HMAS Sydney  Analysed 
1999 VIC Royal Commission Technical accident The Esso Longford Gas Plant Accident: Report of the Longford Royal Commission  Analysed 
2000 Federal Agency Flood Consumer Understanding of Flood Insurance  Analysed 
2000 Federal Audit All hazard Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements  Analysed 
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2000 NSW Parliamentary Bushfire NSW Rural Fire Service Analysed 
2000 NSW Coronial Technical accident Inquest into the deaths arising from the Thredbo landslide  Analysed 
2000 QLD Independent Bushfire Fire Safety and Budget Accommodation: The Building and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2001  Analysed 
2000 VIC Parliamentary Biological Inquiry into the Control of Ovine Johne’s Disease in Victoria Analysed 
2000 NSW Coronial Technical accident Inquest into the event of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race  Analysed 
2000 Federal Independent Maritime Australian Offshore Petroleum Safety Case Review Not online 
2001 NSW Parliamentary Oil Spill Oil Spills in Sydney Harbour (Inquiry)  Analysed 
2001 NSW Independent Technical accident Special Commission of Inquiry into the Glenbrook Rail Accident,Final Report  Analysed 
2001 NSW Coronial Bushfire Inquiry into the Fire at Mt Ku-Ring-Gai Chase National Park  Analysed 
2001 NSW Audit All hazard Readiness to Respond - 2001 Reports (Inquiry into the Ambulance Service)  Analysed 
2001 NSW Audit Bushfire 
Follow up of Performance Audits: Police response to calls for assistance, The levying and collection of land tax, 
Coordination of bushfire fighting activities  Analysed 
2001 WA Parliamentary Fire Bellevue Hazardous Waste Fire Inquiry Analysed 
2002 Federal Governments All hazard Natural Disasters in Australia: Reforming mitigation, relief and recovery arrangements  Analysed 
2002 NSW Parliamentary Bushfire Inquiry into the 2001/2002 Bushfires  Analysed 
2002 NSW Audit Biological Managing Animal Disease Emergencies  Analysed 
2002 VIC Coronial Technical accident 
Inquest into the deaths of Peter Brubeck Wilson and John Francis Lowery and  
the fire at Longford Gas Plant Number 1  Analysed 
2002 VIC Coronial Bushfire Inquest into the Linton Wildfire  Analysed 
2003 Federal Parliamentary Bushfire A Nation Charred: Inquiry into the Recent Australian Bushfires  Analysed 
2003 Federal Audit Biological Pest and Disease Emergency Management Follow-on Audit Analysed 
2003 Federal Audit All hazard Business Continuity Management Follow-on Audit Analysed 
2003 Federal Audit All hazard Business Continuity Management and Emergency Management in Centrelink  Analysed 
2003 NSW Audit Biological Implementing the Ovine Johne’s Disease Program - 2003 Reports Analysed 
2003 ACT Independent Bushfire The Inquiry into the Operational Response to the January 2003 Bushfires  Analysed 
2003 ACT Independent Bushfire The Report of the Bushfire Recovery Taskforce  Analysed 
2003 ACT Audit All hazard Emergency Services  Analysed 
2003 VIC Agency Bushfire Inquiry into the 2002-2003 Victorian Bushfires  Analysed 
2003 VIC Audit Bushfire Fire Prevention and Preparedness  Analysed 
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2003 Tas Parliamentary All hazard Report on Ambulance Services in Tasmania  Analysed 
2003 SA Independent All hazard Review of the Emergency Services Sector (Dawkins Review)  
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
2003 WA Coronial Maritime Record of Investigation into Death HMAS Westralia  
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
2003 Federal Independent Maritime National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority: Review of Implementation Activities Not online 
2003 NSW Coronial Bushfire Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Fire(s) in the Brindabella Range in January 2003 Not online 
2004 NSW Parliamentary All hazard Ambulance Service of NSW: Readiness to respond (Inquiry)  Analysed 
2004 NSW Parliamentary Bushfire Fire Services Funding (Inquiry)  Analysed 
2004 NSW Agency Biological NSW Taskforce on SARS (TSARS)  Analysed 
2004 QLD Audit All hazard Audit of the Queensland Disaster Management System  Analysed 
2004 VIC Audit Biological Beating the Bugs: Protecting Victoria’s Economically Significant Crops from Pests and Diseases  Analysed 
2004 WA Coronial Bushfire Tenterden and Mt Barker Fires Coronial Inquiry Analysed 
2004 WA Audit Bushfire Responding to Major Bushfires  Analysed 
2004 WA Coronial Bushfire Ocean Farm Fires Coronial Inquiry Not online 
2005 Federal Governments Bushfire National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management.   Analysed 
2005 Federal Governments All hazard Review of Australia’s Ability to Respond to and Recover From Catastrophic Disasters Analysed 
2005 Federal Independent Tsunami Tsunamis – Does anyone have to die? Analysed 
2005 Federal Audit Manmade 
Review of the Evaluation Methods and Continuous Improvement Processes for Australia’s National Counter-
Terrorism Coordination Arrangements  Analysed 
2005 NSW Independent Technical accident Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Rail Accident,Volume 1 & Volume 2.  Analysed 
2005 NSW Audit All hazard Coordination of State Rescue Services  Analysed 
2005 VIC Agency Bushfire Examination of Prescribed Burning Practices  Analysed 
2005 VIC Agency All hazard Improving Emergency Response at Melbourne Airport  Analysed 
2005 VIC Audit Flood Managing Stormwater Flooding Risks in Melbourne  Analysed 
2005 SA Parliamentary Bushfire Eyre Peninsula Bushfire and Native Vegetation  Analysed 
2005 NSW Independent Bushfire Statutory Review of the Rural Fires Act 1997 Not online 
2006 Federal Parliamentary Tsunami Inquiry into Australia’s response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami  Analysed 
2006 NSW Parliamentary Biological Inquiry into Managing Animal and Plant Diseases  Analysed 
2006 NSW Audit Biological Major Infectious Disease Outbreaks: Readiness to Respond  Analysed 
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2006 QLD Coronial Fire Palace Backpackers Hostel Fire  Analysed 
2006 ACT Coronial Bushfire 
The Canberra Firestorm: Inquests and Inquiry into Four Deaths and Four Fires between 8 and 18 January 
2003 Volume 1 & Volume 2 Analysed 
2006 VIC Independent Bushfire Fire Season Debrief Outcomes Report 2005/06  Analysed 
2006 WA Parliamentary All hazard Inquiry into Fire and Emergency Services Legislation  Analysed 
2006 VIC Agency All hazard Emergency Management Discussion Paper. Department of Justice. Not online 
2007 SA Coronial Bushfire Inquests into the deaths of [9 named people] (2005 Eyre Peninsula, Wangarry fires).  Analysed 
2007 VIC Coronial Bushfire Record of Investigation into Death (Ararat Road Block).  
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
2007 Federal Audit Biological Australia’s Preparedness for a Human Influenza Pandemic  Analysed 
2007 QLD Independent Cyclone The Final Report of the Operation Recovery Task Force: Severe Tropical Cyclone Larry  Analysed 
2007 QLD Coronial Technical accident Inquest into the Lockhart River air crash  Analysed 
2007 VIC Independent Bushfire Operational Review of Major Fires in Victoria 2006/07 – Ross Smith Report Analysed 
2007 Tas Independent All hazard Tasmanian Medical Retrieval Services External Review  Analysed 
2007 SA Governments Bushfire Ministerial Review of Bushfire Management in South Australia  Analysed 
2007 WA Parliamentary All hazard Inquiry into Western Australia’s Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements  Analysed 
2007 Federal  Terrorism Lessons from London and considerations for Australia: London Terrorist Attacks 7 July 2005 Not online 
2008 Federal Parliamentary All hazard Inquiry into climate change and environmental impacts on coastal communities  Analysed 
2008 Federal Parliamentary All hazard Inquiry into the Administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and related matters  Analysed 
2008 Federal Royal Commission Biological Equine Influenza Inquiry Analysed 
2008 Federal Audit All hazard Emergency Management Australia  Analysed 
2008 QLD Audit Bushfire Management of Rural Fire Services in Queensland  Analysed 
2008 ACT Parliamentary All hazard ACT Fire and Emergency Services Arrangements  Analysed 
2008 VIC Parliamentary Bushfire Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria  Analysed 
2008 VIC Agency Windstorm Review of the April 2008 Windstorm  Analysed 
2008 VIC Agency Fire Westpoint Chemical Fire Community Report  Analysed 
2008 VIC Audit Biological Biosecurity Incidents: Planning and Risk Management for Livestock Diseases  Analysed 
2008 SA Independent All hazard Review of the Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005  Analysed 
2008 SA Coronial Bushfire Wangary Fires Inquest Analysed 
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2008 SA Agency All hazard Volunteer Administrative Workload Review  Analysed 
2008 Federal Independent Maritime National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Operational Review Not online 
2008 VIC Agency Maritime Marine Emergency Framework Review Final Report Not online 
2009 WA Coronial Bushfire Record of Investigation into Death (2007 Boorabin fires).  Analysed 
2009 Tas Coronial Fire Record of Investigation into a Fire at the Myer Store at 98-108 Liverpool Street, Hobart, on 22 September 2007  Analysed 
2009 Federal Governments All hazard 
Recommendations on the Role of AEMO and the Effectiveness of Current Gas and Electricity Emergency 
Arrangements  Analysed 
2009 Federal Independent All hazard 
Offshore Petroleum Safety Regulation – this inquiry produced two reports “Marine Issues” and “Better practice and 
the effectiveness of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority“  Analysed 
2009 Federal Audit All hazard Business Continuity Management and Emergency Management in Centrelink  Analysed 
2009 NSW Independent Flood Recovery Coordinator’s Report of the Mid North and Far North Coast Flood Recovery – May 2009 Analysed 
2009 NSW Agency Bushfire Review of Bushfire Arson Laws  Analysed 
2009 QLD Independent All hazard Report on a Review of Disaster Management Legislation and Policy in Queensland  Analysed 
2009 ACT Audit All hazard Delivery of Ambulance Services to the ACT Community  Analysed 
2009 VIC Agency Bushfire Operational debrief report 2008/09 fire season  Analysed 
2009 VIC Audit Manmade Preparedness to Respond to Terrorism Incidents Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure  Analysed 
2009 Tas Coronial Technical accident Beaconsfield Mine Disaster Coronial Inquest Analysed 
2009 WA Agency Bushfire Review of Western Australia’s Bushfire Preparedness  Analysed 
2009 WA Agency Bushfire Bridgetown Complex Post Incident Analysis  Analysed 
2009 WA Audit All hazard Coming Ready or Not: Preparing for Large-scale Emergencies  Analysed 
2010 Federal Parliamentary Bushfire The incidence of bushfires across Australia. Senate Select Committee on Agriculture and Related Industries.  Analysed 
2010 WA Independent Bushfire Major Incident Review of Toodyay Fire December 2009  Analysed 
2010 Federal Independent Oil spill Montara Commission of Inquiry Analysed 
2010 Federal Audit All hazard Emergency Management and Community Recovery Assistance in Centrelink  Analysed 
2010 VIC Royal Commission Bushfire Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. Interim Report 1, Interim Report 2 and Final Report  Analysed 
2010 VIC Audit All hazard The Department of Human Services’ Role in Emergency Recovery  Analysed 
2010 VIC Audit All hazard Business Continuity Management in Local Government  Analysed 
2010 NT Coronial Maritime Ashmore Reef Boat Explosion – SEIV 36 Analysed 
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2010 WA Independent Bushfire 
A Review of the Ability of the Department of Environment and Conservation Western Australia to Manage Major 
Fires Analysed 
2010 Federal Agency All hazard Working Better Together: An NGO perspective on improving Australia’s coordination in disaster response Not online 
2011 WA Independent Bushfire Major Incident Review: Lake Clifton, Red Hill and Roleystone Fires June 2011.  Analysed 
2011 WA Independent Bushfire Shared Responsibility: The Report of the Perth Hills Bushfire February 2011 Review.  Analysed 
2011 Federal Agency Flood Inquiry into flood insurance and related matters. Natural Disaster Insurance Review.  Analysed 
2011 VIC Agency All hazard Towards a More Disaster Resilient Victoria: Green Paper Options and Issues. Government of Victoria.  Analysed 
2011 WA Parliamentary Fire Inquiry into the 2011 Kimberley Ultramarathon. Parliament of Western Australia  Analysed 
2011 Federal Parliamentary All hazard 
The capacity of communication networks and emergency warning systems to deal with emergencies and natural 
disasters Analysed 
2011 Federal Parliamentary All hazard The asset insurance arrangements of Australian state governments  Analysed 
2011 Federal Parliamentary Maritime Joint Select Committee on the Christmas Island Tragedy of 15 December 2010  Analysed 
2011 Federal Independent All hazard Natural Disaster Insurance Review Analysed 
2011 Federal Independent Maritime National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Operational Review Analysed 
2011 NSW Parliamentary Technical accident Kooragang Island Orica chemical leak  Analysed 
2011 QLD Parliamentary Bushfire Management of Rural Fire Services in Queensland  Analysed 
2011 QLD Audit All hazard National Partnership Agreement for Natural Disaster Reconstruction and Recovery  Analysed 
2011 VIC Independent Flood The review of the 2010-11 Flood Warnings and Response. Interim and Final reports  Analysed 
2011 VIC Independent Fire Independent Inquiry into the effect of arrangements on Country Fire Authority Volunteers  Analysed 
2011 VIC Agency Bushfire Review of the February 2011 Tostaree Fire  Analysed 
2011 VIC Agency Fire TriTech Lubricants factory fire  Analysed 
2011 VIC Agency Bushfire 2011 Review of Community Bushfire Warnings  Analysed 
2011 Tas Audit Bushfire Bushfire Management  Analysed 
2011 SA Parliamentary Bushfire Natural Resources Committee Bushfire Inquiry Analysed 
2011 WA Parliamentary Bushfire Examination of the State’s Preparedness for this Year’s Coming Fire Season  Analysed 
2012 WA Independent Bushfire Appreciating the Risk: Report of the Special Inquiry into the November 2011 Margaret River Bushfire  Analysed 
2012 Federal Parliamentary All hazard Inquiry into the operation of the insurance industry during disaster events  Analysed 
2012 Federal Independent All hazard Review of the Bureau of Meteorology’s extreme weather and seasonal forecasting capacity  Analysed 
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2012 Federal Independent All hazard Barriers to Effective Climate Change Adaptation  Analysed 
2012 QLD Independent Flood Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry Interim and Final reports  Analysed 
2012 QLD Coronial Flood Inquest into the deaths caused by the South-East Queensland floods of January 2011  Analysed 
2012 VIC Parliamentary Flood Inquiry into Flood Mitigation Infrastructure in Victoria  Analysed 
2012 VIC Agency Flood North East Victoria Flood Review Analysed 
2012 VIC Agency Flood Gippsland Flood Event – Review of Flood Warnings and Information Systems  Analysed 
2012 VIC Agency Fire Fire at Yarra Valley Grammar School Analysed 
2012 VIC Agency Bushfire Westmeadows Grassfire  Analysed 
2012 VIC Agency Fire Fire Management at Landfill Sites  Analysed 
2012 VIC Agency Technical accident Port of Portland Emergency  Analysed 
2012 VIC Agency Technical accident NuPlex Chemical Incident  
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
2012 VIC Agency Bushfire 2011/12 Post Bushfire Season Review Report  Analysed 
2012 NT Agency Bushfire Review of the Operations of Bushfires NT  Analysed 
2012 WA Parliamentary Bushfire Inquiry into the State’s preparedness for this year’s fire season  
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
2012 WA Parliamentary All hazard The Toll of Trauma on Western Australian Emergency Staff and Volunteers  Analysed 
2012 WA Coronial Maritime Coronial inquest into 2010 Christmas Island boat disaster or SIEV 221  Analysed 
2012 WA Agency Bushfire Post Incident Analysis for Blackwood Fire 8  Analysed 
2012 WA Agency Bushfire Post Incident Analysis for Blackwood Fire 11  Analysed 
2012 WA Audit All hazard Second Public Sector Performance Report 2012  Analysed 
2013 Federal Parliamentary All hazard Recent trends in and preparedness for extreme weather events  Analysed 
2013 Federal Parliamentary Technical accident Aviation Accident Investigations (Pel-air) Analysed 
2013 Federal Parliamentary Biological Inquiry into health issues across international borders  Analysed 
2013 Federal Parliamentary All hazard Spectrum for public safety mobile broadband  Analysed 
2013 Federal Agency Fire Inquiry to learn lessons from Warrnambool exchange fire  Analysed 
2013 Federal Audit All hazard The Preparation and Delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and Victoria  Analysed 
2013 Federal Audit Flood 
The Australian Government Reconstruction Inspectorate’s Conduct of Value for Money Reviews of Flood 
Reconstruction Projects in Victoria  Analysed 
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2013 Federal Audit Flood 
The Australian Government Reconstruction Inspectorate’s Conduct of Value for Money Reviews of Flood 
Reconstruction Projects in Queensland Analysed 
2013 NSW Independent All hazard Independent Hazard Reduction Audit Panel Analysed 
2013 QLD Independent All hazard Police and Community Safety Review  Analysed 
2013 QLD Governments Bushfire The Malone Review into the Rural Fire Service  Analysed 
2013 ACT Audit Bushfire Bushfire Preparedness Analysed 
2013 VIC Coronial Technical accident Kerang Train Crash Inquest 
Acquired, text 
not accessible 
2013 VIC Agency Bushfire Report into the Harrietville Fire Analysed 
2013 VIC Audit All hazard Management of Unplanned Leave in Emergency Services  Analysed 
2013 VIC Audit Flood Flood Relief and Recovery Analysed 
2013 Tas Independent Bushfire Tasmanian Bushfires Inquiry  Analysed 
2013 SA Parliamentary All hazard Community Safety and Emergency Services in South Australia  Analysed 
2013 SA Independent All hazard Review of the Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005  Analysed 
2013 WA Audit All hazard Delivering WA’s Ambulance Services  Analysed 
2013 Tas Audit All hazard Radio Communications (yet to be completed) Not online 
2013 WA Coronial Bushfire Coroner’s inquest into the fatal bushfire at Albany (yet to report) Not online 
2013 WA Agency Bushfire Report into the fatal bushfire at Albany (completed report will be released following the coronial inquiry) Not online 
2013 NSW Agency Flood Hawkesbury-Nepean Valley Flood Management Review (report due late 2013) Not online 
2013 QLD Audit All hazard Ambulance Service Performance (report due December 2013) Not online 
2014 Federal Independent Technical accident Aviation Safety Regulation Review – (report due May 2014) Not online 
2014 Federal Independent Bushfire Commission of Inquiry appointed into the fire at Marrangaroo Training Area (report expected 2014) Not online 
2014 Federal Independent All hazard Productivity Commission Inquiry Into National Disaster Funding Arrangements (inquiry expected 2014) Not online 
2014 NSW Parliamentary Bushfire Wambelong fire (Inquiry) (report expected late 2014) Not online 
2014 NSW Coronial Bushfire Coronial Inquest into the Warrumbungle Bushfire (expected late 2014) Not online 
2014 VIC Audit All hazard Managing Emergency Service Volunteers (report due February 2014) Not online 
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Appendix B: Disaster inquiries in Australia 
by jurisdiction, hazard and inquiry type 
Table 54: Australian disaster inquiry types by jurisdiction 
 Agency Audit Coronial Governments Independent Parliamentary 
Royal 
Commission Total 
ACT  3 1  8 2  14 
Federal 4 12  4 16 21 3 60 
NSW 4 8 6  7 12 7 44 
NT 1  1  1   3 
QLD  4 3 1 8 1 3 20 
SA 2  2 1 5 4  14 
Tas  2 2 1 4 1 1 11 
VIC 24 10 6  5 7 7 59 
WA 5 4 7  7 7 1 31 
Total 40 43 28 7 61 55 22 256 
 
Table 55: Australian disaster inquiry hazard type by jurisdiction 
 Federal ACT NSW NT QLD SA Tas VIC WA Total 
All hazard 24 7 7  6 6 3 7 7 67 
Biological 6  5     3  14 
Bushfire 6 6 15 2 5 7 5 22 19 87 
Cyclone     1     1 
Fire 2 1 2  2 1 1 8 2 19 
Flood 4  4  2   7  17 
Manmade 1       1  2 
Maritime 5   1    1 3 10 
Oil Spill 1  1       2 
Technical accident 9  10  4  2 9  34 
Terrorism 1         1 
Tsunami 2         2 
Windstorm        1  1 
Total 61 14 44 3 20 14 11 59 31 257 
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Table 56: Australian disaster inquiry by jurisdictions over time 
 Federal ACT NSW NT QLD SA Tas VIC WA Total 
1886   1       1 
1887   1       1 
1901   1       1 
1902        1  1 
1903   2       2 
1909        1  1 
1913       1   1 
1922     1     1 
1923 1         1 
1925     1     1 
1926   1       1 
1927   1       1 
1937        1  1 
1939        1  1 
1944        1  1 
1956     1     1 
1957   1       1 
1961         1 1 
1964 1         1 
1967       1   1 
1968        1  1 
1971   1     1  2 
1973        1  1 
1974    1      1 
1977 1       1  2 
1978   1       1 
1979 1     1    2 
1983   1   2  2  5 
1984 2       1  3 
1985      1   1 2 
1986 1 1        2 
1987 1         1 
1988  1        1 
1989 1  1  1     3 
1991  1 1       2 
1992  1 1       2 
1993  1   1  1   3 
1994 1 1 1  1  1 1 1 7 
1995  1        1 
1996   2       2 
1997        1  1 
1998 2  1       3 
1999 1       2  3 
2000 3  2  1   1  7 
2001   5      1 6 
2002 1  2     2  5 
2003 5 3 2   1 1 2 1 15 
2004   3  1   1 3 8 
2005 4  3   1  3  11 
2006 1 1 2  1   2 1 8 
2007 2    2 2 1 2 1 10 
2008 5 1   1 3  5  15 
2009 3 1 2  1  2 2 4 15 
2010 4   1    3 3 11 
2011 6  1  2 1 1 6 4 21 
2012 3   1 2   9 7 22 
2013 8 1 2  3 2 2 4 3 25 
2014 3  2     1  6 
Total 61 14 44 3 20 14 11 59 31 257 
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Table 57: Australian disaster inquiry by inquiry type over time 
 Agency Audit Coronial Governments Independent Parliamentary 
Royal 
Commission Total 
1886       1 1 
1887       1 1 
1901       1 1 
1902       1 1 
1903       2 2 
1909   1     1 
1913       1 1 
1922       1 1 
1923       1 1 
1925       1 1 
1926       1 1 
1927       1 1 
1937       1 1 
1939       1 1 
1944       1 1 
1956       1 1 
1957     1   1 
1961       1 1 
1964       1 1 
1967    1    1 
1968      1  1 
1971 1      1 2 
1973      1  1 
1974     1   1 
1977     1 1  2 
1978     1   1 
1979      2  2 
1983 3  1  1   5 
1984     1 2  3 
1985     2   2 
1986      2  2 
1987     1   1 
1988     1   1 
1989     1 2  3 
1991     1 1  2 
1992     1 1  2 
1993     3   3 
1994     4 3  7 
1995     1   1 
1996  1 1     2 
1997   1     1 
1998  1   1 1  3 
1999 1     1 1 3 
2000 1 1 1  2 2  7 
2001  2 1  1 2  6 
2002  1 2 1  1  5 
2003 1 6 2  4 2  15 
2004 1 3 2   2  8 
2005 2 3  2 3 1  11 
2006 1 1 2  1 3  8 
2007  1 3 1 3 1  9 
2008 4 3 1  2 4 1 15 
2009 4 4 3 1 3   15 
2010 1 3 2  3 1 1 11 
2011 5 2   6 8  21 
2012 11 1 2  4 4  22 
2013 4 9 2 1 4 5  25 
2014  1 1  3 1  6 
Total 40 43 28 7 61 55 22 256 
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Table 58: Australian disaster inquiry by hazard type over time 
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1886          1    1 
1887          1    1 
1901          1    1 
1902          1    1 
1903          2    2 
1909          1    1 
1913          1    1 
1922          1    1 
1923          1    1 
1925          1    1 
1926          1    1 
1927   1           1 
1937          1    1 
1939   1           1 
1944   1           1 
1956          1    1 
1957      1        1 
1961   1           1 
1964          1    1 
1967   1           1 
1968     1         1 
1971      1    1    2 
1973      1        1 
1974   1           1 
1977   1  1         2 
1978     1         1 
1979  1   1         2 
1983 1  4           5 
1984   3           3 
1985 1  1           2 
1986     1     1    2 
1987          1    1 
1988 1             1 
1989 1    1     1    3 
1991 2             2 
1992 2             2 
1993 2  1           3 
1994 1  5  1         7 
1995   1           1 
1996   1  1         2 
1997     1         1 
1998  1 1       1    3 
1999   1       2    3 
2000 1 1 2   1  1  1    7 
2001 1  2  1    1 1    6 
2002 1 1 2       1    5 
2003 5 2 6     2      15 
2004 2 2 4           8 
2005 3  4   1 1   1  1  11 
2006 2 2 2  1       1  8 
2007 2 1 4 1      1 1   10 
2008 6 2 3  1   2     1 15 
2009 6  5  1 1 1   1    15 
2010 4  4     2 1     11 
2011 5  8  3 2  2  1    21 
2012 5  7  2 5  1  2    22 
2013 11 1 6  1 4    2    25 
2014 2  3       1    6 
Total 67 14 87 1 19 17 2 10 2 34 1 2 1 257 
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Appendix C: Top 5 most frequently mentioned data related keyword 
Australian disaster inquiries 
Table 59: Data related keyword mention count for Australian disaster inquiries flagged by word frequency analysis. 
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1939 (Victoria) Royal Commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to prevent the bush fires of 
January, 1939 and to protect life and property and the measures to be taken to prevent bush fires in Victoria and 
to protect life and property in the event of future bush fires, L.E.B. Stretton.      4                
1944 (Victoria) Royal Commission to Inquire into the Place of Origin and the Causes of the Fires which 
Commenced at Yallourn on the 14th day of February, 1944, the Adequacy of the Measures which had been taken 
to Prevent Damage and the Measures to be taken to Protect the Undertaking and Township at Yallourn, L.E.B. 
Stretton.           4           
1984 (Victoria) Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on bushfire preparedness in Victoria, Australia, 
following the Ash Wednesday fires 16 February 1983 – Inquiries following 2002–2003 bushfires, S.I. Miller et al.          2           
1999 (Victoria) The Esso Longford Gas Plant Accident: Report of the Longford Royal Commission, D. Dawson and 
B. J. Brooks       5  3            
2000 (Federal) Commonwealth Emergency Management Arrangements, Australian National Audit Office        4            5 
2001 (New South Wales) Inquiry into the Fire at Mt Ku-Ring-Gai Chase National Park, J. Stevenson, NSW State 
Coroner’s Office                   2  
2001 (New South Wales) Readiness to Respond - 2001 Reports (Inquiry into the Ambulance Service), New South 
Wales Audit Office 3                    
2002 (Federal) Natural Disasters in Australia: Reforming mitigation, relief and recovery arrangements, Council of 
Australian Governments          1           
2002 (New South Wales) Managing Animal Disease Emergencies, New South Wales Audit Office                3     
2003 (New South Wales) Implementing the Ovine Johne’s Disease Program - 2003 Reports, New South Wales 
Audit Office                4     
2003 (ACT) Emergency Services, J.L. Benton, ACT Auditor Generals office          3           
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2005 (Federal) National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management.  , S. Ellis et al.        3             
2004 (New South Wales) Fire Services Funding (Inquiry), M. Brown et al. NSW Legislative Assembly               3      
2004 (Victoria) Beating the Bugs: Protecting Victoria’s Economically Significant Crops from Pests and Diseases , 
J.W. Cameron Auditor General of Victoria                5     
2005 (Federal) Review of Australia’s Ability to Respond to and Recover From Catastrophic Disasters, Australian 
Emergency Management Committee             5  4      
2005 (Federal) Tsunamis – Does anyone have to die?, Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation 
Council         5      5     3 
2006 (New South Wales) Inquiry into Managing Animal and Plant Diseases, N. Hay et al. NSW Legislative 
Assembly                2     
2006 (ACT) The Canberra Firestorm: Inquests and Inquiry into Four Deaths and Four Fires between 8 and 18 
January 2003 Volume 1 & Volume 2, M. Doogan, ACT Coroner’s Court                 2    
2007 (Queensland) Inquest into the Lockhart River air crash, M. Barnes, Queensland State Coroner     2 1   1            
2007 (Tasmania) Tasmanian Medical Retrieval Services External Review, P. Sharley     1                
2008 (Federal) Inquiry into climate change and environmental impacts on coastal communities, J. George et al. 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia              3       
2008 (Federal) Inquiry into the Administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and related matters, 
G. Sterle, Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee     3 5               
2008 (Victoria) Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, J. 
Pandazopoulos, et al. Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural Resources Committee        2             
2008 (Victoria) Westpoint Chemical Fire Community Report, Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner  3                   
2008 (Victoria) Biosecurity Incidents: Planning and Risk Management for Livestock Diseases, D.D.R. Pearson 
Auditor General Victoria                1     
2009 (Western Australia) Record of Investigation into Death (2007 Boorabin fires), A.N. Hope, State Coroner       2     2 4        
2009 (Tasmania) Record of Investigation into a Fire at the Myer Store at 98-108 Liverpool Street, Hobart, on 22 
September 2007, C.P. Webster, Coroner       1              
2009 (Federal) Recommendations on the Role of AEMO and the Effectiveness of Current Gas and Electricity 
Emergency Arrangements, Energy Security Working Group of the Ministerial Council on Energy         2     5       
2009 (Federal) Business Continuity Management and Emergency Management in Centrelink, Australian National 
Audit Office 1                    
2009 (ACT) Delivery of Ambulance Services to the ACT Community, T. Pham ACT Auditor-General 5         5           
2009 (Victoria) Operational debrief report 2008/09 fire season, J. Fox and W. Major                   3  
2009 (Tasmania) Beaconsfield Mine Disaster Coronial Inquest, R. Chandler, Tasmania Coroner     5                
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2009 (Western Australia) Bridgetown Complex Post Incident Analysis, Department of Environment and 
Conservation                 3  5  
2010 (Western Australia) Major Incident Review of Toodyay Fire December 2009, P. Murphy   1     1         1 4   
2010 (Western Australia) A Review of the Ability of the Department of Environment and Conservation Western 
Australia to Manage Major Fires, E. Ferguson   2     5             
2011 (Western Australia) Shared Responsibility: The Report of the Perth Hills Bushfire February 2011 Review. , 
M.J. Keelty              4       
2011 (Victoria) Towards a More Disaster Resilient Victoria: Green Paper Options and Issues, Government of 
Victoria    5                 
2011 (Western Australia) Inquiry into the 2011 Kimberley Ultramarathon. Parliament of Western Australia, M.D. 
Nahan et al.    2                 
2011 (Federal) Joint Select Committee on the Christmas Island Tragedy of 15 December 2010, G. Marshall et al.           2          
2011 (Victoria) Review of the February 2011 Tostaree Fire, Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner  5                   
2011 (Victoria) TriTech Lubricants factory fire, Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner  4                   
2011 (Victoria) 2011 Review of Community Bushfire Warnings, Molino Stewart Pty Ltd  2                5   
2011 (Tasmania) Bushfire Management, H.M. Blake, Tasmania Auditor General                   4  
2012 (Federal) Review of the Bureau of Meteorology’s extreme weather and seasonal forecasting capacity, C. 
Munro   3 4       3 1 3  2     1 
2012 (Federal) Barriers to Effective Climate Change Adaptation, W. Craik et al. Productivity Commission         4     2       
2012 (Queensland) Inquest into the deaths caused by the South-East Queensland floods of January 2011, M. 
Barnes, Queensland State Coroner           4          
2012 (Victoria) North East Victoria Flood Review, Molino Stewart Pty Ltd             1     2   
2012 (Victoria) Gippsland Flood Event – Review of Flood Warnings and Information Systems, Office of the 
Emergency Services Commissioner  1           2     1  4 
2012 (Victoria) Westmeadows Grassfire, J. Dalton Department of Sustainability and Environment      4           4 3 1  
2012 (Victoria) Fire Management at Landfill Sites, I.R.S. Services       3              
2012 (Victoria) 2011/12 Post Bushfire Season Review Report, Fire Services Commissioner Victoria et al.   4                  
2010 (Western Australia) Coronial inquest into 2010 Christmas Island boat disaster or SIEV 221, A. N. Hope, 
Western Australia State Coroner           1          
2000 (NSW) Inquest into the event of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race, J. Abernethy            4         
2012 (Western Australia) Post Incident Analysis for Blackwood Fire 11, P. Heazlewood et al.   5         5         
2013 (Federal) Recent trends in and preparedness for extreme weather events, S. Birmingham et al.           5   1      2 
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2013 (Federal) Aviation Accident Investigations (Pel-air), B. Heffernan et al.       4              
2013 (Federal) Spectrum for public safety mobile broadband, R. McClelland 2   1  3      3         
2013 (Federal) Inquiry to learn lessons from Warrnambool exchange fire, Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy    3                 
2013 (Federal) The Preparation and Delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland and 
Victoria, I. McPhee ACT Auditor-General 4                    
2013 (Victoria) Report into the Harrietville Fire, M. Hallowes Victoria Emergency Services Commissioner      2           5    
2013 (South Australia) Review of the Fire and Emergency Services Act 2005, P. Holloway               1      
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Appendix D: Key examples of data uptake 
and concerns from Australian disaster 
inquiries 
1939 (Victoria) Royal Commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to 
prevent the bush fires of January, 1939 and to protect life and property and the measures to be 
taken to prevent bush fires in V ictoria and to protect life and property in the event of future 
bush fires, L.E.B. Stretton 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include aerial visual surveillance and 
ground based fire look-out towers. 
 Examples of data concerns include availability, repeatability, redundancy and timeliness 
o p.30 The use of the aeroplane in Victoria, there being an entirely insufficient 
installation of look-out towers, has been general… But it is suggested that the 
use has been too restricted and could be valuable only if fires were to break out 
according to time-table. In the immediate past, on days of fire danger, the 
aeroplane has made a circuit of very wide range. It has, in its circuit, passed 
over location "A" at 10 a.m., has quickly passed out of vision range of "A," and 
has not returned until next day or the fire danger day. If firebreaks out at "A" at 
10.10 a.m., it may he detected by some other means ; it will not be detected by 
the aeroplane observer. The system of aeroplane observation should consist of a 
network operation by one or more machines. The aeroplane should carry a 
transmitting wireless set and the ground patrol or other ground body a receiving 
set. 
 
1984 (Victoria) Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on bushfire preparedness in 
Victoria, Australia, following the Ash Wednesday fires 16 February 1983 – Inquiries following 
2002–2003 bushfires, S.I. Miller et al. 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather forecast, weather 
warnings and satellite vegetation mapping. 
 Examples of data concerns include optimisation, more monitoring, dissemination and 
reliability 
o P. 133 Optimisation of existing meteorological capability to provide most 
effective warning. 
o P.133 Monitoring of seasonal fire danger developments. Utilisation of Landsat 
(satellite) monitoring, and similar systems, to provide progressive fire—related 
information on state of vegetation. 
o P.75 There needs to be a marked improvement generally in the systems and 
procedures used for gathering and disseminating information, particularly 
during disaster operations and during recovery. 
o P.75 As far as possible, warning and information systems need to be 
independent of normal power supplies, since the latter are prone to failure in 
fire situations. Thus, for example, sirens or similar devices driven by batteries 
or compressed air should be used to convey warning messages. 
 
2000 (NSW) Inquest into the event of the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race, J. 
Abernethy 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather forecast and weather 
warnings 
 Examples of data concerns include awareness and lack of knowledge  
o P214 like many other crews in the fleet, did not know the BOM's rule that gusts 
may be 40% stronger than the forecast wind speeds and wave heights may be 
86% or more higher than forecast(ie, rogue waves). 
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2001 (New South Wales) Inquiry into the Fire at Mt Ku-Ring-Gai Chase National Park, J. 
Stevenson, NSW State Coroner’s Office 
 Examples of data concerns include availability of maps in the field 
o Rec 6 That a full briefing be carried out with all persons who are to undertake a 
prescribed burn. 
 
2001 (New South Wales) Readiness to Respond - 2001 Reports (Inquiry into the 
Ambulance Service), New South Wales Audit Office 
 Examples of data concerns include uptake, reliability, effective use and culture 
o P11 overall response time improvement will only be realised when the 
information available from the AmbCAD system is used 
o P25 …hurdles yet to be overcome concerning data reliability and effective use 
of information, once produced.  
o P64 information-driven culture does not depend solely on the availability of 
suitable information. It also requires a commitment by managers at all levels to 
use information to improve the business, and to be pro-active in improving the 
quality and application of the management information itself. 
 
2005 (Federal) National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management.  , S. Ellis et al. 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include satellite hotspots, fire scar 
mapping. 
 Examples of data concerns include consistency and funding 
o Pxiii There has been good progress towards nationally consistent, widely 
available data and information in some arenas, but anomalies and gaps remain. 
These include a national program of fire regime mapping 
o Rec 5.2 - The Inquiry recommends that the Australian Government and the 
state and territory governments jointly provide additional resources and work in 
partnership to establish and refine a national program of fire regime mapping. 
 
2004 (Victoria) Beating the Bugs: Protecting Victoria’s Economically Significant Crops 
from Pests and Diseases , J.W. Cameron Auditor General of Victoria 
 Examples of data concerns include flexibility and availability 
o P6 surveillance activity for threats not known to occur in Victoria is very 
limited 
 
2005 (Federal) Tsunamis – Does anyone have to die?, Prime Minister’s Science, 
Engineering and Innovation Council 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include seismometers and satellite 
positioning 
 Examples of data concerns include timeliness  
o P21 Because this information was not available sooner, news reports were the 
first confirmation seismologists had that the earthquake was massive enough to 
generate a tsunami 
 
2006 (ACT) The Canberra Firestorm: Inquests and Inquiry into Four Deaths and Four Fires 
between 8 and 18 January 2003 Volume 1 & Volume 2, M. Doogan, ACT Coroner’s Court 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include aerial linescan, aerial 
photography, multispectral imagery 
o V1 P189 This data was collected by an aircraft with appropriate instruments, 
and effectively combined an aerial photograph with a digital image taken with 
an infra-red camera. This imagery provided Mr McRae with information as to 
the size, location and perimeter of the various ACT fires 
 Examples of data concerns include accuracy, scalability and consistency  
o V1 P108 fire at Mount Gingera was not accurately plotted 
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o V2 352 ...as fire activity intensified in the early afternoon, it became 
increasingly difficult to get reliable information about the position of the 
various fire fronts. Although information was radioed in by firefighters in the 
field, he said that it was difficult to build a coherent view of the fire front 
2008 (Victoria) Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires 
in Victoria, J. Pandazopoulos, et al. Victorian Parliamentary Environment and Natural 
Resources Committee 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include satellite imagery 
 Examples of data concerns include maturity and cost 
o P158 while remote sensing technology has significant potential, it had yet to be 
fully proven 
o P159 the technology is not yet cost-effective 
2009 (Western Australia) Record of Investigation into Death (2007 Boorabin fires), A.N. 
Hope, State Coroner 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather forecast 
 Examples of data concerns include not relied upon  
o P9 In the context of the nature and reliability of the information provided by the 
Bureau of Meteorology, the fact that the significant wind change information 
contained in these spot forecasts appears not to have been relied upon at all by 
the DEC Incident Management Team responsible for fire safety on 30 
December 2007 is remarkable.  
o P56 RI recommend that to the extent it has not already done so, DEC take 
action to ensure that in future cases relevant weather forecast information, 
particularly information as to significant wind changes, is promptly transmitted 
through the Incident Management Team and made available to persons with 
field operation responsibility. 
2009 (Tasmania) Record of Investigation into a Fire at the Myer Store at 98-108 Liverpool 
Street, Hobart, on 22 September 2007, C.P. Webster, Coroner 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include thermal camera 
 Examples of data concerns include data used too late and training 
o P32 …failed to use the thermal imaging camera in a timely manner. 
o P32 …inadequate training with the use of thermal imagining cameras. 
 
2009 (Victoria) Operational debrief report 2008/09 fire season, J. Fox and W. Major 
 Examples of data concerns include availability, quality, extent of detail  
o P23 many complaints about the availability and quality of maps, as well as the 
extent of detail (too much or too little) 
o P23 no operating manual to guide external mappers / GIS operators 
 
2009 (Western Australia) Bridgetown Complex Post Incident Analysis, Department of 
Environment and Conservation 
 Examples of data concerns include cleaned of extraneous information 
o P37 An aviation map that is ‘cleaned’ or extraneous information would be of 
benefit to air crew. 
 
2010 (Western Australia) Major Incident Review of Toodyay Fire December 2009, P. 
Murphy 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather forecast and fire weather 
warnings 
o P3 BoM provided the emergency services briefing (ESB) with predicted severe 
to catastrophic conditions across a number of fire weather districts. All relevant 
regions were placed on high alert and local arrangements were assessed for 
readiness. 
 Examples of data concerns include information flow to decision makers, accurate, 
timeliness, lack of situational awareness 
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o Piv … the poor passage of information through the chain of command, 
particularly from the fire ground to the IMT, is endemic to all rural fire services 
in Australia. Similarly in Toodyay, there was a lack of appreciation of the 
importance of information and the integrity of the chain of command. This 
meant that decision makers did not always have accurate and up-to-date 
information. 
o P17 a general lack of situational awareness in the IMT and higher levels of 
command 
 
2011 (Victoria) Towards a More Disaster Resilient Victoria: Green Paper Options and 
Issues, Government of Victoria 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include satellite flood perimeters 
 Examples of data concerns include right information, right form, right time, 
consistency, rigor, accuracy, timeliness, fitness for purpose, common boundaries, tust, 
uptake, rumours and misinformation 
o P34 Access to the right information, in the right form, at the right time is 
critical to coordinated operations and effective decision-making. Currently, a 
wide variety of assessment material is produced across government and through 
different control and coordination centres that lacks consistency and rigor, 
reducing its value to decision-makers. Government also needs accurate and 
timely impact assessments to plan both short- and long-term recovery. At 
present, the way in which this information is collected and collated makes it 
difficult for State and local government to respond effectively to community 
needs. 
o P34 Common boundaries have the benefit of bringing agency representatives 
together at various forums, which enables networking, and building important 
relationships and trust required for effective joint-agency planning, response 
and recovery. 
o P43 New technologies – online and mobile media are now well established as 
significant tools for public communication among communities and emergency 
response agencies. Agencies need to harness technology, including social media 
effectively, to provide official warnings. They also need to manage the 
challenge of information being disseminated ahead of or in conflict with 
authorised information. In other words, governments need to keep people 
informed while avoiding the spread of misinformation. 
 
2011 (Western Australia) Inquiry into the 2011 Kimberley Ultramarathon. Parliament of 
Western Australia, M.D. Nahan et al. 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include satellite hotspots 
o P66 Hotspots used by Park Managers 4-5 times per days Mr Michael Bass “One 
of the best means available for us for monitoring the outbreak and movement of 
fires on the property is by satellite imagery which I monitor regularly, on 
average every few hours 
 Examples of data concerns include cost, errors of omission and errors of commission 
o P283 The Terra MODIS instrument was one of the first satellites to constantly 
broadcast data for anyone with the right equipment and software to download, 
free of charge. 
o P285 Accuracy is a two sided question between errors of omission and errors of 
commission. SRSS are unable to make a categorical statement that SRSS fire 
hotspots are more “accurate” than M14, even in the north of Australia. Given 
the increased sensitivity, SRSS’s proprietary algorithm will report more fire 
o hotspots than M14. 
 
2011 (Federal) Joint Select Committee on the Christmas Island Tragedy of 15 December 
2010, G. Marshall et al. 
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 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include ground based RADAR and 
satellite RADAR 
 Examples of data concerns include detection without identification and accuracy 
o P9 Simply detecting an object with the radar is not sufficient to identify it as a 
small boat. 
o P71 it became evident that the current surveillance and monitoring protocols for 
detecting and intercepting Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SIEVs) is not fool 
proof. 
2011 (Victoria) Review of the February 2011 Tostaree Fire, Office of the Emergency 
Services Commissioner 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include fire modelling 
 Examples of data concerns include timeliness, relevance, clarity of message, 
consistency, interoperability accuracy, responsive, lack of a manual, technical means of 
filtering/triaging inputs and tailored. 
o P6 review found some issues with the timeliness, relevance and clarity of 
messages across all warning systems 
o P31 R11. The Fire Services introduce systems, procedures and operational 
training that promote information sharing and consistent situational awareness 
at every level, including to and from the fireground. This should include 
agencies such as police members on duty at roadblocks. 
o P31 The interoperability of different technologies continues to be problematic. 
The suite of technologies available at the state level need to be better integrated 
across agency functions to improve the way they are accessed and used (for 
example, fire mapping and modelling). Difficulties associated with different 
technologies also need to be resolved so that they are accurate and responsive to 
the potential needs of users. 
o P31 The capacity of the Phoenix Rapidfire tool and other systems to produce 
intelligence and modelling accurately and quickly is compromised by the lack 
of a manual or technical means of filtering and triaging inputs.  
o p38 Information Officers need to be highly skilled in those areas, and in the 
development of relevant, timely and tailored information 
o P41 Rec 17. The Fire Services evaluate the new information and warning 
systems to identify ways to integrate them and improve their capacity to issue 
timely, relevant and tailored messages. This should include the use of social 
media. 
 
2011 (Tasmania) Bushfire Management, H.M. Blake, Tasmania Auditor General 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include fire regime mapping 
 Examples of data concerns include national coordinated 
o Progress on previous recommendations: 
 COAG 2004 recommendation 5.2 ... that the Australian Government 
and the state and territory governments jointly provide additional 
resources and work in partnership to establish and refine a national 
program of fire regime mapping. 
 State entities were not aware of any nationally coordinated program or 
of any national progress against this criterion. 
 Our assessment: 25 per cent implementation. 
 
2012 (Federal) Review of the Bureau of Meteorology’s extreme weather and seasonal 
forecasting capacity, C. Munro 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather forecast and weather 
warnings. 
 Examples of data concerns include quality, timeliness, frequency, accessibility, 
presentation and trust 
o P11 Bureau’s extreme weather services met their needs in terms of quality, 
timeliness, frequency, accessibility and presentation 
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o P30 Senior regional staff have developed trusted relationships with their 
counterparts in the state emergency services and have built up extensive local 
knowledge over many years. Their contextual knowledge is seen as critical to 
contribute to effective decision-making. 
2012 (Victoria) North East Victoria Flood Review, Molino Stewart Pty Ltd 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include gauges 
 Examples of data concerns include accuracy, timeliness, coverage and reliablility. 
o P7 The Numurkah Hospital flooded before any warning had been received or 
preventative action taken. This was due largely to a combination of the 
following factors: a flood warning system that was unable to provide accurate 
and timely data - a lack of river gauges that could have enabled more reliable 
prediction 
 
2012 (Victoria) Gippsland Flood Event – Review of Flood Warnings and Information 
Systems, Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather warnings and gauges 
 Examples of data concerns include third party source, quality and timeliness, coverage 
and accessibility. 
o P15 BoM’s capacity to monitor or model floods and provide predictive 
warnings varies across Gippsland. This is because they rely on other parties for 
some information, and the nature of flood predictions or warnings depends on 
the quality and timeliness of that information. For instance, there remain a 
number of locations where BoM is unable to provide more than qualitative 
flood information, due to the low coverage or accessibility of gauges (for 
example in East Gippsland). 
 
2010 (Western Australia) Coronial inquest into 2010 Christmas Island boat disaster or 
SIEV 221, A. N. Hope, Western Australia State Coroner 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include ground based RADAR and space 
based RADAR. 
 Examples of data concerns include availability and effectiveness 
o Piv On the early morning of 15 December 2010 there was almost no 
surveillance being conducted of the ocean to the north and northwest of 
Christmas Island. 
o Pxiii There was no effective radar surveillance being conducted north of 
Christmas Island at the time when SIEV 221 arrived. 
 
2012 (Western Australia) Post Incident Analysis for Blackwood Fire 11, P. Heazlewood et 
al. 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather forecast 
 Examples of data concerns include tightening of connections between staff, experience 
and availability of experts. 
o P10 Tightening the connection between weather forecasting and decision 
making would offer opportunities for improved risk management. 
o P10 Modern forecasting models offer the prospects of more informed decisions 
but need to be interpreted by experienced meteorologists. 
o P12 Lesson 9. DEC embed an experienced forecaster in the state operations 
centre. 
 
2013 (Federal) Recent trends in and preparedness for extreme weather events, S. 
Birmingham et al. 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include weather forecast and weather 
warnings. 
 Examples of data concerns include coverage, availability and trust. 
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o P56 The Bureau of Meteorology have expanded their radar network 
considerably in recent years and are still expanding the network, but along the 
coastlines there are still gaps in coverage. 
o P58 Recommendation 1 Para 2.115 The committee recommends that the 
Commonwealth government, through the Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, 
continues to support data collection and research to improve forecasting of 
extreme weather events, especially early warning capabilities. 
o P109 However, while weather forecasting is much more accurate than in the 
past, the committee heard that people still need convincing to trust and act on 
this information.68 
 
2013 (Federal) Spectrum for public safety mobile broadband, R. McClelland 
 Examples of data concerns include availability of communications  
o P40 Even a modest sustained growth rate in data demand would impact on the 
adequacy of the ACMA's PSMB spectrum decision for PSAs' future needs. 
 
2013 (Federal) The Preparation and Delivery of the Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans 
for Queensland and Victoria, I. McPhee ACT Auditor-General 
 Examples of data concerns include timeliness, quality, omitted data, over aggregation 
and consistency. 
o P16 There was early recognition that Australian Government oversight of the 
recovery and reconstruction efforts in Queensland and Victoria was reliant on 
timely and high quality data.  
o There is also limited evidence of the Taskforce analysing the information that 
has been reported by the states or raising questions about: omitted data (in 
relation to agreed reporting metrics); overly‐aggregated data that provided 
limited transparency of actual reconstruction progress in relation to the events 
covered by the NPAs; and the consistency of the data that was provided over 
time. 
 
2013 (Victoria) Report into the Harrietville Fire, M. Hallowes Victoria Emergency 
Services Commissioner 
 Examples of data uptake, usage or awareness include aerial reconnaissance 
As noted there are many similarities between the provision of data to a fire agency which 
can be used and the data which a fire agency provides in the context of a warning. For this 
reason the following reports which are all making comments related to warnings have also been 
included. 
2008 (Victoria) Westpoint Chemical Fire Community Report, Office of the Emergency 
Services Commissioner 
 In the context of alerts, examples of data concerns include coordination, consistency, 
accuracy and timeliness 
o P6 coordination and consistency of information between/from agencies 
o P7 assist community accessing accurate and timely emergency information 
 
2011 (Victoria) TriTech Lubricants factory fire, Office of the Emergency Services 
Commissioner 
 In the context of warnings, examples of data concerns include consistency, relevant, 
timely, 24 hour availability, human error and accuracy.  
o P7 Rec 1, The Fire Services Commissioner ensures that policy, operational 
procedures, systems and training relating to information and warnings that have 
been applied to bushfires are now also applied to other emergencies. In 
particular: information and warning messages are consistent as well as relevant, 
timely and accurate; a formal arrangement is established to ensure twenty-four 
hour availability of information officers… 
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o P14 The review team estimates that the response of the correct brigades to the 
correct location was delayed by four minutes and 56 seconds. This was 
primarily due to a combination of incorrect information provided by the first 
caller and the road name (Venture Court, Dandenong South) not being included 
in the Vicmap data used by ESTA to build the ESTA CAD Map. 
 
2011 (Victoria) 2011 Review of Community Bushfire Warnings, Molino Stewart Pty Ltd 
 In the context of warnings, examples of data concerns include timeliness, accuracy, 
consistent terminology, relevant, consistent, efficiency of the system and authorising 
environment. 
o P1 The timeliness of community warnings was found to be an issue in recent 
fires. It was largely dependent on the speed and accuracy of fire intelligence 
received by ICCs. (Incident Control Centres) 
o P1 There were a few issues identified in relation to the terminology used 
including the lack of consistency of fire language between OSOM and 
FireWeb. 
o P19 speed of information received by the IMT from the fire, the efficiency of 
the warning systems (technical and non-technical) and the authorising 
environment were major determinants in the poor timing of warning messages 
during the Tostaree fire. 
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Appendix E: Consolidated concerns from Australian disaster inquiries 
Table 60: Consolidated list of concerns in Australian disaster inquiries flagged by word frequency analysis. 
Inquiry Concern(s) raised in inquiry 
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1939 (Victoria) Royal Commission to inquire into the 
causes of and measures taken to prevent the bush fires 
of January, 1939 and to protect life and property and 
the measures to be taken to prevent bush fires in 
Victoria and to protect life and property in the event of 
future bush fires, L.E.B. Stretton.  
availability, repeatability, 
redundancy and timeliness 1  1   1 1         
1984 (Victoria) Report of the Bushfire Review 
Committee on bushfire preparedness in Victoria, 
Australia, following the Ash Wednesday fires 16 
February 1983 – Inquiries following 2002–2003 
bushfires, S.I. Miller et al. 
optimisation, more monitoring, 
dissemination and reliability     1 1 1 1        
2001 (New South Wales) Inquiry into the Fire at Mt 
Ku-Ring-Gai Chase National Park, J. Stevenson, NSW 
State Coroner’s Office availability of maps in the field            1    
2001 (New South Wales) Readiness to Respond - 2001 
Reports (Inquiry into the Ambulance Service), New 
South Wales Audit Office 
uptake, reliability, effective use 
and culture     1 1     1  1   
2005 (Federal) National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation 
and Management.  , S. Ellis et al. consistency and funding 1    1           
2004 (Victoria) Beating the Bugs: Protecting Victoria’s 
Economically Significant Crops from Pests and 
Diseases , J.W. Cameron Auditor General of Victoria flexibility and availability       1       1  
2005 (Federal) Tsunamis – Does anyone have to die?, 
Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and Innovation 
Council timeliness   1             
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2006 (ACT) The Canberra Firestorm: Inquests and 
Inquiry into Four Deaths and Four Fires between 8 and 
18 January 2003 Volume 1 & Volume 2, M. Doogan, 
ACT Coroner’s Court 
accuracy, scalability and 
consistency 1 1    1          
2008 (Victoria) Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land 
Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria, J. 
Pandazopoulos, et al. Victorian Parliamentary 
Environment and Natural Resources Committee maturity and cost 1    1           
2008 (Victoria) Westpoint Chemical Fire Community 
Report, Office of the Emergency Services 
Commissioner 
coordination, consistency, 
accuracy and timeliness 1 1 1  1           
2009 (Western Australia) Record of Investigation into 
Death (2007 Boorabin fires), A.N. Hope, State Coroner not relied upon          1       
2009 (Tasmania) Record of Investigation into a Fire at 
the Myer Store at 98-108 Liverpool Street, Hobart, on 
22 September 2007, C.P. Webster, Coroner data used too late and training          1 1     
2009 (Victoria) Operational debrief report 2008/09 fire 
season, J. Fox and W. Major 
availability, quality, extent of 
detail  1  1   1         
2009 (Western Australia) Bridgetown Complex Post 
Incident Analysis, Department of Environment and 
Conservation 
cleaned of extraneous 
information 1               
2010 (Western Australia) Major Incident Review of 
Toodyay Fire December 2009, P. Murphy 
information flow to decision 
makers, accurate, timeliness, lack 
of situational awareness 1 1 1        1     
2011 (Victoria) Towards a More Disaster Resilient 
Victoria: Green Paper Options and Issues, Government 
of Victoria 
right information, right form, 
right time, consistency, rigor, 
accuracy, timeliness, fitness for 
purpose, common boundaries, 
trust, uptake, rumours and 
misinformation 3 1 2 2    1 3    1   
2011 (Western Australia) Inquiry into the 2011 
Kimberley Ultramarathon. Parliament of Western 
Australia, M.D. Nahan et al. 
cost, errors of omission and 
errors of commission  2   1           
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2011 (Federal) Joint Select Committee on the 
Christmas Island Tragedy of 15 December 2010, G. 
Marshall et al. 
detection without identification 
and accuracy  1  1            
2011 (Victoria) Review of the February 2011 Tostaree 
Fire, Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner 
timeliness, relevance, clarity of 
message, consistency, 
interoperability, accuracy, 
responsive, lack of a manual, 
technical means of 
filtering/triaging inputs and 
tailored 3 1 2 2    1      1  
2011 (Victoria) TriTech Lubricants factory fire, Office 
of the Emergency Services Commissioner 
consistency, relevant, timely, 24 
hour availability, human error 
and accuracy 1 2 1 1  1          
2011 (Victoria) 2011 Review of Community Bushfire 
Warnings, Molino Stewart Pty Ltd 
timeliness, accuracy, consistent 
terminology, relevant, consistent, 
efficiency of the system and 
authorising environment 3 1 1 1       1     
2011 (Tasmania) Bushfire Management, H.M. Blake, 
Tasmania Auditor General national coordinated     1           
2012 (Federal) Review of the Bureau of Meteorology’s 
extreme weather and seasonal forecasting capacity, C. 
Munro 
quality, timeliness, frequency, 
accessibility, presentation and 
trust  1 1    1 1 1   1    
2012 (Victoria) North East Victoria Flood Review, 
Molino Stewart Pty Ltd 
accuracy, timeliness, coverage 
and reliability  1 1 1  1          
2012 (Victoria) Gippsland Flood Event – Review of 
Flood Warnings and Information Systems, Office of the 
Emergency Services Commissioner 
third party source, quality and 
timeliness, coverage and 
accessibility  1 1 1        1   1 
2010 (Western Australia) Coronial inquest into 2010 
Christmas Island boat disaster or SIEV 221, A. N. 
Hope, Western Australia State Coroner availability and effectiveness     1  1         
2000 (NSW) Inquest into the event of the 1998 Sydney 
to Hobart Yacht Race, J. Abernethy awareness and lack of knowledge 1         1      
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2012 (Western Australia) Post Incident Analysis for 
Blackwood Fire 11, P. Heazlewood et al. 
tightening of connections 
between staff, experience and 
availability of experts 1         2      
2013 (Federal) Recent trends in and preparedness for 
extreme weather events, S. Birmingham et al. coverage, availability and trust    1   1  1       
2013 (Federal) Spectrum for public safety mobile 
broadband, R. McClelland availability of communications       1          
2013 (Federal) The Preparation and Delivery of the 
Natural Disaster Recovery Work Plans for Queensland 
and Victoria, I. McPhee ACT Auditor-General 
timeliness, quality, omitted data, 
over aggregation and consistency 1 1 1     2        
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Appendix F: Sensor data in disaster 
decision making web survey  
Information sheet 
 
Interest in the use of sensor data from space-based, airborne and ground platforms 
to support emergency management decisions has increased substantially in recent years. 
This includes information such as the weather forecast, satellite derived fire hotspots, 
thermal line scans and geolocated photos from social media. At the same time, there 
remains limited understanding of how much data producers and value adders can tailor 
data products for emergency management and what information would be of most value 
to end-users. The Fenner School of Environment and Society from the Australian 
National University in collaboration with Geoscience Australia, the Cooperative 
Research Centre for Spatial Information and the Bushfire & Natural Hazards 
Cooperative Research Centre are currently conducting and funding research to address 
such gaps in understanding. 
The relevance and validity of the research will be improved by the participation of 
those involved in the emergency management, policy and data sectors. We invite you to 
contribute to this research through completion of the on-line survey which will ask you 
to share your opinions and experiences regarding the use and usefulness of sensor data 
from satellites, planes and ground based sensors, including social media, for supporting 
emergency management decision-making. A formal background in or understanding of 
data is not required to participate in the survey. 
It is expected that the survey will take around 15 minutes to complete. All 
responses will remain strictly confidential. Summary survey results will be made 
available to all interested respondents. 
Your participation  
Your participation in the survey is voluntary. Submission of the completed web-survey 
will indicate your consent to participate. Once you have commenced the survey you are 
entitled to skip any questions you would prefer not to answer, or you can withdraw 
simply by not clicking on the ‘submit survey’ Tab on the final page of the survey. You 
will be able to withdraw from participation once the survey is submitted by contacting 
the primary researcher. To maintain your confidentiality, as far as the law allows, all 
survey responses will be coded and any identifying material will be stored separately 
from survey responses. 
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Use of the data 
Information gathered during this research will be analysed by the researchers and 
presented in the scientific literature to inform those interested in the use and value of 
data products to the emergency management sector. In addition this ANU research will 
contribute towards the PhD of the primary researcher and will be published as part of a 
PhD thesis. All publications arising from the survey will be subject to peer review and 
openly published. Individual participants will not be identified in any publication. After 
publication, the data is required to be kept securely for 5 years. 
Researchers and organisation contacts 
Professor Stephen Dovers, Dr Michael Eburn and Mr. David Hudson from the Fenner 
School of Environment and Society, Australian National University; and Dr Adam 
Lewis from Geoscience Australia. 
If you have any questions about this study, please contact the primary 
researcher David Hudson at david.hudson@anu.edu.au 
The ethical aspects of the research have been approved by the Australian National 
University Human Ethics Committee. If you have any issues or concerns about the 
research or the way it has been conducted please contact the researchers directly (see 
contact details above) or the ANU Human Research Ethics Office (02) 6125 3427 or 
email: human.ethics.officer@anu.edu.au 
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Survey 
1. How long have you been involved in emergency management 
(in any capacity)? 
Less than 5 years     ☐ 
Between 5-10 years     ☐ 
Greater than 10 years     ☐ 
I am not involved in emergency management ☐ 
 
2. What type of organisation are you primarily associated with? 
Federal government     ☐ 
State government     ☐ 
Local government     ☐ 
Research sector    ☐ 
Private sector     ☐ 
Non-Governmental Organisation  ☐ 
 
3. What is your age? 
Under 35 years old    ☐ 
35-49 years old    ☐ 
50-64 years old    ☐ 
65 years or older    ☐ 
 
4. Where is your current organisation located? 
Australian Capital Territory    ☐ 
New South Wales     ☐ 
Northern Territory     ☐ 
Queensland      ☐ 
South Australia     ☐ 
Tasmania      ☐ 
Victoria      ☐ 
Western Australia     ☐ 
Other (please specify) 
Please specify……………………………………………. 
 
5. My role in the data supply chain mainly involves: 
Data collection related tasks   ☐ 
Value adding existing datasets  ☐ 
User of data     ☐ 
Other (please specify) 
Please specify……………………………………………. 
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6. In your current role, do you use sensor data (data from 
satellites, planes and ground based sensors including social 
media)? 
Yes ☐   No ☐   Unsure ☐ 
 
7. Do you think sensor data should be used in emergency 
management decision making? 
Yes ☐   No ☐   Unsure ☐ 
 
8. How aware are you of the following range of sensor data 
products? 
 Never 
heard of 
it 
Heard of 
it 
Know it Used it Based a 
decision 
on it 
Weather forecast ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Weather warnings ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Stream gauge ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Flood warning ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Seismograms ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Earthquake alerts ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Satellite or aerial imagery 
(Photo like/optical) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Satellite or aerial imagery 
(RADAR) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Satellite or aerial imagery 
(Multispectral) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Imagery derived 
perimeter/extent/footprint 
information for either fire, 
flood, oil slick or landslide  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Burn intensity map ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Fuel load map ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Emergency phone calls 
(Triple zero) 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Individual social media 
message eg a twitter 
tweet 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Social media trend alert 
eg a trending keyword like 
earthquake 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Satellite positioning data 
eg GPS 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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9. What types of sensor data do you use in your current role? 
Raw data such as uncorrected satellite telemetry    ☐ 
Processed data such as corrected satellite imagery    ☐ 
Specialist data products such as wind speed/direction data feeds  ☐ 
Standard data products such as the weather forecast   ☐ 
Unsure         ☐ 
 
10. Which of the following issues do you think are relevant to the 
use of emergency management sensor data today? 
Availability of data     ☐ 
Cost of the data     ☐ 
Cost of capability development  ☐ 
Openness and licencing    ☐ 
Skills in the use of the data   ☐ 
Documentation of data products  ☐ 
Quality of data     ☐ 
Timeliness of data products   ☐ 
Trust of the data     ☐ 
Other       ☐ 
Please specify……………………………………………. 
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11. How much do you think the following factors influence the use 
of sensor data in emergency management decisions? 
 Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Highly 
important 
Unsure 
Lack of expertise and 
knowledge about sensor 
data 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Concerns about legal 
liability in using sensor 
data in decision making 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Government directives 
that limit the flexibility of 
emergency management 
decision-makers to use 
sensor data 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Sensor data and its 
development is not a 
budgetary priority in 
emergency management 
agencies  
 o o o o o o o  o 
Using sensor data creates 
difficult political issues 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Meeting community 
expectations for 
emergency 
suppression makes it 
hard to consider other 
goals and priorities 
 o o o o o o o  o 
In emergency 
management decisions 
there is not enough time 
to take account of all the 
available data including 
sensor data 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Current and emerging 
sensor data products lack 
specific relevance to 
emergency management 
decisions 
 o o o o o o o  o 
  o o o o o o o  o 
           
12. Do you have any comments regarding factors that may 
encourage or discourage the use of sensor data in emergency 
management decisions? 
Comment box: 
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13. How likely would you be to base a high consequence decision 
(eg life threatening decision) on the following dataset? 
 Not at 
all likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Highly 
likely 
Unsure 
Data collected by staff 
within your own 
organisation 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Bureau of Meteorology 
weather forecast data 
ingested and displayed in 
your organisation’s 
system 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Bureau of Meteorology 
weather forecast data 
displayed on their public 
website with commercial 
advertising 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Weather forecast data 
from a private company 
on their website 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Coarse resolution (250 
metre) satellite imagery 
from the NASA website 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Bushfire hotspots on the 
Geoscience Australia 
Sentinel system 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Bushfire hotspots 
ingested and displayed in 
your organisation’s 
system 
 o o o o o o o  o 
A single stream gauge 
measurement 
 o o o o o o o  o 
An official warning from 
the Bureau of 
Meteorology 
 o o o o o o o  o 
A university created 
satellite based fire 
perimeter map with the 
associated image 
 o o o o o o o  o 
A university created 
satellite based fire 
perimeter map without 
associated image due to 
licencing restrictions 
 o o o o o o o  o 
A government agency 
created satellite based fire 
perimeter map with the 
associated image 
 o o o o o o o  o 
A government agency 
satellite based fire 
perimeter map without 
associated image due to 
licencing restrictions 
 o o o o o o o  o 
A single tweet from twitter 
saying there is a fire at a 
location 
 o o o o o o o  o 
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An alert from a 
commercial service which 
tracks trends in social 
media 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Emergency phone calls 
(Triple zero) 
 o o o o o o o  o 
           
14. Would your answers to question 13 be different if the 
consequences were lower, eg the decision had resource 
implications, but was not life threatening? 
Yes ☐   No ☐   Unsure ☐ 
 
If you answered yes to Question 14, please describe how your answers would be 
different, would the changes be universal or just for specific datasets? 
 
Comment box: 
 
 
15. Is an emergency phone call (Triple zero) a form of sensor 
data? 
Yes ☐   No ☐   Unsure ☐ 
 
16. Is social media information a form of sensor data? 
Yes ☐   No ☐   Unsure ☐ 
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17. Which quality factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to 
inform an emergency management decision? 
 Not 
importa
nt at all  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Highly 
importan
t 
Unsure 
Accuracy of a sensor data 
product 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The speed which a data 
product is delivered to the 
user ie Timeliness 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Reliability of a data 
products eg its ability to be 
consistently reproduced  
 o o o o o o o  o 
The clarity or simplicity 
of sensor data products 
content and/or presentation 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The completeness of a 
sensor data product in 
coverage and/or 
presentation 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The time it takes to become 
familiar with how to use a 
product ie useability 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The consistency within 
one data product or across a 
time series of data products 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The description of how the 
data product was made ie 
provenance 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The product complies with 
relevant standards and 
meets predefined 
specifications  
 o o o o o o o  o 
The quantity of 
documentation which 
accompanies the product 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The interoperability of the 
data product to connect 
with your systems 
 o o o o o o o  o 
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18. Which reputational factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used 
to inform an emergency management decision? 
 Not at 
all likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Highly 
likely 
Unsure 
The mandate of the 
provider to be producing 
emergency management 
data products 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The reputation of the 
provider 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Your familiarity with the 
data provider 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The popularity of the data 
product  
 o o o o o o o  o 
The business model of 
the data product such as 
daily weather forecasts vs. a 
once off burn intensity map 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The sensor was owned 
and/or operated by your 
country ie sovereignty 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The ability to access the 
data product securely 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The security of the 
network which transported 
the data product 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Whether or not the sensor is 
civilian or defence 
operated ie dual-use 
 o o o o o o o  o 
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19. Which data policy factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data 
product being used to inform an emergency management 
decision? 
 Not at 
all likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Highly 
likely 
Unsure 
Cost of the sensor data 
product  
 o o o o o o o  o 
Access restrictions on 
the raw data which created 
the sensor data product  
 o o o o o o o  o 
Ability to publically 
disclose the source of 
the data 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Ability to publically 
release the raw data 
 o o o o o o o  o 
Restrictions on your ability 
to distribute the data ie 
copyright 
 o o o o o o o  o 
The responsibilities and 
liabilities associated with 
your use and the use of 
those to whom you 
distribute the data product  
 o o o o o o o  o 
           
20. In your opinion, what are the most important features that a 
sensor data product must have if it is going to be used in a 
decision making process? 
Comment box: 
 
 
21. Do you have any additional comments on this survey? 
Comment box: 
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Appendix G: Sensor data in disaster 
decision making web survey results 
Dates: 3/17/2014 - 6/9/2014 
How long have you been involved in emergency management (in any capacity)? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Less than 5 years 13.5% 31 
Between 5-10 years 16.6% 38 
Greater than 10 years 68.1% 156 
I am not involved in emergency management 1.7% 4 
answered question 229 
skipped question 1 
 
What type of organisation are you primarily associated with? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Federal government 12.7% 29 
State government 71.6% 164 
Local government 3.9% 9 
Research sector 1.7% 4 
Private sector 3.1% 7 
Non-Governmental Organisation 7.0% 16 
answered question 229 
skipped question 1 
 
What is your age? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Under 35 years old 15.4% 35 
35-49 years old 36.4% 83 
50-64 years old 45.6% 104 
65 years or older 2.6% 6 
answered question 228 
skipped question 2 
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Where is your current organisation located? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Australian Capital Territory 10.5% 24 
New South Wales 25.8% 59 
Northern Territory 2.6% 6 
Queensland 10.0% 23 
South Australia 12.7% 29 
Tasmania 6.1% 14 
Victoria 17.9% 41 
Western Australia 6.6% 15 
Other (please specify) 7.9% 18 
answered question 229 
skipped question 1 
Number Response Date 
Other (please 
specify) 
Categories 
1 May 30, 2014 3:26 AM Malrborough Kaikoura New Zealand 
2 May 29, 2014 4:32 AM Njgeria, Abuja  
3 May 28, 2014 11:13 PM New Zealand  
4 May 15, 2014 8:37 AM New Zealand  
5 May 13, 2014 10:34 PM New Zealand  
6 May 13, 2014 1:48 AM New Zealand  
7 May 5, 2014 12:15 AM New Zealand  
8 May 4, 2014 12:42 AM New Zealand  
9 Apr 30, 2014 4:54 AM Kenya,Africa  
10 Apr 30, 2014 4:24 AM New Zealand  
11 Apr 30, 2014 1:57 AM New Zealand  
12 Apr 30, 2014 1:46 AM Fiji  
13 Apr 30, 2014 1:33 AM New Zealand  
14 Apr 29, 2014 11:37 AM In all States except WA 
15 Apr 28, 2014 6:39 AM Kingston, Jamaica 
16 Apr 28, 2014 4:08 AM China  
17 Apr 28, 2014 3:34 AM Australia-wide  
18 Apr 21, 2014 12:32 AM National  
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My role in the data supply chain mainly involves: 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Data collection related tasks 12.0% 27 
Value adding existing datasets 9.3% 21 
User of data 61.8% 139 
Other (please specify) 16.9% 38 
answered question 225 
skipped question 5 
Number Response Date Other (please specify) Categories 
1 May 30, 2014 3:26 AM I am a General Manager of a Fire Authority 
2 May 23, 2014 5:54 AM Equally in data collection and value adding datasets 
3 May 20, 2014 6:08 AM 1 and 2 
4 May 15, 2014 8:37 AM Operational Data Management, Modelling and Analytics 
5 May 6, 2014 9:09 PM Combination of above 
6 May 6, 2014 12:23 AM Strategy 
7 May 5, 2014 12:15 AM Management, audit, facilitation, monitoring, encouraging. 
8 May 4, 2014 12:42 AM 
Director of Training NZFS & Assistant National 
commander 
9 May 3, 2014 3:12 AM Research and development 
10 May 2, 2014 7:25 AM IT 
11 May 2, 2014 6:32 AM indirectly 
12 May 1, 2014 11:44 PM Supporting data capture and analysis 
13 May 1, 2014 7:51 PM Supply training in EM 
14 May 1, 2014 11:31 AM All of the above 
15 May 1, 2014 2:28 AM contractor 
16 Apr 30, 2014 6:14 AM Initiator of data collection 
17 Apr 30, 2014 5:59 AM 
Co-ordination of meteorological data collection and 
forecast products 
18 Apr 30, 2014 4:24 AM Manager of performance information 
19 Apr 30, 2014 4:13 AM All of the above 
20 Apr 30, 2014 2:56 AM Developing data capture 
21 Apr 30, 2014 2:38 AM Standards 
22 Apr 30, 2014 2:34 AM Business owner of projects requiring spatial data 
23 Apr 30, 2014 2:34 AM 
In my role I'm trying to ensure crews operating the tankers 
have ready and in-cabin access to relevant data 
24 Apr 30, 2014 2:11 AM Procurement 
25 Apr 30, 2014 2:06 AM My role encompasses all three of these 
26 Apr 30, 2014 1:33 AM Database administrator inc. report creation 
27 Apr 30, 2014 1:32 AM 
Provision of community warnings, advice and information 
during preparedness, response and recovery. 
28 Apr 30, 2014 1:22 AM All of the above 
29 Apr 29, 2014 7:48 AM Both collection and value add 
30 Apr 29, 2014 1:05 AM Commercial data acquisition and distribution. 
31 Apr 28, 2014 11:16 PM All of the above 
32 Apr 28, 2014 10:06 PM all of the above 
33 Apr 28, 2014 11:37 AM front line data 
34 Apr 28, 2014 8:47 AM following procures which have changed as a result of data 
35 Apr 28, 2014 7:53 AM State Situation Officer: value adding and using 
36 Apr 28, 2014 3:34 AM All of the above 
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37 Apr 28, 2014 3:34 AM 
Assessing how we collect data (including what data we 
collect) and educating our end-users to use that data to help 
make operational & strategic decisions 
38 Apr 21, 2014 12:32 AM Resaerch Manager with portfolio covering al of the options 
 
In your current role, do you use sensor data (data from satellites, planes and ground based 
sensors including social media)? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 82.6% 166 
No 14.9% 30 
Unsure 2.5% 5 
answered question 201 
skipped question 29 
 
Do you think sensor data should be used in emergency management decision making? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 97.0% 197 
No 1.0% 2 
Unsure 2.0% 4 
answered question 203 
skipped question 27 
 
How aware are you of the following range of sensor data products? 
Answer Options 
Never 
heard 
of it 
Heard 
of it 
Know 
it 
Used 
it 
Based a 
decision 
off it 
Response 
Count 
Weather forecast 0 7 16 46 134 203 
Weather warnings 0 7 19 40 136 202 
Stream gauge 41 34 51 34 34 194 
Flood warning 2 19 72 48 58 199 
Seismograms 23 56 90 20 9 198 
Earthquake alerts 10 48 94 30 15 197 
Satellite or aerial imagery 
(Photo like/optical) 
0 10 27 75 91 203 
Satellite or aerial imagery 
(RADAR) 
1 22 49 62 66 200 
Satellite or aerial imagery 
(Multispectral) 
22 34 50 40 52 198 
Imagery derived 
perimeter/extent/footprint 
information for either fire, 
flood, oil slick or landslide 
11 21 42 58 68 200 
Burn intensity map 17 36 53 43 51 200 
Fuel load map 14 35 50 44 57 200 
Emergency phone calls 
(Triple zero) 
8 12 58 70 53 201 
Individual social media 
message eg a twitter tweet 
1 30 83 66 22 202 
Social media trend alert eg a 
trending keyword like 
earthquake 
12 51 83 45 8 199 
Satellite positioning data eg 
GPS 
0 4 27 72 100 203 
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answered question 203 
skipped question 27 
 
 
 
What types of sensor data do you use in your current role? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Raw data such as uncorrected satellite telemetry 14% 29 
Processed data such as corrected satellite imagery 62% 125 
Specialist data products such as wind speed/direction data 
feeds 
62% 126 
Standard data products such as the weather forecast 85% 172 
Unsure 7% 14 
answered question 202 
skipped question 28 
 
Which of the following issues do you think are relevant to the use of emergency management 
sensor data today? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Availability of data 87% 177 
Cost of the data 59% 119 
Cost of capability development 48% 98 
Openness and licencing 52% 106 
Skills in the use of the data 81% 165 
Documentation of data products 32% 65 
Quality of data 69% 139 
Timeliness of data products 84% 171 
Trust of the data 54% 109 
Other (please specify) 6% 13 
answered question 203 
skipped question 27 
    
Number Response Date Other (please specify) Categories 
1 May 13, 2014 11:37 PM Data overload, selection of most significant information 
2 May 13, 2014 10:57 PM 
Data transmission / network problems - lack of coverage, 
lack of speed and bandwidth, topography difficulties, 
emergency services are not profitable enough for 
commercial infrastructure, mobile data terminals too 
expensive and hard to retro-fit into vehicles 
3 May 13, 2014 10:39 PM Plenty of data - usually requires trusted expert analysis 
4 May 5, 2014 12:21 AM Real time data is best.  I.e. less than an hour old. 
5 May 3, 2014 3:19 AM 
Interoperability of data, especially between agencies and 
between jurisdictions 
6 Apr 30, 2014 5:01 AM Analysis of vast amounts of data under time constraints 
7 Apr 30, 2014 4:24 AM Skills in analysis and interpretation 
8 Apr 30, 2014 2:08 AM 
This should be graded as this technology is evolving and the 
decision making requires the appropriate skill set to interpret 
the data in context of the events conditional factors.  This is 
an analytical process not practiced enough with emergency 
managers not that I consider operational managers as 
‘emergency managers’ but in the field most operational 
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managers use a dynamic decision making process which 
arguably creates a risk propensity. 
9 Apr 28, 2014 5:23 AM 
The loss of services from Gov't Depts to maintain datasets 
due to budget cuts 
10 Apr 28, 2014 4:34 AM Interoperability across the EM Sectors 
11 Apr 28, 2014 3:39 AM 
getting the old school operators to respect new data sources 
suchs as socmed 
12 Apr 28, 2014 2:55 AM Ability to get the data to the front line 
13 Apr 21, 2014 12:49 AM 
Capability (people and systems) do use high-tech data 
products, at local, regional and national levels 
 
How much do you think the following factors influence the use of sensor data in emergency 
management decisions? 
Answer 
Options 
Not at all 
important    
1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Highly 
important    
7 
Unsure 
Rating 
Average 
Response 
Count 
Lack of 
expertise and 
knowledge 
about sensor 
data 
0 4 2 18 40 58 67 11 5.84 200 
Concerns about 
legal liability in 
using sensor 
data in decision 
making 
12 46 23 31 29 18 22 19 3.89 200 
Government 
directives that 
limit the 
flexibility of 
emergency 
management 
decision-
makers to use 
sensor data 
8 28 24 25 26 28 35 27 4.48 201 
Sensor data and 
its development 
is not a 
budgetary 
priority in 
emergency 
management 
agencies 
3 8 13 27 40 49 44 16 5.26 200 
Using sensor 
data creates 
difficult 
political issues 
36 48 33 19 13 14 13 21 3.11 197 
Meeting 
community 
expectations for 
emergency 
suppression 
makes it hard to 
consider other 
goals and 
priorities 
8 25 25 31 29 32 30 18 4.47 198 
In emergency 
management 
decisions there 
is not enough 
time to take 
account of all 
8 13 13 27 36 49 45 8 5.08 199 
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the available 
data including 
sensor data 
Current and 
emerging 
sensor data 
products lack 
specific 
relevance  to 
emergency 
management 
decisions 
7 32 28 35 28 26 13 29 4.04 198 
answered question 201 
skipped question 29 
 
Do you have any comments regarding factors that may encourage or discourage the use of sensor 
data in emergency management decisions? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Count 
  57 
answered question 57 
skipped question 173 
Number Response Date Response Text 
1 
May 29, 2014 
4:38 AM no 
2 
May 20, 2014 
6:12 AM Quality and accuracy of data. Disclosure of personal information. 
3 
May 18, 2014 
10:26 PM Human resources to process and interpret data 
4 
May 13, 2014 
10:57 PM 
Data availability, terminals to process it, slow speed to set-up 
specialists, impossible to get high-speed data out to remote fire 
commanders, lack of money to develop apps for portable / tablet 
terminals 
5 
May 13, 2014 
10:39 PM Trusted, known sources and analysis are best. 
6 
May 6, 2014 
5:35 AM 
The timeliness and availabillity of "sensor assets" is a huge issue in 
disasters. I have experienced this locally during a disaster where it was 
difficult to find a "go to" point of contact in government (even through 
the disaster coordination centre) who understood the range of 
capability that could be brought to bear, and then have the ability to 
coordinate and act on it. 
7 
May 6, 2014 
1:50 AM 
Lack of use and/or understanding. 
Lack of intuitiveness of social media. 
8 
May 5, 2014 
4:17 AM Speed of access, correctly geo referenced and quality assessment 
9 
May 5, 2014 
3:17 AM 
Satellite data seems to have limited coverage across south east 
Australia (eg: Sentinel Hotspots) 
10 
May 5, 2014 
12:21 AM 
I have to have teh data in a timely way to use it.  Googl maps is handy.  
Met service satellite images are better but often very broad scale.   
Scale is important to the nature of the project worked on. 
11 
May 2, 2014 
6:56 AM 
Lack of expertise and 'head space' to consider changes in service 
provision. 
12 
May 2, 2014 
1:00 AM 
Some data is either difficult to use or too time consuming to obtain.  
Also, I believe that most of the above questions are important but was 
not sure how the questions are to be interpreted... 
13 
May 1, 2014 
11:45 PM 
I agree with the statement (Q.11 of this survey) "In emergency 
management decisions there is not enough time to take account of all 
the available data including sensor data" and this is a cultural problem 
that must be addressed by my Agency.  In my Emergency Management 
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role for example, Topographic maps are essential to providing an 
effective and timely service; however, individual emergency 
responders frequently do not equip themselves with topographic maps, 
which are readily available, due to (perceived) response time targets 
and perhaps a 'hero' mentality of trying to be the first responder on 
scene. 
14 
May 1, 2014 
11:24 PM 
In my organisation this sort of data and supporting hardware is simply 
not available to assist frontline personnel 
15 
May 1, 2014 
7:54 PM 
Should be done on a national scale. Not up to individual organisations. 
Make cost effective 
16 
May 1, 2014 
11:39 AM 
People in charge who don't understand how technology can help des 
idiom making are less likely to listen advice derived from sensor data. 
17 
Apr 30, 2014 
4:24 AM 
National Security and Defence silos of sensor data limit utility in some 
instances 
18 
Apr 30, 2014 
4:20 AM 
The awareness factor is critical here. It includes the fact that users mis-
understand the products - for example few realise that radar data can be 
used in a GIS directly using WMS feeds, and that very detailed fire 
intell can be derived from it. Also BoM does not release volumetric 
products or CAPPIs to end users, impeding the intell gathering. 
 
All up the tendency is that end-users ask for what they are comfortable 
with, and providers make them comfortable with what they ask for - 
and no progress occurs. I ran a $2M Federal awareness grant in 2000 
(GeoInsight) to tackle this, and we need to do that again. 
19 
Apr 30, 2014 
4:04 AM 
There should be more of it at a cost effective price. more training is 
required across the board. better representation at fed, state and 
organisational level 
20 
Apr 30, 2014 
3:49 AM traditional / historical approaches, availability 
21 
Apr 30, 2014 
3:15 AM 
Needs to be processes to flag the mission critical information (the 
needle) in the data haystack 
22 
Apr 30, 2014 
3:01 AM 
Sometimes decisions are made at a high level based on a minimal 
scope of data steam rather than the wider picture ("Tunnel Vision"). 
This can be a negative to effective use of real time data. 
23 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:53 AM 
Agencies need to be aware of and able to access relevant data sets for 
maintaining the information picture and informing planning and public 
information operations 
24 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:40 AM 
there is never enough time or resource to review all the data - esp 
social media. Social media is primarily a predictive tool. But I’d rely 
an authoritative source before I rely on facebook or twitter 
25 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:39 AM Ability to handle big data. Ability to interpret data 
26 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:34 AM has to be user friendly 
27 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:09 AM 
the availability of more timely data in a format that can be used more 
readily than currently available will likely increase its use significantly 
28 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:08 AM 
Sensor to budgetary priority in emergency agencies should not be an 
issue.  There is enough data from events that would allow a prudent 
collective return on investment business case to be developed that 
would encompass all agencies allowing them to fund their appropriate 
needs. 
 
There is in my opinion considerable development to be had in what is 
enough time in EM decision making.  Agencies / Government have 
created a false interpretation to the community on the capability to 
respond.  Technically the first responder is the community, the 
resilience (capacity and capability) of the community is key in 
allowing appropriate time frames for EM decision making.  For the 
community to get this ‘key’ they have to understand and take 
responsibility for the hazards they are exposed to. 
 
EM at this level is ‘Governance’ and the decision making must be 
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prudent and any reference to ‘dynamic decision making’ needs to be 
removed.  Unfortunately the majority of EM’s making the decisions 
have had extensive front line operational exposure to dynamic decision 
making and I have already eluded this creates a risk propensity and is 
contextually in breach of the HSW harmonised legislation.  There are 
too many examples where EM has risked life for what? I have read 
many times in EM documents that agencies are prepared to risk life to 
save saveable life this at best is a neutral mathematical equation and 
yet this is the mindset of some EM’s. 
29 
Apr 30, 2014 
1:43 AM 
Sensor data might replace local knowledge. 
 
It could lead to centralised decision making. 
 
Delegation to the field operators may suffer. 
Getting the data to the field is a challenge. 
30 
Apr 29, 2014 
12:29 PM 
Lack of benefits of data application, and failure to provide training to 
end useres 
31 
Apr 29, 2014 
8:01 AM 
Data source information should be included in media reports and 
political statements related to progress of emergencies. 
32 
Apr 29, 2014 
6:36 AM 
Trust in the system and the higher managers to allow you to use it in 
decision making, and then defending your use if it does not prove a 
good outcome 
33 
Apr 29, 2014 
5:24 AM 
Some of the answers to question 11 don't match the question, a bit 
confusing 
34 
Apr 29, 2014 
1:09 AM 
Lack of timeliness in EOS supply chain limits utility of data in 
response phase of disaster management. 
35 
Apr 28, 2014 
11:18 PM 
Sensor data innovation is great but someone has to analyse and use it in 
a valuable way i.e. intelligence otherwise its just data. 
36 
Apr 28, 2014 
10:32 PM 
The questions phrased above can be interpenetrated differently 
depending on your level of experience in using sensor data for decision 
making processes during emergencies. For example we use flood 
warning rain gauges and flow monitoring telemetry equipment as well 
as GIS, GPS and a range of tools to to assist in giving our communities 
relevant information prior, during and after an emergency. 
37 
Apr 28, 2014 
9:58 PM 
Moving from prescriptive analytics to predictive is going to be 
increasingly important - however access to data feeds in real time, cost 
of technology platforms (particularly cross jurisdiction) will continue 
to limit our ability to utilise sensor data in this fashion. 
38 
Apr 28, 2014 
10:28 AM 
Packaging of sensor data for easy consumption by incident managers is 
a challenge.  Many incident managers are not technically literate so do 
now know how to use the data, or do not trust it. 
Accessing sensor data for L1 and L2 incidents is extremely difficult. 
39 
Apr 28, 2014 
7:59 AM 
The lack of expertise is exacerbated by the limited budgets for 
capability development 
40 
Apr 28, 2014 
7:20 AM 
Ability to integrate datasets including with our own rather than just 
rely on standalone published data. 
41 
Apr 28, 2014 
7:10 AM 
Most Important decisions are badly impacted by public servants with 
no knowledge of the real world. 
42 
Apr 28, 2014 
6:03 AM 
Time factors in dissemination of the data down through the chain of 
command may discourage the use  of data, say, in a major bushfire. 
Firefighters on the fire ground may have to make choices based on 
situational awareness rather than sensor data. 
43 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:38 AM 
Having highly trained and capable operators is essential for all use of 
sensor data. 
44 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:23 AM 
In Qu 11. I am unsure what is meant by “Meeting community 
expectations for emergency suppression makes it hard to consider other 
goals and priorities: 
 
 
 
In Qu11.  I don’t believe these items should be rated on importance 
more is it perceived as an issue low to high. 
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45 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:01 AM 
timeliness is more important that quality but data will only be trusted if 
quality is understood. 
value added products are more useful than image products but need to 
be standardised and interoperable to be useful 
46 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:01 AM 
One of the critical factors is data access and sharing between 
government agencies responding to an incident. 
47 
Apr 28, 2014 
4:34 AM 
Development of a central point of Intelligence and Mapping at the 
Regional Level to streamline Tactical/Local level operations & 
information flow AND supported by the Strategic/State level 
48 
Apr 28, 2014 
4:32 AM 
data not always readily available in "field operations" due to the lack 
of communications and data connections 
49 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:52 AM 
trust in data, timeliness of data and ability to send to others are issues 
about the use of data 
50 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:51 AM 
I my experience I cannot over emphasize that TIMELESS is the most 
critical factor for sensor data. 
 
No matter how good the sensor data is - if the emergency has passed 
before the sensor information has arrived then it is tantamount to being 
irrelevant. 
51 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:46 AM 
One of the key challenges faced by EM and IM managers is access to 
timely information and a complete suite of datasets. Foe example, 
difficult to access all layers of data for both flood and fire planning and 
modeling - area, terrain, topography and geography is good, modeling 
is hit and miss however base layers of properties, owners, mitigation 
measures et all is difficult to assemble and collate into a single tool, 
where layer can be turned on and off dependent on the risk and type of 
emergency 
52 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:39 AM 
in Q. 11 above, I could answer this very differently for the type of 
sensor data so its hard to generalise. e.g. we are huge users of 
multispectral data for fire, use it all the time, all resect it, same can't be 
said for socmed data... 
53 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:36 AM Cost and availability to volunteer organisations / non-private NGOs 
54 
Apr 28, 2014 
2:58 AM Lack of suitable data communication capability in many areas 
55 
Apr 28, 2014 
2:55 AM 
Having the tools required to access data at whatever level of the IMT it 
is required, especially in the field. 
56 
Apr 28, 2014 
2:23 AM 
people in AIIMS structures that are unaware or can not interpret 
information is a planning function inhibit the benefits of technology. 
Mobile ICV's are also not kept up to date with technology based on 
tight budgets. 
57 
Apr 21, 2014 
12:49 AM No 
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How likely would you be to base a high consequence decision (eg life threatening decision) on the 
following dataset? 
Answer Options 
Not at all 
likely 1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Highly 
likely 7 
Unsure 
Rating 
Average 
Response 
Count 
Data collected by 
staff within your 
own organisation 
2 4 3 6 25 47 96 4 6.1 187 
Bureau of 
Meteorology 
weather forecast 
data ingested and 
displayed in your 
organisation’s 
system 
3 3 2 6 33 49 88 4 6.1 188 
Bureau of 
Meteorology 
weather forecast 
data displayed on 
their public website 
with commercial 
advertising 
4 4 19 20 49 51 35 4 5.2 186 
Weather forecast 
data from a private 
company on their 
website 
18 26 26 34 45 23 4 8 3.8 184 
Coarse resolution 
(250 metre) 
satellite imagery 
from the NASA 
website 
12 21 21 29 39 29 12 24 4.2 187 
Bushfire hotspots 
on the Geoscience 
Australia Sentinel 
system 
18 14 16 18 26 44 29 20 4.6 185 
Bushfire hotspots 
ingested and 
displayed in your 
organisation’s 
system 
19 8 8 16 28 46 45 15 5.0 185 
A single stream 
gauge measurement 
23 22 28 26 16 14 10 43 3.5 182 
An official warning 
from the Bureau of 
Meteorology 
1 3 2 8 22 52 98 1 6.2 187 
A university 
created satellite 
based fire 
perimeter map with 
the associated 
image 
19 10 22 24 38 32 17 22 4.3 184 
A university 
created satellite 
based fire 
perimeter map 
without associated 
image due to 
licencing 
restrictions 
34 20 25 27 28 15 3 31 3.3 183 
A government 
agency created 
13 4 6 12 36 56 43 14 5.3 184 
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satellite based fire 
perimeter map with 
the associated 
image 
A government 
agency satellite 
based fire 
perimeter map 
without associated 
image due to 
licencing 
restrictions 
22 11 24 26 32 34 10 21 4.1 180 
A single tweet from 
twitter saying there 
is a fire at a 
location 
68 51 26 19 10 5 2 4 2.3 185 
An alert from a 
commercial service 
which tracks trends 
in social media 
30 34 41 27 29 11 3 10 3.2 185 
Emergency phone 
calls (Triple zero) 
2 4 6 12 24 50 82 7 5.9 187 
answered question 189 
skipped question 41 
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Would your answers to question 13 be different if the consequences were lower, eg the decision had 
resource implications, but was not life threatening? 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
Yes 33.7% 63 
No 52.9% 99 
Unsure 13.4% 25 
If you answered yes to Question 14, please describe how your answers would 
be different, would the changes be universal or just for specific datasets? 
35 
answered question 187 
skipped question 43 
Number Response Date 
If you answered yes to Question 14, please 
describe how your answers would be 
different, would the changes be universal 
or just for specific datasets? 
Categories 
1 
May 23, 2014 
2:37 AM 
I expect the actual decision making process would rely on the different 
data sources to very different ways based on the instinctive response you 
feel at the time. I rate a single tweet low now, but in the heat of battle, it 
might be the one thing that triggers a set of decisions in a high 
consequence environment as the individual data sources mean nothing 
without context and regardless of the research or the theories about 
recognition primed decision making, the decision will always consult 
several aspects. If the stakes are lower, the decisions might need more 
validated data to be made. 
2 
May 22, 2014 
4:59 AM 
Mor important to get it right if the situation is life threatening  
 
Answers would be different for specific datasets 
3 
May 13, 2014 
10:41 PM Trusted data quality and time important 
4 
May 6, 2014 
5:45 AM 
Answers would be different for specific datasets. Some of the datsets are 
great for "situational awareness" but you'd never rely on them for any 
more than that (i.e weather forecast data from private company on their 
website Vs data from BoM). Often you don't have the financial resources 
for such private sources but could help provide awareness. 
5 
May 5, 2014 
3:49 AM 
I would investigate all the data, collate and compare. I would probably 
do the same for a life threatening situation above, however would relly 
on the more accredited respected organisations for data. 
6 
May 2, 2014 
7:34 AM my position does not require me to make life threatening decisions 
7 
May 2, 2014 
6:58 AM 
Being certain about the identity and source of any individual/agency 
supplying data/information. 
8 
May 1, 2014 
11:51 PM 
Given the time-constraint difference between life-threatening and non-
life-threatening emergencies, data pertaining to a non-life-threatening 
emergency warrants further investigation and data analysis, to build up a 
full picture of the emergency and its associated hazards, before then 
acting on it. 
9 
May 1, 2014 
7:56 PM Stand to lose a lot then you risk a lot 
10 
May 1, 2014 
2:47 AM 
Would depend on other available systems and information and possibly 
the validation of the information from a secondary source 
11 
Apr 30, 2014 
6:18 AM 
They would be specific to the dataset - the circumstances being 
considered 
12 
Apr 30, 2014 
5:21 AM 
I would more likely to be open to universal datasets - or I would at least 
consider them. 
13 
Apr 30, 2014 
5:04 AM 
Risk evaluation ie lower impact may allow for a lower error tolerance in 
decision making and therefore encourage the use of alternate information 
sources 
14 
Apr 30, 2014 
4:32 AM 
Firstly, Q13 is incomplete, as I would have my team analysing a range of 
satellite feeds directly, and not relying on a third-party value-adder. Also 
I use, in order of preference for hotspot data, WA LandGate, Uni of 
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Maryland then GA's Sentinel. I was on the initial steering committee for 
Sentinel. 
 
Now for this question... 
 
Sensor data is just that "data". According to AIIMS 4 doctrine, it needs 
to be turned into information, and then into Intell. It is intell that does the 
decision support within an IMT. The act of developing intell has to 
account for the reliability of the source data. A non-critical decision may 
use intell based on lower quality source data. If you have the time to do 
validation, or if you have to react to an incorrect decision, then making a 
decision is better than not doing so. 
 
Finally a comment on Q17 (over the page). The use of a data source to 
support decision making, as I have said, is through a two step processing 
chain, with other data added along the way. MY answers are from this 
perspective. The topics that I have not ticked are irrelevant - you need to 
know the tool before the emergency. You will not learn about 3.9 micron 
imagery while the fire bears down on the urban edge. 
15 
Apr 30, 2014 
4:30 AM 
Life thretening raises the bar, too many decision variables to answer this 
question in depth 
16 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:56 AM More likely to make the decision. 
17 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:16 AM 
if situation not life-threatening and hence time available, would seek in 
circumstances where likelihood is low to confirm data by other means. 
18 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:14 AM 
Organisational focus is on protecting life, soif consequnece was not 
related to this, may have a different outlook 
19 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:04 AM reliability is not so relevant when lives are not at risk. 
20 
Apr 30, 2014 
1:54 AM I think you mean yes to Q14 
21 
Apr 30, 2014 
1:34 AM Generally.  
22 
Apr 29, 2014 
6:38 AM 
Time to assess, use different resources and consult or cross reference 
other data sources. Universal. 
23 
Apr 29, 2014 
5:27 AM 
I would be more inclined to make decision on other information if it 
wasn't life threatening 
24 
Apr 28, 2014 
10:01 PM 
Typically non-life threatening situations are rated as a lower priority; this 
would also be the case if the event was likely to incur substantial 
property loss without consequential threat to life. I would expect this to 
be a universal response. 
25 
Apr 28, 2014 
8:55 PM less time critical, specific datasets 
26 
Apr 28, 2014 
8:05 AM 
The timeliness of the data would be very influental so it would push 
everything to the left 
27 
Apr 28, 2014 
7:24 AM 
The LDCC would seek to verify any information that required a major 
decision. All information on social media is treated as suspect. 
28 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:51 AM Data specific, based on agency specific guidelines etc 
29 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:02 AM 
Lower consequences would make me feel more comfortable using some 
of the data sources. 
30 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:39 AM 
More preceedence can be given to single data instances 
(twitter/commercial services). 
31 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:25 AM Generally universal 
32 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:16 AM 
Life threatening decisions need to be validated by an accurate agencey 
approved system/s to add weight to your final course of action 
33 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:01 AM 
All decisions in volunteer firefighting consider the implications to life or 
property. Very often the threats to these things change your approach. 
34 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:01 AM 
Less risk may allow for a more aggressive strategy, in saying that high 
risk may only leave an aggressive strategy so very hard to quantify 
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35 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:00 AM 
My decision making is based on the reliability of the data available from 
the most apropriate sources. 
 
Is an emergency phone call (Triple zero) a form of sensor data? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 66.5% 125 
No 14.4% 27 
Unsure 19.1% 36 
answered question 188 
skipped question 42 
 
Is social media information a form of sensor data? 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 62.8% 118 
No 19.7% 37 
Unsure 17.6% 33 
answered question 188 
skipped question 42 
 
Which quality factors  affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to inform an emergency 
management decision? 
Answer Options 
Not at all 
likely 1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Highly 
likely 
7 
Unsure 
Rating 
Average 
Response 
Count 
Accuracy of a sensor data 
product 
0 0 0 3 13 40 122 0 6.58 178 
The speed which a data 
product is delivered to 
the user ie Timeliness 
0 0 0 1 18 45 113 0 6.53 177 
Reliability of a data 
products eg its ability to 
be consistently 
reproduced 
0 0 0 3 21 44 108 0 6.46 176 
The clarity or simplicity 
of sensor data products 
content and/or 
presentation 
0 1 2 8 31 66 68 0 6.06 176 
The completeness of a 
sensor data product in 
coverage and/or 
presentation 
0 1 4 16 43 67 44 2 5.73 177 
The time it takes to 
become familiar with 
how to use a product ie 
useability 
1 5 8 23 41 48 51 0 5.52 177 
The consistency of the 
data product each time it 
is delivered 
0 1 2 10 28 66 69 2 6.06 178 
The description of how 
the data product was 
made ie provenance 
3 8 17 32 28 38 33 15 5.01 174 
The product complies 
with relevant standards 
and meets predefined 
specifications 
3 6 15 12 32 55 50 3 5.48 176 
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The quantity and/or 
sufficiency of 
documentation 
2 9 14 27 50 44 28 2 5.06 176 
The interoperability of 
the data product to 
connect with your 
systems 
1 7 7 12 22 49 78 2 5.88 178 
answered question 178 
skipped question 52 
 
Which reputational factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to inform an emergency 
management decision? 
Answer Options 
Not at all 
likely 1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Highly 
likely 7 
Unsure 
Rating 
Average 
Response 
Count 
The mandate of the 
provider to be 
producing 
emergency 
management data 
products 
1 7 9 16 36 39 63 6 5.62 177 
The reputation of 
the provider 
1 1 4 9 22 67 71 2 6.06 177 
Your familiarity 
with the data 
provider 
2 5 4 24 30 60 48 2 5.58 175 
The popularity of 
the data product 
10 18 25 44 39 28 10 2 4.20 176 
The business model 
of the data product 
such as daily 
weather forecasts vs. 
a once off burn 
intensity map 
5 13 15 23 41 42 20 17 4.81 176 
The sensor was 
owned and/or 
operated by your 
country ie 
sovereignty 
18 26 11 23 30 34 25 8 4.34 175 
The ability to access 
the data product 
securely 
4 14 18 21 23 48 44 5 5.12 177 
The security of the 
network which 
transported the data 
product 
6 12 14 29 29 41 39 6 5.01 176 
Whether or not the 
sensor is civilian or 
defence operated ie 
dual-use 
20 31 16 34 19 25 17 15 3.89 177 
answered question 177 
skipped question 53 
 
Which data policy factors affect the likelihood of a sensor data product being used to inform an 
emergency management decision? 
Answer 
Options 
Not at all 
likely 1 
2 3 4 5 6 
Highly 
likely 7 
Unsure 
Rating 
Average 
Response 
Count 
Cost of the 
sensor data 
product 
8 11 9 19 30 42 56 2 5.30 177 
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Access 
restrictions on 
the raw data 
which created 
the sensor data 
product 
7 6 15 20 44 45 30 9 5.05 176 
Ability to 
publicly 
disclose the 
source of the 
data 
13 15 15 33 30 36 25 9 4.56 176 
Ability to 
publicly release 
the raw data 
14 24 21 32 30 27 22 5 4.23 175 
Restrictions on 
your ability to 
distribute the 
data ie copyright 
6 19 18 22 31 32 38 9 4.81 175 
The 
responsibilities 
and liabilities 
associated with 
your use and the 
use of those to 
whom you 
distribute the 
data product 
1 12 12 27 35 39 38 13 5.15 177 
answered question 177 
skipped question 53 
 
In your opinion, what are the most important features that a sensor data product must have if it is 
going to be used in a decision making process? 
Answer Options Response Count 
  124 
answered question 124 
skipped question 106 
Number Response Date Response Text 
1 May 29, 2014 4:47 AM Cost of data acquisition 
2 May 28, 2014 11:29 PM 
Up to Date 
 
Easily accessable 
 
In a usable format 
3 May 23, 2014 6:08 AM 
consistency, repeatability, accessibility, historical record, 
timeliness, interoperability based upon standards, credibility 
and confidence of source 
4 May 22, 2014 5:02 AM Reliability and accuracy 
5 May 20, 2014 6:33 AM 
Quality and use of data has a direct and positive outcome for 
decision making 
6 May 19, 2014 4:47 AM interoperability, high availability, reliability 
7 May 16, 2014 1:20 AM Long term availibity 
8 May 15, 2014 8:50 AM Quality, currency, accuracy 
9 May 15, 2014 6:46 AM reliable,a ccurate and able to stand up in court 
10 May 14, 2014 1:03 AM 
Quick, close to real time due to changing nature of fire, cheap 
$ and in easily transportable data format 
11 May 13, 2014 11:48 PM 
Awareness of assumptions and limitations of the product. 
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Simplicity to use 
 
Relevance to operational use 
12 May 13, 2014 10:44 PM 
Known and trusted.  Also identification of the underlying 
assumptions the data is based on. 
13 May 13, 2014 1:56 AM 
Accuracy  
 
Proven track record 
14 May 7, 2014 12:16 AM reliability - frequent, consistent date giving reliable results 
15 May 6, 2014 9:26 PM Accuracy of user end product 
16 May 6, 2014 6:00 AM Government based, timeliness, proven and reliable technology 
17 May 6, 2014 2:04 AM Accuracy and therefore reliability. 
18 May 6, 2014 12:58 AM 
Reliability, validity, information easy to digest, user friendly 
at the coal-face 
19 May 5, 2014 9:27 AM Community accessible 
20 May 5, 2014 4:22 AM 
quality, maturity of organisation producing it, pre agreed 
access and copy right details. 
21 May 5, 2014 3:53 AM Accurate, secure and proven 
22 May 5, 2014 3:23 AM 
Accuracy 
 
Reliability 
 
Relevance 
23 May 5, 2014 2:28 AM Acuracy and timeliness 
24 May 5, 2014 12:30 AM 
The sensor data will only confirm a situation which an "on the 
ball manager" already knows of or suspects due to prior 
monitoring of other fire weather or environmental attributes. 
25 May 4, 2014 12:48 AM accuracy and timliness 
26 May 3, 2014 9:06 AM 
Clear and concise information that can be quickly interpreted 
into operational decisions either strategic or on the ground.  
The information sources ideally should interoperate and 
present one or at most a few pictures from many sources as a 
decision tool to be used at any level. 
27 May 3, 2014 6:48 AM 
Ease of use, data manipulation, migration and intergration 
with existing agency systems and data. 
28 May 3, 2014 3:24 AM Timeliness, accuracy and relevance 
29 May 2, 2014 10:30 PM 
Has provenance  
 
Is endorsed by government ( any level) for use 
 
Easily accessed 
 
Simple  
 
Provides summary  
 
Has a 'what if' ability associated with the product or service 
 
Is usable across a rage of platforms including portable devices 
without massive data downloads  
 
Has a level of public accessibility for education, informed 
action and socialisation into understanding decisions made 
30 May 2, 2014 7:41 AM 
acceptance of usefulness, ability to display in an 
understandable format 
31 May 2, 2014 7:01 AM 
The ability to stand up to a legal challenge regarding making 
decisions based on the data. 
32 May 2, 2014 1:56 AM Reliability 
33 May 2, 2014 1:44 AM accuracy, credibility, timeliness, ease of use. 
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34 May 2, 2014 12:20 AM 
# Granularity of data - too much information can impede 
interpretation; vs. too little information makes it hard to make 
an informed decision. 
 
# Data products should be provided in conjunction with 
ongoing training for the end-user 
 
# Access to a variety of different data products - ie. not 
relying on only on a single type of data or a single provider of 
data products 
35 May 1, 2014 11:52 PM Credibility and availability 
36 May 1, 2014 11:33 PM 
From a frontline perspective: Timeliness, currency, accuracy 
and portability. And from a departmental perspective: cost 
37 May 1, 2014 7:59 PM 
Accuracy, timeliness, accessible remotely ie on tablets etc, 
$$$$ 
38 May 1, 2014 11:47 AM Timeliness and accuracy 
39 May 1, 2014 4:24 AM 
Features include data that meets user needs both in terms of 
content and presentation, is accurate, timely, consistent and 
reliable. 
40 May 1, 2014 2:51 AM Accurate, timely and reliable 
41 Apr 30, 2014 12:18 PM Accurate, readily available and easy to use 
42 Apr 30, 2014 10:39 AM timeliness 
43 Apr 30, 2014 6:26 AM Accuracy and timeliness. 
44 Apr 30, 2014 6:20 AM Cost, ease of use, accessibility, standards 
45 Apr 30, 2014 6:17 AM accurate, current and readable 
46 Apr 30, 2014 5:26 AM timely, reliability,interpretation,relevance 
47 Apr 30, 2014 5:08 AM 
Accurate, applicable within an operational context, reliable 
and evidence based./  Validated in peace time. 
48 Apr 30, 2014 4:59 AM 
Data must have specific relevance to the end user need, not be 
adapted to suit a vatiety of needs.  Should not be used as 
answer to everything. 
49 Apr 30, 2014 4:49 AM 
For any band, there is a balance needed between resolution, 
repeat time and processing time. The purpose of accessing the 
sensor data also needs to be clear. Labour intensive beginning 
and end of shift maps are one thing, but how the event unfolds 
during the shift can be more important. Knowing what to look 
for - lenticularis clouds in an MTSAT image, an anomalous 
plume base in a radar image - can provide real wisdom the 
user knows (a) what should be situation at that time and (b) 
what a deviation from that expectation might look like.  
 
Thus real value of sensor data is in confirming (or not) that the 
"script" being followed. If it is, the intell is simply "as we 
predicted", if it isn't then the data in the image gives the first 
clues as to what the anomaly is. 
50 Apr 30, 2014 4:37 AM quick easy understanable and relevant 
51 Apr 30, 2014 4:34 AM Familiarity and interoperability 
52 Apr 30, 2014 4:28 AM Its relevance to the decision 
53 Apr 30, 2014 3:55 AM Timely, relevant, accurate, local 
54 Apr 30, 2014 3:47 AM Reliability of data, cost vs effectiveness 
55 Apr 30, 2014 3:22 AM Timeliness and reliability 
56 Apr 30, 2014 3:06 AM Timely, accurate and legal 
57 Apr 30, 2014 3:00 AM Timely credible integrated and useful 
58 Apr 30, 2014 2:50 AM 
Consistent availability.  
Significance factor: I don't need the data from 20 river sensors 
if only one of them reaching a certain threshold is indicative 
of potential flooding.  
Associated interpretation: eg - if a river gauge show a height 
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increase of 1m - what does this mean in terms of potential 
impact. 
59 Apr 30, 2014 2:46 AM 
reliability – emergency management decisions have to be 
based on authoritative information. There isn’t sufficient 
emergency resource and the stakes can be very high to gamble 
60 Apr 30, 2014 2:44 AM accurate & reliable trusted source 
61 Apr 30, 2014 2:37 AM 
Accuracy, accessibility, timeliness, ease of interpretation, 
frequency of supply. 
62 Apr 30, 2014 2:29 AM Timeliness 
63 Apr 30, 2014 2:22 AM 
If the data is valid and current then it becomes a mandatory 
component of all the other information gathered to identify the 
risks that will be placed in context for the decision making 
process. 
64 Apr 30, 2014 2:21 AM relevance, accuracy, timeliness and reliability 
65 Apr 30, 2014 2:17 AM 
Must be reliable and easliy used/interpreted to assist with 
decision making 
66 Apr 30, 2014 2:17 AM Accuracy and reliability 
67 Apr 30, 2014 2:08 AM Availability 
68 Apr 30, 2014 2:08 AM 
1) Fit for purpose. 
2) Timely 
3) Accurate, or provided with confidence statements 
3)fit for purpose. 
 
As an example from personal experience, a  map produced by 
professional cartographer and available 6 hrs after the data is 
received is no use to a fire crew, (though it will be of great 
value to the subsequent Royal Commission) whereas a sketch 
map traced onto a photocopied sheet available 5 minutes after 
the helicopter lands is much more use in dealing with the 
incident. 
69 Apr 30, 2014 2:00 AM 
Accuracy 
Timeliness 
Precison 
70 Apr 30, 2014 1:49 AM Well understood 
71 Apr 30, 2014 1:44 AM Accuracy, Timeliness, Operability, Relative to my task. 
72 Apr 30, 2014 1:43 AM Reliability, timeliness and accuracy 
73 Apr 30, 2014 1:42 AM Maeningful, useful, valid, reliable and timely 
74 Apr 30, 2014 1:37 AM Robustness I'd the data process underpinning. 
75 Apr 30, 2014 1:37 AM 
timely 
accurate 
relivant 
usable 
individually verifiable 
76 Apr 30, 2014 1:31 AM Accuracy, timeliness, interface, 
77 Apr 29, 2014 5:38 PM 
Accuracy, micro level eh suburb or village level,  user friendly 
for volunteers. 
78 Apr 29, 2014 12:40 PM Current, acurate, and ability to interigate (drill down) 
79 Apr 29, 2014 11:37 AM Accuracy, reproducability, speed and ease of access 
80 Apr 29, 2014 10:17 AM reliability 
81 Apr 29, 2014 8:33 AM timeliness, reliability, familiarity 
82 Apr 29, 2014 8:10 AM Speed, reliability, accuracy 
83 Apr 29, 2014 8:08 AM authenticity and reliability 
84 Apr 29, 2014 7:56 AM 
Reliability, timeliness, cost benefit, ease of use and 
interoperability 
85 Apr 29, 2014 6:40 AM 
Trust in the source, the data is able to be replicated 
consistently and be a legal source of data. 
86 Apr 29, 2014 6:31 AM 
Given that most emergency situations are time critical, 
timeliness and reliability are the most critical aspects of sensor 
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data products. Near-real time intelligence is crucial in order 
for effective response actions to be applied. 
87 Apr 29, 2014 5:31 AM accuracy and timeliness 
88 Apr 29, 2014 2:12 AM timeliness, accessibility and ease of use 
89 Apr 29, 2014 1:18 AM 
Accuracy, timeliness, limited number of access restrictions, 
'open' licensing, familiar format. 
90 Apr 28, 2014 11:29 PM Quality, credibility, consistency and timeliness 
91 Apr 28, 2014 11:25 PM 
Timliness, accuracy, reliability, functionality, 
tailored/simplicity 
92 Apr 28, 2014 10:46 PM 
Data must be reliable, instill trust in the user that the 
information can be shared with a confident amount of 
accuracy and that it is part of the decision making process. 
93 Apr 28, 2014 10:07 PM 
Reliability, timliness and fit for purpose. This is all about trust 
in what the data is telling us, this includes trust in down 
stream processes that transform the raw input into "actionable 
intelligence". 
94 Apr 28, 2014 9:27 PM timely, accurate accessable from remote locations 
95 Apr 28, 2014 9:02 PM Reliability, accuracy, timeliness 
96 Apr 28, 2014 10:32 AM 
Ease of consumption, and integration with existing systems, 
eg, emap 
97 Apr 28, 2014 9:27 AM Availability, reliability, accuracy. 
98 Apr 28, 2014 8:09 AM Timeliness, consistency, suitability 
99 Apr 28, 2014 8:04 AM consistent, timely quality 
100 Apr 28, 2014 7:27 AM Accuracy. Timeliness. 
101 Apr 28, 2014 7:13 AM Accuracy, cost, open access, reputation 
102 Apr 28, 2014 6:26 AM Timeliness, accuracy, effectiveness. 
103 Apr 28, 2014 5:57 AM Timeliness and no restrictions on use. 
104 Apr 28, 2014 5:54 AM 
Timeliness, accuracy, ability to be manipulated into 
operational maps etc 
105 Apr 28, 2014 5:46 AM reliable and accurate 
106 Apr 28, 2014 5:08 AM acuurate 
107 Apr 28, 2014 5:05 AM Accuracy. 
108 Apr 28, 2014 5:05 AM 
Authentic, reliable, secure, free, simple to use, access to 
private information in EM PPRR. 
109 Apr 28, 2014 4:55 AM consistency and reliability 
110 Apr 28, 2014 4:48 AM time relvant 
111 Apr 28, 2014 4:37 AM accuracy and efficiency 
112 Apr 28, 2014 3:51 AM 
Timeliness, accuracy, ability to reuse, redistribute, ability to 
share with stakeholders 
113 Apr 28, 2014 3:49 AM 
No secrets, we need to know everything about it including 
what sensor is, its temporal and spatial information associated. 
This has been the case often with the use of Military classified 
systems; we must have our own people in the details, again no 
secrets. It’s also now the case that the public demand how we 
source our data and media will investigate and interrogate us 
re the source (see MH370), not disclosing is a big public 
concern that we must resects and understand. 
114 Apr 28, 2014 3:42 AM Cost and availability 
115 Apr 28, 2014 3:35 AM Reliable, accurate and timely. 
116 Apr 28, 2014 3:31 AM ease of use, access and accuracy 
117 Apr 28, 2014 3:29 AM Accuracy and currency 
118 Apr 28, 2014 3:20 AM 
Consistancey in application, assumptions on predictive 
modeling, intergration with cuttently available data 
119 Apr 28, 2014 3:19 AM Trust the source 
120 Apr 28, 2014 3:06 AM 
Ease of access, regularly updated, preferably supported by 
organisation 
121 Apr 28, 2014 3:05 AM Availability, reliability and timeliness 
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122 Apr 28, 2014 3:04 AM Reliability and accuracey 
123 Apr 28, 2014 2:31 AM 
Accuracy, Timeliness, reliability, cross state, Dept., agency, 
NGO support and function common use 
124 Apr 8, 2014 3:29 AM Timeliness 
 
Do you have any additional comments on this survey? 
Answer Options Response Count 
  32 
answered question 32 
skipped question 198 
Number Response Date Response Text 
1 
May 29, 2014 
4:47 AM No 
2 
May 14, 2014 
1:03 AM 
I think some specialist questions may have been useful... drawing the 
differences between emergency sectors; a flood is different, to a 
torrential downpour, is different to a fire, is different to an explosion, is 
different to a road crash, is different to a sunken aircraft. 
3 
May 6, 2014 
6:00 AM 
There needs to be a "Sensor Coordinator" built into the Australian 
disaster management arrangements. i.e The District Disaster 
Management Groups should have clear access to "capability" of assets. 
E.G - There is no use having all the best satellites in the world when our 
disaster management system relies on the locals doing the ground work 
and not having or knowing about such information or assets being 
available. It's kind of like developing an evacuation route map and 
forgetting to educate the locals on what it is, where its found and how to 
use it. 
4 
May 6, 2014 
12:58 AM 
National standardization is important.  Training needs to be easy to 
access, consistent between agencies and across state borders. 
5 
May 5, 2014 
3:53 AM 
Im not in the field however have answered based on if i was to utilise the 
information for my curretn role. 
6 
May 5, 2014 
12:30 AM 
Sensor data is useful but must not substitute for Management by walking 
/ driving / flying around to see field situations for oneself prior to or post 
emergency.  This way we get few surprises, only confirmations!  PNB. 
7 
May 2, 2014 
10:30 PM Good luck 
8 
May 1, 2014 
11:33 PM 
Yes. I wish our supposedly World Class fire service actually had any of 
these things so that frontline fire officers have all the relevant info when 
making decisions on the fire ground. 
9 
Apr 30, 2014 
4:49 AM 
This survey seems to be predicated on the notion the EM users take 
feeds of data from providers in some formal relationship. This is less 
relevant than it was even five years ago. For most products there are up 
to three possible feeds. Satellite data is widely available, from far more 
platforms than are known to most users (AQUA, TERRA, OMI, 
ASTER, LANDSAT, CloudSat, NOAA, GOES, HIMAWARI (8!) etc, 
etc), while most users don't know about the really valuable bands. 
(Knowing lead researchers gives you access to expedited data 
sometimes!) 
 
The scientific difference between the 2003 ACT fires and Black 
Saturday is that the latter had almost no sensors pointed at it. Yes 
commercial arrangements are essential for things like airborne 
multipsectral sensors, but flexibility is also essential elsewhere. 
 
Having spent years in this sandpit, feel free to contact me: 
**** 
10 
Apr 30, 2014 
4:37 AM nope 
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11 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:50 AM Lot of fire related questions! 
12 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:46 AM 
do we get to see the results? even displayed on this survey sight would 
be interesting 
13 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:37 AM No 
14 
Apr 30, 2014 
2:08 AM 
1) My primary involvement is/was fire management and suppression, 
hence the limited interest in seismograms and stream gauges. 
 
2) Mnay of the questions seemed to me to require answers that would 
vary with context.  So for example I would use a product of a lower 
resolution or precision from a producer known to be consistent.  A 
producer with erratic quality control, so right on the button sometimes 
and wildy wrong at other times is of no use to anyone. 
15 
Apr 29, 2014 
12:40 PM 
Most thought provoking survey. 
Congratulations 
16 
Apr 29, 2014 
8:10 AM Happy to answer additional questions ********** 
17 
Apr 29, 2014 
8:08 AM no 
18 
Apr 28, 2014 
11:29 PM No 
19 
Apr 28, 2014 
11:25 PM No 
20 
Apr 28, 2014 
10:07 PM 
In my day job I am an Intelligence Analyst for a federal agency - I see 
sensor data in the EM space as no different to SIGINT etc in the Law 
Enforcement space - you need reliable, trusted data sources, usable 
interfaces to make sense of what the sensors are telling us, and trained 
and capable staff (e.g. Intelligence Analysts) to determine the "so what" 
and provide this in a usable fashion to the decision makers. Simple 
really:).   (A good survey by the way!) 
21 
Apr 28, 2014 
9:27 AM Thanks! 
22 
Apr 28, 2014 
8:09 AM 
Bit difficult to keep some of the variables independent as some are co-
dependent 
23 
Apr 28, 2014 
7:13 AM Done! 
24 
Apr 28, 2014 
6:26 AM 
What would happen if the Bureau of Meteorology was privatised? Will it 
become more or less efficient and effective in provision and/or 
timeliness of fire weather forecasts. 
25 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:57 AM 
This survey should have somehow incorporated the disaster charter and 
the effects it has on cost, restrictions and timeliness. 
26 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:05 AM 
My coincerns with univerisity drerived data relates to timeliness of 
delivery of information. 
27 
Apr 28, 2014 
5:05 AM 
Pre identified or benchmark of sensor data products for EM use to keep 
all the stakeholders on the same page facilitated at the Regional level to 
enhance continuity and redundancy for the state. 
28 
Apr 28, 2014 
4:55 AM No 
29 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:51 AM 
Australia needs a generic data suite, that is all hazards, that can be used 
across jurisdictions by agencies to provide a source of consistent data 
30 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:35 AM No. 
31 
Apr 28, 2014 
3:06 AM 
In the last few years online information and the ability to send and 
receive that information has been critical in decision making and I think 
we are only just understanding it, the future is enormous especially with 
drones etc for real time information 
32 
Apr 21, 2014 
12:59 AM Takes longer than 10 minutes. 
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Appendix H: Web survey results: Question 17-19 factors affecting uptake 
Table 61: Results from question 17-19, values greater or less than 0.5 from the mean have been highlighted in bold. 
 Summary Experience Location 
 Count Mean SD 
< 5 
yrs 
5-10 
yrs 
> 10 
yrs ACT NSW NT QLD SA TAS VIC WA 
Accuracy 178 6.6 0.7 6.7 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.6 6.2 6.9 6.5 6.9 6.7 6.3 
Timeliness  177 6.5 0.7 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.8 6.6 6.2 6.8 6.3 6.6 6.4 6.6 
Reliability 176 6.5 0.8 6.6 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.9 6.4 6.5 6.3 6.5 
Simplicity 176 6.1 1.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.3 
Completeness 175 5.7 1.0 5.3 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.8 
Useability 177 5.5 1.3 4.7 5.7 5.6 6.1 5.5 5.2 5.4 5.5 4.8 5.6 6.2 
Consistency  176 6.1 1.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.2 
Provenance 159 5.0 1.6 4.5 5.2 5.1 5.6 5.0 5.6 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.0 5.4 
Standards & specifications  173 5.5 1.5 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.1 5.7 5.7 5.3 5.8 5.7 5.2 5.2 
Documentation  174 5.1 1.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.7 4.6 5.1 5.1 4.7 5.1 
Interoperability  176 5.9 1.4 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.5 6.3 6.2 5.4 6.2 5.9 5.6 5.7 
Mandate 171 5.6 1.4 5.8 5.6 5.6 4.9 6.0 5.3 6.2 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.8 
Reputation  175 6.1 1.1 5.9 6.0 6.1 5.8 6.3 5.8 6.0 5.9 6.2 6.0 5.8 
Provider familiarity 173 5.6 1.3 5.4 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.1 5.7 4.9 
Product popularity 174 4.2 1.6 4.2 4.5 4.1 3.7 4.4 4.0 4.5 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.2 
Business model 159 4.8 1.6 4.2 5.1 4.9 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.7 5.0 
Sovereignty 167 4.3 2.0 4.4 4.4 4.3 3.2 4.8 5.3 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.5 4.6 
Access security  172 5.1 1.7 4.8 5.1 5.1 3.9 5.6 5.7 5.1 5.0 4.5 5.0 5.4 
Network security 170 5.0 1.7 4.8 4.6 5.1 4.1 5.4 5.8 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.6 5.0 
Dual-use 162 3.9 1.9 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.4 4.1 5.4 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 
Cost 175 5.3 1.7 5.7 5.3 5.2 4.8 5.3 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.7 5.0 5.9 
Access to raw data  167 5.1 1.6 4.7 4.8 5.1 4.9 5.1 5.2 4.8 5.4 4.5 5.4 5.3 
Publicly disclose the source  167 4.6 1.8 4.8 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.9 4.6 4.4 
Publicly release the raw data 170 4.2 1.8 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.2 3.9 3.5 4.3 4.5 
Copyright 166 4.8 1.8 4.4 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.3 4.6 4.6 5.0 3.4 5.0 4.7 
Responsibilities and liabilities 164 5.1 1.5 5.3 4.7 5.2 5.8 5.6 5.0 5.0 5.1 4.1 5.0 5.2 
Average 171 5.3 1.4 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.4 
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 Summary Organisation type Age Role in supply chain 
 Count Mean SD 
Fed 
Govt 
State 
Govt 
Local 
Govt Research  Private NGO 
Under 
35 
35-
49 
50-
64 Provider 
Value 
adder User 
Accuracy 178 6.6 0.7 6.4 6.6 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.3 6.4 6.7 
Timeliness  177 6.5 0.7 6.6 6.5 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.5 
Reliability 176 6.5 0.8 6.3 6.5 6.8 6.7 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.5 
Simplicity 176 6.1 1.0 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.7 6.3 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.8 6.1 
Completeness 175 5.7 1.0 5.3 5.7 5.9 6.3 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.3 5.8 
Useability 177 5.5 1.3 5.6 5.5 5.1 5.3 6.4 5.9 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.1 5.5 
Consistency  176 6.1 1.0 5.9 6.1 6.4 6.0 6.6 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.8 6.1 
Provenance 159 5.0 1.6 5.2 4.9 4.4 6.7 5.0 5.5 5.1 4.9 5.1 4.7 5.1 4.9 
Standards & specifications  173 5.5 1.5 4.8 5.6 5.4 6.7 5.6 5.3 5.8 5.4 5.5 4.6 4.8 5.6 
Documentation  174 5.1 1.4 4.9 5.2 4.5 6.5 5.0 4.5 5.0 4.9 5.1 4.7 4.6 5.1 
Interoperability  176 5.9 1.4 5.7 5.9 6.3 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.4 5.5 6.0 
Mandate 171 5.6 1.4 5.5 5.7 6.3 6.3 5.7 4.8 5.9 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.9 5.6 
Reputation  175 6.1 1.1 6.1 6.1 5.6 6.7 5.9 5.8 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.7 5.9 6.1 
Provider familiarity 173 5.6 1.3 5.2 5.6 5.4 6.7 5.7 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.6 5.9 5.6 
Product popularity 174 4.2 1.6 4.0 4.3 3.5 5.3 4.3 3.9 5.0 4.3 4.0 5.1 4.0 4.1 
Business model 159 4.8 1.6 4.7 4.9 4.5 5.5 5.6 4.0 5.2 4.5 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.8 
Sovereignty 167 4.3 2.0 4.1 4.5 3.4 4.0 5.1 3.8 5.3 4.0 4.4 4.0 4.0 4.4 
Access security  172 5.1 1.7 5.2 5.2 3.9 5.3 5.6 4.6 5.6 4.9 5.2 5.4 4.4 5.2 
Network security 170 5.0 1.7 4.8 5.1 4.6 5.3 5.3 4.3 5.2 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.2 5.1 
Dual-use 162 3.9 1.9 3.9 4.0 2.5 5.0 4.7 2.9 4.4 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.0 4.0 
Cost 175 5.3 1.7 4.7 5.4 5.0 5.3 6.1 5.1 6.0 5.2 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.2 
Access to raw data  167 5.1 1.6 5.0 5.1 3.6 4.3 5.6 5.6 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.4 4.9 
Publicly disclose the source  167 4.6 1.8 4.7 4.5 4.4 6.3 5.0 4.6 4.9 4.4 4.5 5.0 4.9 4.4 
Publicly release the raw data 170 4.2 1.8 4.4 4.3 3.6 4.0 4.7 3.4 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.9 4.0 4.2 
Copyright 166 4.8 1.8 5.1 4.9 5.0 3.3 4.6 4.4 5.1 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.8 4.8 
Responsibilities and liabilities 164 5.1 1.5 5.5 5.1 5.6 5.5 5.1 4.6 5.6 5.0 5.1 5.9 5.3 5.0 
Average 171 5.3 1.4 5.2 5.4 5.1 5.7 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.3 
 
